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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This case study of leadership in crisisat Meadow View
Community College (fictitious name)was undertaken to add to
the practical and theoretical knowledge and understandingof
presidential leadership issues that actuallyoccur in
American community colleges.The investigation was a
single, descriptive, in-depth case study ofa community
college that experienced a crisis in leadership.The
president and members of his administration at thecollege
under study had received from campus constituentsthree
votes of "no confidence" in approximately twoyears.
In the United States there are approximately 1,500
public and private two-year colleges which comprisenearly
40 percent of our higher education institutions (American
Association of Community Colleges, 1994).Of the
approximately 12 million people enrolled in undergraduate
higher education, over 43 percent attend communitycolleges
(American Association of Community Colleges, 1994).
Community colleges nationwide servea similar purpose.
They provide a diverse cross-section of studentsa quality
liberal arts and sciences education and/or specialized
professional/technical training opportunities ata
reasonable cost.Community colleges offer a variety of2
certificate and associate degreeprograms along with
personal enrichment courses and developmentalinstruction to
help ensure student success.Many community college
students graduate from their certificateor associate degree
programs while others transfer credit to four-yearcolleges
and universities.Community colleges also work in
partnerships with local high schools andbusinesses to
provide specialized job training and/orretraining
opportunities to develop a quality workforceand promote
economic development.Thus, the community college
enterprise plays a significant role inAmerican society and
in our system of higher education(Adelman, 1992).However,
like any organization, community collegesare not immune to
crises in leadership.
This case study report ofa crisis in leadership at
Meadow View Community College contains sixchapters.It
follows accepted naturalistic qualitativecase study
reporting methods and guidelines (Erlandson,Harris,
Skipper, and Allen, 1993; Goetz and LeCompte,1984; Lincoln
& Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994;
Silverman, 1993; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Wolcott,1990; Yin,
1994.) Chapter one comprises a brief discussionon
background information of the problem,statement of the
problem, significance of the study, approach ofthe study,
limitations of the research, and explicationof researcher
biases and assumptions.3
Chapter two contains a review of selectedliterature
intended to help the researcher and the readerview the case
study from alternative theoretical perspectives.Seven
theoretical approaches and perspectiveson leadership are
reviewed including trait, behavioral, power/influence,
contingency or situational, transactional and
transformational, cultural and symbolic, andpost-
industrial.Specific topics of leadership in higher
education, the president's constituencies,leadership
effectiveness, derailment, success and failurein the
college presidency, and moral and ethical dimensionsof
college leadership are also presented.
Chapter three reviews the relevant methodological
literature and presents and discusses thenaturalistic
inquiry paradigm.Chapter topics include (a) validity,
reliability, and generalization,(b) characteristics of
naturalistic research,(c) qualitative methods in data
collection and analysis, and (d) thecase study approach to
conducting and reporting research.
Chapter four outlines and discusses theresearcher's
use of naturalistic inquiry and qualitative methods inthis
case study.Discussion includes the natural research
setting, human as instrument, purposive sampling,emergent
design, grounded theory, and phases andprocesses of
inductive data analyses.Facts and details about
observations, documents, interviews and respondentsare4
included.A brief discussion of confidentialityand
anonymity concludes the chapter.
Chapter five is a descriptive accountof the leadership
crisis at Meadow View Community College.It describes
situational circumstances and catalyticevents surrounding
the votes of no confidence.
Chapter six summarizes the results of theresearch
questions and includes tentative conclusions ofthe study.
Constituent perceptions of the leadership crisis,what they
learned from their experiences, and how theleadership
crisis may have been avoidedare presented and discussed.
Implications of the study for communitycollege leaders and
ideas for future research are also discussed.An epilogue
concludes the report.
Background of the Problem
There is an acknowledged "leadership crisis"in
American institutions of higher education(Bensimon,
Neumann, & Birnbaum, 1989; Fisher & Tack, 1990;Fisher,
Tack,& Wheeler, 1988; Razik & Swanson, 1995;Roueche,
Baker,& Rose, 1988).Bennis and Nanus (1985) wrote that
the chronic "crisis of leadership" in America'sinstitutions
is the pervasive inability of organizationalleaders to cope
with the needs and expectations of theirconstituents.
Burns (1978) wrote, "the crisis of leadership todayis the5
mediocrity or irresponsibility ofso many of the men and
women in power" (p.1).
According to studies by Fisher and Tack(1990) and
Fisher and others (1988), effectiveleadership in American
colleges and universities has reachedcrisis proportions in
recent years.The authors reported that in 1985,15% of the
2800 presidents they studiedwere considered by their peers
and selected experts to be effective.In contrast, a later
study (Fisher & Tack, 1990) reported thatonly three percent
of a representative sample of presidentsfrom four-year and
two-year public and private institutionswere identified as
effective leaders.The crisis in leadership has spawneda
"crisis of confidence" in higher education.Roueche, Baker
and Rose (1988) suggested "this crisisof leadership is
critical in the community college" (p. 49).
American community college presidentsare being
challenged by increasingly chaotic internaland external
environments (Baker, 1992a, 1992b).The report of the
American Association of Community and JuniorColleges
Commission (1988)on the future of communitycolleges
recognized the more complicated and riskynature of today's
community college presidency.College presidents today face
a number of pressing problems:declining enrollment of
traditional-aged students, reductions infederal and state
funding, problems with access, reduced publicsupport,
unionization and faculty activism, and democratized6
governing boards (Fisher & Tack, 1990).These conditions
prompted some observers to question whetherthe college
presidency was becoming tougher and lessattractive,
suggesting that perhaps college presidentsmay prefer to
bail out of their jobs sooner than theywould otherwise.
In a study spurred by a wave of resignationsof
prominent chief executive officers fromDuke, Columbia,
Yale, and other universities, Mooney (1992)investigated
presidential tenure and reported thatpresidential tenures
had not varied significantly for the previouseight years.
On average, the length of presidentialtenures continues to
be around seven years.The study was conducted for the
Association of Governing Boards of Collegesand Universities
and it compared the turnover rate for academicyears 1984-85
to 1991-92 in college presidencies nation-widefrom about
3,400 degree-granting institutions includingpublic and
private two-year colleges.While the results of thestudy
may have shown consistency across broad categories of
institutions, it did not reflect trends withinhighly
specialized groups of institutions, suchas community
colleges.The study also did not show whetheror not those
groups tended to change CEOs more frequently thanothers.
In The Community College Presidency:Current Status and
Future Outlook, Vaughan, Mellander, and Blois(1994)
surveyed 337 public community college presidentsand
reported that, all things considered, the presidencyis a7
relatively stable position, witha reported average tenure
of 7.3 years for presidents in theircurrent positions.The
authors noted, however, that approximately half the
respondents expected not to be in theircurrent positions
within five years from the time of the study,"respondents
felt greater satisfaction with their chosenprofession than
with the particular circumstances in which theycurrently
found themselves" (Vaughan et al., 1994, p.48).
Understanding presidential leadership issuesin higher
education, especially their contexts and circumstances,is
important for extending the knowledge baseof the field as
well as for understanding and improvingpractice (Birnbaum,
1989, 1992a, 1992b; Merriam, 1988).Although many studies
have provided aggregated informationon the college
presidency in terms of longevity and tenure,relatively few
studies have revealed details of particularleadership
contexts.That is, what specific types of eventsand
circumstances characterized successfulor unsuccessful
college leadership contexts, how did presidentsview their
jobs, how did constituents view their leaders,and what were
the reasons for any leadership crises and/orearly
departures of presidents from their colleges?
In an article in The Chronicle of HigherEducation,
Cage (1995) reported that one nationally recognized
community college president, Dr. Robert McCabe,president of
Miami-Dade Community College, chose to "call itquits"8
(i.e., retire) sooner than he expected.Dr. McCabe stated
that the reason for his retirementwas increased tension
caused by dealing with a "difficult board oftrustees."
Understanding leadership contexts and thereasons that
community college presidents leave office hasimplications
for understanding not only community collegeleadership, but
also for understanding what can sometimesgo wrong while one
is president.Studies of situations where thingsgo wrong
are "curiously understudied" given the frequency with which
they occur (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994,p. 498).
This case study was conducted ina western state that
saw in a period of two to three years nearly one-third of
its community colleges embroiled in conflict,controversy
and upheaval as a result of leadership crises.Presidents
received votes of "no confidence" from their facultyand
staff, were fired outright by their Boards,or were
otherwise pressured into leaving their positions.This high
incidence of community college leadership crises prompted
this researcher to move beyond a general curiosityof what
was happening in one state to a systematic, focused, in-
depth case study of one of the community colleges in that
state that had experienced a crisis in leadership.
Although much research exists in thearea of
educational leadership focusing on leadership
characteristics, qualities, practices, and habits of
effective leaders in organizations, there has been little9
practical research into real-life situations investigating
leadership issues and crises as they actuallyoccur in
educational organizations.Educational institutionsare
dynamic and changing environments and what might havebeen
effective leadership several years agomay or may not be
appropriate today.Experienced practitioners understand
that usefulness and appropriateness ofany prescriptions for
practice must be judged in relationship to thespecific
circumstances of practice in their own setting, thus,"the
interest in learning by positive and negativeexample from a
case study presupposes that the case may, in someway, be
comparable to one's own situation" (Erickson, 1986,p. 153,
italics added).
Therefore, this single, descriptive in-depthcase study
is offered as a response to the need formore naturalistic
research into educational leadership crises (Birnbaum,
1992a; Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).
Statement of the Problem
This case study focused upon the problem of whatcan be
learned from an investigation of one community college
enduring a crisis in leadership.Research questions guiding
the study included:(a) what does the research literature
have to say about leadership and leadership in crisis;(b)
how did the crisis in leadership occur at Meadow View
Community College (fictitious name) and whatwere the10
situational preconditions and catalyticevents surrounding
the crisis;(c) what were the perceptions of theleadership
crisis as viewed by the Board of Trustees,administrators,
faculty, staff, student leadership andthe college
President;(d) what did Meadow View CommunityCollege
constituents learn from the leadership crisisexperience;
and (e) what can this case study of leadershipin crisis
contribute to the body of knowledge in communitycollege
leadership?
Significance of the Study
The significance of this research studywas its
investigation of a critical occurrence ofa contemporary
leadership phenomenon in a real-lifecontext with
implications for improving practice ineducational
leadership (Birnbaum, 1992a; Erlandsonet al., 1993; Lincoln
& Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Yin, 1994).
The Approach of the Study
This study focused on theoccurrence of a crisis in
leadership at a particular community college.The intent of
the study was to provide an in-depth descriptionof how the
crisis occurred, how it might have been avoided,and what
was leaned.A naturalistic qualitative singlecase
description was chosen because open-ended,holistic, and11
inductive characteristics of this approach matchedthe
objectives of the study.The study was "hypothesis-
generating" not "hypothesis-testing" (see Chapter3).The
qualitative research approach utilized purposivesampling,
emergent design, multiple sources of data (observations,
interviews, documents and records), anda rich, "thick"
description of respondent's constructions of theleadership
crisis context.Findings were used to generatesome
tentative conclusions about how the crisismay have been
avoided.No generalizations were made beyond thisspecific
case study.
Limitations
Although the naturalistic research paradigm and
qualitative approach were well-suited to the study,certain
limitations existed.First, case study research itselfhas
inherent biases.It is "one of the few modes of scientific
study that admit the subjective perception and biasesof
both participants and researcher into the researchframe"
(Goetz & LeCompte, 1984, p. 95).Second, statistical
generalization of case study findings to other community
colleges and educational settings is not possible.Data for
the study was purposively, rather than randomlyselected and
therefore the study and the results were context-specific
and not generalizable.A third limitation was potential
bias in the researcher-as-instrument approach to data12
collection.Throughout the study measureswere taken to
reduce researcher-introduced biases; however, the
possibility of its presence in unknownareas remained.
Researcher Biases and Assumptions
The researcher recognized certain biases (or
preferences) which were present at the time thestudy was
conducted.The researcher was partial to the following
assumptions and views:
Profound conflicts of interests, values, feelings,
and actions tend to pervade social and organizational
life.
When people interact they affect eachother.Because
of this complex interaction, people havedifferent
experiences and don't alwayssee the same things in
the same ways--they have unique perspectives.
Perspective connotes a view witha particular focus
or vantage point.Any one focus of observation
provides only a partial view.A more complete
picture is an image created from multiple
perspectives.
Knowing the perspectives of others extendsmeaning
and enhances understanding.
Many elements are implicated inany given action and
each element interacts with others inways that
mutually shape them all.13
There is a danger in reacting too heavily to "the
brightest light" or "the loudest noise."However,
the dangers of overlooking or not listeningto all
relevant constituent concerns are greater.
Consumers of information in this report will beable
to derive naturalistic generalizations aboutthe case
study that will become useful extensions of their
personal and professional understandings.14
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LEADERSHIP LITERATURE
Overview
The literature selected for review in thisstudy
belonged to the general body of literatureon leadership in
higher education.Special attention was given to those
works that were found particularly relevantto this case
study and influential in illuminating the theoryand
practice of community college leadership.
Leadership is "one of the most observed andleast
understood phenomena on earth" (Burns, 1978,p. 2).There
are almost as many different definitions of leadershipas
there are researchers or theorists who have attemptedto
define the concept (Bass, 1981).Researchers representing
separate disciplines of inquiry have looked at leadership
problems in different ways and have asked theory-specific
questions about the nature of leadership.Bass (1990) cited
over 7,500 studies on leadership, but only a small subset of
that literature focused on higher education.
Because no objective criteria exist for assessing the
presence, absence, or degree of leadership, leadership is to
a great extent in the eye of the beholder (Bensimon,
Neumann, et al., 1989).Wills (1994) suggested that
leadership is what its constituentssay it is.Leadership
in organizations seems to exist to the extentthat15
organizational participants believe it does.That belief
depends in part on how participants, through their
interactions, construct realities of organizationallife and
define leadership roles.Roueche et al.(1988) developed a
definition of leadership specifically related to the
community college setting: "Leadership is the abilityto
influence, shape, and embed values, attitudes, beliefsand
behaviors consistent with the increased commitmentto the
unique mission of the community college" (p. 34).
Gardner (1990) pointed out that "leaders act ina
stream of history...as they labor to bring abouta result,
multiple forces beyond their control,even beyond their
knowledge, are moving to hasten or hinder the result"(p.8).
Similarly, Razik and Swanson (1995) wrote, "anexamination
of leadership reflects one conclusion--leadershipis not
definitive but elusive and constantly changing,reflecting
an ever-changing society and world" (p. 40).Therefore,
researchers' efforts to understand the elusivenature of
leadership have reflected a number of theoretical
perspectives and approaches.
Leadership Research and Theories
Leadership research and theories can be grouped into
six major categories which are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.The categories include:(a)trait studies which
attempt to identify a leader's personality traits and16
intelligence and their relationshipsto specific skills;(b)
behavioral studies which examine whatleaders do, and the
types and patterns of activities observed;(c)
power/influence theories which investigatesources and
amounts of power available to leadersand how that power is
used;(d) contingency or situational theorieswhich
emphasize the importance of situationalfactors in the
internal and external environmentsand their influence on
leadership;(e)transactional/transformational theories
which focus on mutual relationships betweenleaders and
followers, and (f)cultural and symbolic theorieswhich
focus on the creation, maintenance, change,interpretation
and reinterpretation of events in leadershipcontexts.Also
included in this review, but which didnot fit into the
foregoing categories, is an alternativetheoretical
perspective on leadership needs for thetwenty-first
century.
Trait Approach
The trait approach emphasizes the personalattributes
of leaders.Early leadership theorieswere concerned almost
entirely with theoretical issues focusingon the qualities
of the leader (Bass, 1981).These studies were basedon the
assumption that individuals possessed certainphysical
characteristics, personality traits, and intellectual
abilities that made them natural leaders (Razik& Swanson,17
1995).Trait theories attributed leadersuccess to
possession of extraordinary abilities suchas tireless
energy, penetrating intuition, uncanny foresight, and
irresistible persuasive powers (Yukl, 1989).
Much of the recent trait research has beenon
personality traits and specific skills and their
relationships to role requirements and levels of
effectiveness or success (Bentz, 1990; Hogan et al., 1994;
Lombardo, Ruderman, & McCauley, 1988).One of the key
principles coming out of the trait approach is the idea of
balance, that is, tempering one trait with another.For
example, "tempering a high need for power with emotional
maturity required to ensure that subordinatesare empowered
rather than dominated" (Yukl, 1989, p. 271),or balancing a
desire for change against the need for continuity. The trait
approach focuses on the individual, but what the individual
leader or manager actually does on the job is the focus of
the behavioral research approach.
Behavioral Approach
Early research in the behavioral approach focusedon
activity patterns and how managers spent their time.In
recent years, however, studies have examined the roles,
functions, and practices of leaders in order to identifythe
behaviors and skills that might be taught to potential
leaders (Yukl, 1989).Other kinds of behavior research have18
sought to identify differences in behavior patterns between
effective and ineffective leaders (see Birnbaum 1992a,
1992b).
Eleven categories of behaviors were identified byYukl,
Wall, and Lepsinger (1990) as generic to most taxonomiesof
leadership:informing, consulting and delegating, planning
and organizing, problem solving, clarifying roles and
objectives, monitoring operations and environment,
motivating, recognizing and rewarding, supporting and
mentoring, networking, and managing conflict and team
building.All eleven were considered relevant to leadership
effectiveness, but the authors noted that the relative
importance and use of the behaviors will differ by
individual, organizational level and across leadership
situations.
Likert (1961) developed a continuum of leadership
styles which is still referred to today because it provided
a systematic understanding of leadership concepts applicable
across organizations.Likert (1961) distinguished among
four leadership styles:exploitative authoritative,
benevolent authoritative, consultative, and participative
(democratic).Likert's studies demonstrated that in
situations where leaders used consultativeor participative
leadership, there was evidence of trust, collaborativegoal
setting, bottom-up communication, and supportive leader
behavior.In organizational situations where exploitative19
authoritative or benevolent authoritativeleadership was
utilized, organizations were characterizedby threats, fear,
punishment, top-down communication andcentralized decision-
making and control.Likert (1961) suggested that themore
effective leaders were those who utilizedparticipative
decision procedures.
The behavioral approach to researchidentifies what
effective leaders do in terms of theiractivities, but it
does not take into account situationalfactors such as
differences in composition ofgroups or the internal and
external environmental variables that influencethe practice
of leadership.Other research studies attemptto understand
leadership behavior from the specific approachof power
influence.
Power/Influence Approach
Research from the power-influence approachto
understanding leadership attempts to explain leadership
effectiveness in terms of the types and amounts ofpower
possessed by a leader and how that power is used.Power is
used not only for influencing subordinates butalso for
influencing peers, superiors, and people outsidethe
organization.The power of leadership depends toa
considerable extent on how the leader is perceivedby
others.The manner in which a leader exercises her/his
power largely determines "whether it results in enthusiastic20
commitment, passive compliance, or stubborn resistance"
(Yukl, 1989, p. 270).
In a classic study, French and Raven (1959)
investigated social power and distinguishedamong five
different bases of power which they termed (a) rewardpower,
(b) coercive power,(c) legitimate power,(d) expert power,
and (f) referent power.Reward power was definedas the
"ability to administer positive valences andremove or
decrease negative valences" (p. 445).Coercive power was
viewed as the use of threats and negative valences,i.e.,
punishment.Legitimate power was considered the most
complex of the five.The source of legitimate powerwas
found to be in the social structure or culturalvalues of an
organization which allowed one person to exercisepower over
another by virtue of superior position ina hierarchy of
authority.However, even this type of power is nota
guaranteed one.French and Raven (1959) pointed out thatif
there was an attempted use of legitimatepower outside the
accepted range of legitimate authority of the office, it
will "decrease the legitimate power of the authorityfigure"
(p. 448).
Referent power had its basis in the desire of followers
to identify with the leader, to be one with the leaderor to
be like him or her.Expert power referred to a special
knowledge or skill held by one person and round usefulto
another.For example, doctors, lawyers, accountants,or a21
friendly person giving directionspossess expert power.Of
the five types of power in theFrench and Raven (1959)
typology, legitimate, referent, andexpert power were the
most often cited in the literatureon educational
leadership.
Razik and Swanson (1995) observedthat within the human
systems of organizations and institutions,legitimate (or
organizational) power is grantedto those in key positions
and is the most commonsource of power in organizations.
Bensimon et al.(1989) asserted "the most likelysources of
power for academic leaders are expert andreferent power"
(p. 38).Fisher (1984, 1991, 1994) viewedreferent power in
the college presidency interms of charismaticpower.
According to Fisher (1984, 1994),academic leaderscan
cultivate charismatic power byremaining distant orremote
from constituents, by attendingto their personalappearance
and style, and by exhibitingself-confidence.Self-
confidence was related to cultivatinga style of speaking
and walking that conveyeda sense of self-assuredness.
Style consisted of presidentialcomportment, attitude,
speech, dress, mannerisms,appearance, and personal habits.
But, Fisher (1984, 1994) assertedsocial distance was
considered the key to charismaticpower.Fisher (1994)
suggested that college presidentsshould emphasize the
importance of the trappings of theiroffice as symbols of
its elevated status and not establishclose relationships22
with faculty and not be overly visible.He advocated that a
leader should be present in the workplaceonly for brief,
informal moments or on important occasions,and that leaders
should avoid day-to-day familiaritybecause familiarity
"makes the leader more debatable and lesslikely to be
inspiring...familiarity invariably breeds debate,questions,
doubts, and reservations" (Fisher, 1994,p. 65).Fisher
(1994) therefore argued that distancerecognizes and uses
the trappings of office which should be"adjusted only to
suit the personality and sophisticationof the audience or
constituency" (p. 65).The concept of charismaticpower
proposed by Fisher (1984, 1994) appeared to bemuch
different from the referent power traditionally by
French and Raven (1959) as the willingnessof followers to
accept influence by a leader they like and with whomthey
identify.
Charisma in leadership was discussed by otherauthors
as well.Bass (1985) suggested charismamay provide some
leaders with an extra measure of influence thatmoves their
institutions toward higher levels of performance.But, this
may not always be true.Charisma can be a two-edged sword.
Charisma can have a dark side to it (Birnbaum, 1992a).
Charismatics sometimes have an unhealthy narcissismthat can
lead to a grandiose sense of certainty, disdain for
subordinates, unwillingness to tolerate dissent, anda sense
that normal rules don't apply to them (Goleman, 1990,cited23
in Birnbaum, 1992a).When charismatics failas leaders,
they may still project qualities commonlyassociated with
good leadership because they haveconsiderable talent for
self-presentation and the capacity tocreate favorable
impressions of themselves (Hogan, Raskin,& Fazzini, 1990,
cited in Birnbaum, 1992a).
Abbott and Caracheo (1988) limited theirtreatment of
power to the context of organizations and arguedthat there
are only two bases of power--authority andprestige.Power
based on authority is derived from theleader's established
position within a social institution'shierarchy and is
delegated by the institution.Prestige power is basedon
the leader's possession of naturalor acquired
characteristics such as honesty, integrity,expertise, and
so forth, which are valued by others in theorganization.
Prestige power must be earned by the leaderthrough
demonstration of these characteristics.The authors argued
that reward and coercive powerare not bases of power as
French and Raven (1959) purported, butways in which power
is exercised in an institutional environmentbased on either
authority or prestige or both.
Power and influence theories and theoriesbased on
leader traits and behaviors have providedsignificant
contributions to leadership research.Leadership can be
understood Iurther through research into theparticular
circumstances and contexts of leadershipsituations.24
Contingency/Situational Approach
The contingency/situational approachto leadership
proposes that the effects of leader behaviorare contingent
upon the leadership situation.A major assumption is that
different leader behavior or trait patterns willhave
varying degrees of effectiveness in differentleadership
situations, and that an identified behaviorpattern for one
situation is not optimal for all situations.
The approach emphasizes the importance ofsituational
factors such as leader authority and discretion,the type of
work performed, subordinate ability and motivation,and the
expectations of subordinates, peers, superiorsand outsiders
(Yukl, 1989).Thus, leadership relationships, behaviorsand
effectiveness are mediated by leadership situationsand how
they are interpreted.
All organizations, and the events thatoccur in them,
can be viewed and interpreted in a number ofways.Meaning
of an event is what is most important, and meaningexists
only as it is interpreted through one belief systemor
another.What people see and do in organizations is
strongly determined by personal theories (implicitor
explicit) of events and how those events get interpreted.
Take a community college committee meeting, forexample.
Suppose that Sharon is trying to reach a decision,Greg
wants to make sure everyone has a chance to participate,
Mary is there to prove herself and win points, and Bobsees25
himself as attending a pointless ritual.Depending on their
perceptions and interpretations (of pastmeetings and that
meeting), each individual maysee others and the current
situation differently.
One of the more useful tools available forleaders to
understand organizations and events in themwas proposed by
Bolman and Deal (1984).They suggested that organizations
and events can be looked at from four differentvantage
points or "frames" which they identifiedas(a) structural,
(b) human resource,(c) political, and (d) symbolic.Each
frame addressed a critical task ofmanagement and
leadership.The structural frame emphasized the formal
roles and hierarchical systems of relationshipsin an
organization.The human resource frame focusedon the needs
of people with the belief that they have inherentneeds for
achievement and creativity.The political frame viewed
organizations as fragmented into special interestgroups in
competition over power and scarce resources.And, the
symbolic frame viewed organizationsas cultures and
subcultures with specific values, reminding theleader that
reality is socially constructed and symbolicallymediated.
To benefit from the use of multiple frames,two
fundamental components of leadership in organizationsmust
be recognized--a "commitment to values" anda "flexible
approach" to the complexity of organizations (Bolman& Deal,
1984, p. 300).Values tend to guide leadership behavior,26
but leaders may often underappreciate thecomplexity of
their organizations and may become overresponsiveand
inflexible:
When faced with formidable challenges,managers
(even leaders) tend to become inflexible...staying
with the same problems and employing thesame
solutions makes [them] feel comfortable andin
control...the leaders of the future will needto
sidestep this tendency, to find opportunitiesin
organizational crises (Bolman & Deal, 1984,p.
296).
The perspective of multiple framessuggests that
leaders and followers with different perspectiveswill
interpret the meaning of leadership situationsdifferently.
This is consistent with evolving ideas abouthigher
education organizations as they have been portrayedas
bureaucracies, collegiums, political systems(Carroll, 1992)
and organized anarchies (Cohen & March, 1986).As people
interpret events through different frames,disagreements and
conflicts inevitably emerge.Bolman and Deal (1984)
proposed that the sequential application of eachframe to
the same event or issue can help to clarify what is
happening and generate options of interpretationand action.
The comparison of frames also can help clarifyand resolve
many situations of confusion and conflict.
According to Bolman and Deal (1984), leadersneed to be
committed to values, to think flexibly aboutorganizations
and events, to see them from several angles, tohave visions
of new strategies or patterns on everyday thoughtand deed,
and to adapt their style to fit emerging issues.Flexibility27
of a leader's thinking fosters flexibility intheir
behavior.Leaders who "understand anduse only one or two
of the frames are like a highly specializedspecies:They
may be well adapted to a very narrow environment but
extremely vulnerable to changes in climate"(Bolman & Deal,
1984, p. 109).
Another useful and fairly popularway of looking at
situational factors that influence the practiceof
leadership is to view leadership contextsas transactional
or transformational.
Transactional/Transformational Approach
Much of the literature on educational leadership
reflected the influence of James McGregor Burns(1978), who
distinguished between two types of leadership--the
transactional and the transformational.Transactional
leadership was characterized by typical bureaucratic
activities of leadership where peopleengage in
relationships for the purpose of exchanging thingsof value,
pursuing their own purposes and goals, and formingtemporary
relationships.In contrast, the transformational leader
goes beyond the bureaucratic actions of the transactional
leader; he or she builds upon the followers' needfor
meaning and organizational purpose,
Leadership over human beings is exercised when
persons with certain motives and purposes
mobilize, in competition or conflict with others,28
institutional, political, psychological,and other
resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the
motives of followers (Burns, 1978,p. 18).
"The genius of leadership", Burns(1978) wrote, "lies in the
manner in which leaders see and acton their own and their
follower's values and motivations"(p.19, italics added).
Transforming leadership "occurs whenone or more
persons engage with others in such away that leaders and
followers raise one another to higherlevels of motivation
and morality" (Burns, 1978,p. 20).Thus, the test of a
leader is the ability to achieve significantchange that
represents the mutual interests of followersand leaders.
Other authors have extended, elaborated,or taken issue
with the transactional and transformativeleadership views
of Burns (1978).For example, a key ingredient of
transformative leadership for Bennis andNanus (1985) was
the notion of empowerment.Leaders empower followers by
bringing significance, competence, community,and enjoyment
to leader-follower work relationships.
Bensimon et al.(1989) suggested that the
transformational model of leadership hadthree underlying
assumptions which "conflict with normativeexpectations in
higher education" (p. 74), making it unlikelythat
transformational leadership is appropriate inacademic
organizations.The assumptions they identifiedwere that
(a) leadership emanates from a single highlyvisible
individual,(b) followers are motivated by needsfor29
organizational affiliation, and (c) leadershipdepends on
visible and enduring changes.The authors suggested that
the presence of two forms of authority inacademic
organizations, the administrative and theprofessional,
limits the authority of the president andtherefore the
opportunity for transformational leadership.Bensimon et
al.(1989) also maintained that the transactional,not the
transformational, better characterizes thereality of
leadership in higher education:
The conceptual foundations of transactionaltheory
appear highly adaptable to those features of
academic organizations most likelyto obstruct
transformational leadership:the concept of
governance as a collective process that involves
all important campus constituencies,with
particular emphasis given to theparticipation of
the faculty...[and] the faculty'sprerogative to
declare no confidence in the president,which
often has the same power to dismissa president as
does a vote by the college trustees (p. 74).
Bensimon et al.(1989) added that "transactionalleadership
tends to be spurned despite its obviousapplication to
higher education, because it isseen as descriptive of an
`managerial' rather than a 'leadership' profile"(p. 75).
Birnbaum (1992a) found that effectivepresidents at the
institutions he studied tended to synthesizeand use both
the transactional and transformational approachesto
leadership.The transactional had its usefulnessin
supporting status quo and what currentlyworked.The
transformational approach focused on restoringvalues and
improving behavior in an evolutionaryway, thus presidents30
"did not consider valuesmore important than instrumental
activities, but realized that if theywere to have influence
they must attend to both" (Birnbaum, 1992a,p. 29-30).
Transactional and transformationalapproaches to
leadership considered the values and motivationsof both
leaders and followers in the leadershipcontext.Another
equally important and influential factor forleaders is
working within organizational culture andmanaging symbolic
meaning.
Cultural and Symbolic Approaches
Cultural and symbolic theories view leadershipin
organizations as a continuous interchangeamong participants
of mutually-influenced sociallyconstructed realities.
Schein (1992) described cultureas "a phenomenon that
surrounds us at all times, being constantlyenacted and
created by our interactions with others"(p.1).He
proposed that these "dynamic processes of culturecreation
and management are the essence of leadership"(Schein, 1992,
p. 1).Analysis of leader behavior and organizational
culture thus are viewed as inseparably connected(Schein,
1992; Smith & Peterson, 1988).
In the early literature on organizationalculture,
Schein (1985) developed a conceptual hierarchyto describe
culture at three levels--artifacts, values, andassumptions.
At the first level, culture is made visible andtangible31
through symbolic forms such as rites,ceremonies, rituals,
myths, sagas, stories, languagesystems, and norms of the
organization.The second level consists of values which
reveal how people explain and rationalizewhat they say and
do as a group.Values link artifacts to assumptions.The
degree of congruity or conflictamong values often
determines the degree of members' socializationin the
organization.The third and deepest level of the cultural
hierarchy are assumptions--theessence of culture.They
represent learned responses to environmental expectations
and exert a powerful influence over what peoplebelieve, how
they think, and what they do.
Culture in higher education has been definedby Kuh and
Whitt (1988) as the "collective, mutuallyshaping patterns
of norms, values, practices, beliefs, andassumptions that
guide the behavior of individuals andgroups in an
institution of higher education and providea frame of
reference within which to interpret the meaningof events
and actions on and off campus" (p. 13).Cultural influences
can occur at many levels, within the institution and its
departments, as well as at the system and state levels
(Tierney, 1988).Bensimon et al.(1989) suggested that the
cultural view of leadership is highly compatiblewith the
characteristics of academic organizations whichare
characterized by ambiguity of purpose, diffusionof power32
and authority, and the absence ofclear and measurable
outcomes.
Literature on organizational culturein community
colleges referred to leadersas either founders or
transitioners (Baker, 1992a, 1992b).Founders were
important in the initial stages ofcultural development and
their effectiveness was measured bythe degree to which they
successfully envisioned and communicateda future for the
organization and motivated othersto commit to it.
Transitional leaders, on the other hand,were seen as change
agents with significant opportunity toredirect the culture
of an organization.
It is not surprising, therefore,that much of the
literature suggested that the uniquetalent of successful
leaders in organizations was their abilityto work with
culture.Leaders are becoming moreaware of the critical
role that culture plays in institutionallearning and change
and "how intricately intertwinedtheir own behavior is with
culture creation and management" (Schein,1992).
According to Schein (1992), leadersembed and transmit
organizational culture in fiveways:(a) by what theypay
attention to, measure, and control;(b) by their reactions
to critical incidents and crises;(c) by deliberate role-
modeling, coaching, and teaching;(d) by their choice of
criteria for allocation of reward andstatus; and (e) by33
their choice of criteria for recruitment,selection,
promotion, retirement and terminationof personnel.
Academic institutions vary in culturalcharacteristics
and institutional cultures impactactions and results in the
organization.Institutional cultures facilitatesome
actions, proscribe others and playa major role in
determining what a presidentcan and cannot do (Birnbaum,
1992a, 1992b).Leadership exhibited bya president at one
college may prove unsuccessful atan institution with a
different culture (Biggerstaff, 1992).In spite of this,
many college administrators:
often have only an intuitivegrasp of the cultural
conditions and influences thatenter into their
daily decision making....[they]tend to recognize
their organization's culture onlywhen they have
transgressed its bounds andsevere conflicts or
adverse relationshipsensue.As a result, they
frequently find themselves dealingwith
organizational culture in an atmosphereof crisis
management, instead of reasoned reflectionand
consensual change (Tierney, 1988,p. 4).
By attending to an organization'sculture, "presidents
can discover the reasons why styles, structures,and
strategies work well in some situationsand fail in others
(Biggerstaff, 1992, p. 60).By bringing the dimensionsand
dynamics of organizational culture tothe fore, leaderscan
begin to understand the cultures of theirinstitutions as
well as the likely consequences ofleadership decisions
before, not after, they act.
According to Tierney (1988),a leader's understanding
of organizational cultureencourages them to (a) consider34
real or potential conflicts not inisolation but on the
broad canvas of organizational life,(b) recognize
structural or operational contradictionsthat suggest
tensions in the organization,(c) implement and evaluate
everyday decisions with a keenawareness of their role in
and influence upon organizationalculture,(d) understand
the symbolic dimensions of instrumentaldecisions and
actions, and (e) consider why differentgroups in the
organization hold varying perceptionsabout the institution.
In a similar vein, Birnbaum (1992a)suggested that
organizations can be analyzed attwo distinct levels, the
substantive and the symbolic (seePfeffer, 1981).The
substantive dimension involves understandinghow decisions
and other organizational actionsresult in observable,
objective outcomes.The symbolic aspect focuseson how
organizational activities are perceived andinterpreted by
participants.Birnbaum (1992a) proposed thatpresidents can
influence their institutionson both levels through what he
referred to as "instrumental leadership"and "interpretive
leadership."College presidents provide instrumental
leadership through their technicalcompetence, experience,
and judgment.They "coordinate the activities ofothers,
make timely and sensible decisions,represent the
institution to its various publics, andcope with the
everyday crises caused by environmental changeand internal
conflict" (Birnbaum, 1992a, p. 152).35
Interpretive leadership,on the other hand, involved
managing perceptions of institutionalfunctioning and the
relationship of the institution to itsenvironment.This
kind of leadership emphasizes themanagement of meaning
through the actions or words of theleader.Presidents
provide interpretive leadership whenthey "change
perceptions by highlightingsome aspects of the institution
and environment while muting others,by relating new ideas
to existing values and symbols, and byarticulating a vision
of the college in idealized formthat captures what others
believe but have been unable to express"(Birnbaum, 1992a,
p. 154).Though the two forms of leadershipare
conceptually distinct, they interactwith each other.
Instrumental acts often have symbolicsignificance, and
interpretive acts affect theway people behave and think.
Both forms of leadership are involvedto varying degrees in
all presidential actions.
According to Schein (1985), "the onlything of real
importance that leaders do is tocreate and manage culture"
(p. 2).He also pointed out it ismore likely that culture
controls leaders than leaders controlculture.Thus, to be
effective, leaders must align theirstrategies with their
institutions's culture rather thancompete with it.
According to Schein (1985, 1992),a leader has opportunity
to clarify his or her vision and values throughreactions to
critical incidents.How a leader responds toa crisis will36
often create new organizational norms and procedureswhile
revealing some of the leaders underlyingassumptions about
the importance of people and the value of thework to be
accomplished.
Institutional culture based on mutual values,mutual
trust, and institutional integrity was investigatedby Clark
(1992).He conducted a qualitative case study ofa two-year
unionized college that successfully managedto deal with
internal organizational conflicts.The culture held an
institutional value system of collaboration basedupon "a
trust dynamic and a value system expressed, modeled,and
rewarded by the organizational leadership" (Clark,1992, p.
202).Institutional and individual integritywere
paramount."Honesty, credibility, clear communication,and
`walking the way we talk'" (Clark, 1992,p. 198) were
considered fundamental aspects ofa culture embracing
institutional integrity and successfully dealingwith campus
crisis and conflict.
Institutional cultures may have different
characteristics to them, but the events that takeplace
within them are given a particular meaning by theactions,
reactions, and interactions of leaders.
Pfeffer (1981) proposed that the role ofleadership in
organizations may be largely (but not entirely)restricted
to symbolic actions.The purpose of symbolic actions isthe
management of meanings.Pfeffer (1981) distinguished37
between substantive outcomes andsymbolic results in
management of meaning.Substantive outcomes refer to
actions and activities in tangible,measurable results, such
as salary allocations, capital or operatingbudget
allocations, and so forth.In contrast, symbolic outcomes
are measured by sentiments of affect, values,beliefs, and
constituent satisfaction.Many administrative actionscan
have both real immediate effects andsymbolic connotations.
An example is the allocation ofresources.According to
Pfeffer (1981), the fact thata resource allocation can be
consistent with the power dependencerelations in an
organization and still leave thosemembers who have received
less well satisfied "speaks to thecapacity of management to
legitimate and rationalize actions"(p. 8).It is important
to understand how organizational benefitsand resources get
allocated; but at the same time, it isimportant to
understand how such allocation patternsare perceived and
justified by organizational participants inthe sense of
managing what it means.
Meaning can be "created throughuse of language,
ceremonies, symbols, and settings" (Pfeffer,1981, p.44) to
produce socially constructed realities.Those socially
constructed realities are "as much the toolsof managers [or
leaders] as economic analysis, theories ofleadership, and
organizational design" (Pfeffer, 1981,p. 46).38
Socially constructed realities and the use of symbolic
actions is particularly important to college presidents.
Parnell (1990) wrote, "the college president of the 1990s
must understand the importance of symbolism and be sensitive
to the meanings attached to a range of activities...the
effective leader plans and shapes the symbolism of hisor
her actions" (p. 27).
Parnell (1990), Pfeffer (1981), and Schein (1992)
emphasized the importance for leaders to understand
institutional culture and symbolicallymanage meaning in
organizations.It follows that if leaders are notaware of
institutional culture and likely consequences of decisions
and actions or the assumptions of the groupupon which they
impose solutions, "they are likely to fail" (Schein,1992,
p. 373).College leaders, therefore, are constrainedto pay
attention to socially constructed realities andsymbolic
actions within an institution's culture.Unfortunately (or
fortunately), continuously shifting external and internal
environmental factors in the college settingmay impact or
change institutional culture.
The notion of change in organizations is key to the
concept of culture and learning in organizations.Schein
(1992), Senge (1990), and Wheatley (1994) suggested that
change is fundamental to organizations.Change requires
leaders and their organizations to learn- -learn how to see
themselves as a system of relationships with a greatersense39
of identity and autonomy (Wheatley, 1994); learnhow to
search for truth, problem solve, trust, and improve(Schein,
1992); and learn how to learn (Senge, 1990).Thus, learning
ultimately must be made part of organizational culture.
According to Schein (1992), a learning culturemust
"contain the shared assumption that solutions to problems
derive from a pragmatic search for truth and thattruth can
be found anywhere, depending on the nature of the problem"
(p. 366).What must be avoided in a learning culture isan
automatic assumption that wisdom and truth reside inany one
source or method.Schein (1992) stressed that information
and open communication are central to organizationalwell-
being and the learning culture,
a fully connected [information] network can only
work if high trust exists among all participants
and that high trust is partly a function ofleader
assumptions that people can be trusted and have
constructive intent (p. 370).
Also, according to Schein (1992), the onlyway to build a
learning culture that continues to learn is "forleaders
themselves to realize that they do not know andmust teach
others to accept that they do not know"(p. 367).Learning
then becomes a shared responsibility.
Wheatley (1994) also viewed organizationsas capable of
learning.She saw organizations as systems of relationships
that have the capacity to determine identity,empower
members, learn from informational interchange, andself-
renew.Wheatley (1994) asserted that organizations "needa40
broad distribution of information, viewpoints and
interpretations" (p. 64), and that they "need to stop
describing tasks and instead facilitate process" (p. 38).
She emphasized quality interaction and pointed out that
"leadership is always dependent on the context, but the
context is established by the relationshipswe value
(Wheatley, 1994, p. 144).
Senge (1990) characterized a "learning organization"as
an organization "where people continually expand their
capacity to create the results they truly desire, wherenew
and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where
collective aspiration is set free, and where peopleare
continually learning how to learn together" (p. 3).He
proposed that an organization can becomea "learning
organization" through the art and practice of five basic
disciplines:(a) personal mastery in continually clarifying
and deepening personal vision, focusing energies, developing
patience, and seeing reality objectively;(b) mental models
through recognizing the deeply ingrained assumptions,
generalizations, pictures, and images that influence howwe
understand the world and how we take action,(c) building
shared vision through fostering genuine commitment to values
and purposes rather than compliance;(d)team learning
through developing diversity and productive patterns of
member interaction and genuine "thinking together"; and,(e)
systems thinking through integrating the other disciplines41
into a coherent body of theory and practice.Thus,
according to Senge (1990), the ability to think
systematically, to analyze fields of forces andunderstand
their joint causal effects on each other, andto abandon
simple linear causal logic in favor of complexmental models
will become more critical to learning organizationsand
their leaders.
Understanding institutional culture, its subtle
characteristics and potential for organizational
modification and improvement through learning willaid
college leaders in spotting and resolving potential
conflicts and in managing change more efficientlyand
effectively.
As shown in previous sections, research intoleadership
is multidimensional and has drawn frommany scholarly
disciplines and ideas.However, none of the theoriesor
perspectives contained all the necessary variablesto
adequately characterize the complexity of leadershipand its
contexts, or to predict best-case leadership scenarios.
Previous leadership studies have had their critics,and one
scholar has offered an alternative theoretical perspective
to understanding leadership and leadership needs forthe
twenty-first century.42
Alternative Theoretical Perspective
Rost (1991) criticized previous leadership studiesand
their emphasis on peripheral aspects ofleadership such as
traits, styles, preferred behaviors, contingenciesand
situations, and so forth.He contended that such studies
did not address the essential nature of leadership,and that
most of the theories of leadership reflectedan "industrial
paradigm" that is no longer acceptableor applicable to
leadership needs for the twenty-first century.
The "crisis in leadership" today, accordingto Rost
(1991) is not from a lack of good leaders with vision,but
that "our school of leadership is still caughtup in the
industrial paradigm while much of our thought andpractice
in other aspects of life have undergone considerable
transformation to a postindustrial paradigm" (p. 100).
Rost (1991) argued that the industrial paradigm'sview
of leadership conveyed three notions about thenature of
leadership: leadership as "being number one...producing
excellence"; leadership as "the leaders in office..or an
administration"; and, leadership as "that ofone person
directing other people" (Rost, 1991, p. 98).In other
words, leadership was equated with good management.Rost
(1991) proposed that leaders and followers todaystill act,
choose and think based on this model of an industrialized
leadership paradigm.43
A more appropriate way to view leadershiptoday,
according to Rost (1991), is witha definition that contains
the assumptions and valuesnecessary to a transformed,
postindustrial society.Such a model of leadership would
include:
collaboration, common good, globalconcern,
diversity and pluralism in structureand
participation, client orientation, civicvirtues,
freedom of expression, critical dialogue,
qualitative language and methodologies,
substantive justice, and consensus-oriented
policy-making process" (Rost, 1991,p. 181).
Thus, Rost (1991) defined leadershipas "an influence
relationship among leaders and followerswho intend real
changes that reflect their mutual purposes"(p.102).
In Rost's (1991) model, the influencerelationship of
leaders and followers is multidirectionaland noncoercive.
Leaders and followers are active insteadof reactive.They
purposefully desire certain changes thatare substantive and
transforming.They actively develop and advancepurposes.
Instead of controlling options to developconsensus as
managers do, they seek new and creative approachesand
expand options as a technique for problemsolving.They
take high risk positions and help peoplework for the common
good and help people build community.
The alternative views of Rost (1991)and the general
theories and perspectives of leadershippresented thus far
provided important and relevant informationabout the nature
of leadership and leadership contexts.Specific studies onleadership in higher education isan important subset of
that research.
Leadership in Higher Education
44
Leadership in higher education, likeleadership in
general, is difficult to describe anddetermine because it
depends not only on the position, behavior,and personal
characteristics of the leader but alsoon the nature of the
situation or setting (Hoy & Miskel, 1982).Bensimon et al.
(1989) noted that the college settinghas been variously
described as (a) a bureaucracy,(b) a collegium,(c)a
political system, and (d)an organized anarchy.When
colleges are viewed as a bureaucracy,emphasis is on
structured management and the leader'srole in making
decisions and getting results.As a collegium, collegesare
seen as participative and the leader strives tomeet
constituents' needs through processes ofconsultation and
interpersonal skills.When colleges are viewedas a
political system, leaderscan be seen as mediators or
negotiators among competinggroups, and influencing through
persuasion and diplomacy.In the college as organized
anarchy, leaders are constrained by inherentorganizational
ambiguities.
The notion of American collegesas organized anarchies
was advanced by Cohen and March (1974).According to Cohen
and March (1986), an organized anarchy is"any organization45
that has problematic goals, unclear technology,and fluid
participation" (p. 2).In the case of colleges and
universities, Cohen and March (1986) explainedthat (a)
goals are problematic because theyare characterized by a
loose collection of changing ideasmore than a coherent
structure,(b) technology is unclear because the
organization does not understand itsown processes and it
operates on the basis of a simple set of trial-and-error
procedures (the residue of learning fromaccidents of past
experiences and imitation),(c) participation is fluid
because individual participantsvary from one time to
another and they vary among themselves in theamount of time
and effort they devote to the organization.
Cohen and March (1986) identified fourambiguities
connected to the anarchy and faced by collegepresidents:
1. Ambiguity of purpose--whatare the goals of the
organization and in what termscan action be
justified?Do constituents agree?Are goals
clearly stated and are there defined specific
procedures for measuring the degree of goal
achievement?
2. Ambiguity of power--how powerful is the president
and what can he/she accomplish?Do presidents
have as much power as they think they do?
3. Ambiguity of experience--what is to be learned
from the presidency and how does the president46
make inferences about his/her experience?Are the
inferences correct?
4. Ambiguity of success--when isa president
successful and how is this assessed?
According to Cohen and March (1986), theseambiguities
impact the actions and the effectivenessof college
presidents more than they realize,
presidents easily come to believe thatthey can
continue in office forever if theyare only clever
or perceptive or responsive enough...theyeasily
come to exaggerate the significance of theirdaily
actions for the collegeas well as for themselves
(p. 204).
Thus, Cohen and March (1986) concluded:
we believe that a college president is,on the
whole, better advised to think of himselfas
trying to do good than as tryingto satisfy a
political or bureaucratic audience;better advised
to define his role in terms of the modestpart he
can play in making the college slightly betterin
the long run than in terms of satisfyingcurrent
residents or solving current problems(p. 205).
Other scholars had different views ofthe college
presidency and analyzed other issues.Kerr and Gade (1986)
researched the state of the academic presidencyat more than
800 institutions of higher education.They analyzed how the
college presidency is affected by changingtimes, by
environments of mixed constituencies andconflicts of
interests, and by the styles, strategies,and tactics of
those in office.To understand the college presidencythey
argued, "it is necessary to appreciate thecontext of each
individual presidency--to comprehend thetyrannies of time47
and of place, but also to appreciatethe vagaries of human
behavior in approaching decisions"(Kerr & Gade, 1986, p.
xi, italics added).
Kerr and Gade (1986) reported thata variety of
presidential behaviors and interactions withmultiple
constituents in particular leadership settingsimpacts
levels of presidential success and longevity.They reported
that the average tenure for college presidentswas about
seven years and that about 15 percent of collegepresidents
were involved in separations each year.Variations in
length of tenure among institutionswere viewed as a surplus
over a minimum tenure of about three years.That is, a new
president usually is given about twoyears to prove
competence, then another year or so fora faculty or a Board
to enact a change (see Birnbaum, 1992a, fora discussion of
"the honeymoon period").Kerr and Gade (1986) proposedthat
the average surplus over the threeyear period is a better
measure of what is happening to longevity, which is "plus
seven to nine years historically and plus fouryears on the
average today for all presidents and plus twoyears for many
community college presidents" (p. 21).
Kerr and Gade (1986) also investigated whatcollege
presidents do after serving a presidency.They reported
that 15 percent of former incumbentsgo to another
presidency, 20 percent return to teaching, about15 percent
into other administrative positions in highereducation, 2548
percent into retirement or semiretirement, and 25 percent
find employment outside academics.Thus, Kerr and Gade
(1986) submitted that "the presidency isan episode in a
career and not a career until retirement" (p. 22).
Implications of findings on the nature of thecollege
presidency in Kerr and Gade's (1986) studywere reflected in
comments of several college presidents (citedon pp. 33-34,
202-219).They were found particularly relevant to
characteristics of the present case study.
The secret of any organization is trust.Almost
anything will work when enough trust ispresent.
Without it, nothing works (italics added).
When you make a decision, however largeor small, ask
what is the right decision...all things considered
(original italics).
Be accessible, be credible, and involvemore people
earlier (from 85 percent of the presidents
interviewed).
When you're wrong admit it.Almost everyone will know
it anyway.Your capitulation will be seenas
reasonableness, not weakness.
Remind yourself daily that general administrationmust
always be the servant, never the master.
Though these presidential admonitions reflectyears of
experience and may serve to guide college leaders,Kerr and
Gade (1986) emphasized that the college presidencyis
context-bound, that contexts vary greatly, and thatthere is
no single best or even possible strategy for all leadership
contexts.Few presidents can sufficiently controlor
totally influence the context that surrounds them.The
specific context "may either liberate themor suffocate49
them, it may let them bloom orcause them to wither" (Kerr &
Gade, 1986, p. 170).Thus, Kerr and Gade (1986) concluded,
the multifaceted interaction of environmentsand
participants in particular contexts makesit
impossible to know precisely howmany or how much
of each are the result of the time andplace, on
the one hand, or of human performanceon the
other...That is always the puzzle (p. 170).
Relatively few scholars have attemptedto study the
puzzle of leadership crisis contexts inAmerican higher
education and even fewer have studiedthe community college
setting.Carroll (1992) investigated the forced
resignations of three college presidentsincluding one from
a community college.Carroll (1992) suggested that
leadership crisis events in college settingscan be best
understood through an organizational theoryembracing both
institutional politics and academic culture.He suggested
that the type and mix of power used bya president and a
faculty within a crisis context affectthe outcome.
Identified sources of presidentialpower in Carroll's (1992)
study were (a) control of information anddecision points,
(b) interpretation of institutional reality,(c) selective
personnel appointment and removal, and (d)legitimate and
personal power.Identified sources of power for thefaculty
were legitimate power, negative sanctions andpersonal
power.Carroll (1992) concluded that bona fidepresidential
power is ultimately legitimate power basedon constituent
endorsement which may be determined throughfaculty50
interpretation of presidential words andactions within the
local academic culture.
In other research, Vaughan (1986) conductedan in-depth
study of outstanding presidents of publictwo-year colleges.
Based on surveys from 68 community collegepresidents who
were considered exemplary by their peers, the author
reported that respondents ranked "integrity,judgment,
courage, and concern for others as the top personal
attributes the successful presidential leadershould
possess" (p. 4).Respondents also identified "producing
results, selecting qualified people, resolvingconflicts,
communicating effectively, and motivating others"(Vaughan,
1986, p.4) as desirable skills and abilities.
in Vaughan's (1986) study was the inclusionof perceived
personal failures by presidents.Identified personal
failures included, "being too far removed fromthe faculty,
being superficial, being a poor listener, andspending too
much time away from campus" (p. 155).
Vaughan (1986) also found that community college
presidents "do not seem to understand fullytheir role as
leader...there seems to be a struggleamong presidents to
determine how they can give strong leadershipwithout
alienating the faculty and board" (p. 230).The struggle
tended to result from issues surrounding "theautocratic
image associated with the community college presidency,"
"unionization on campus," "participatory governance,"and51
"the obvious need for strong leadership"(Vaughan, 1986, p.
230).Vaughan (1986) added that the successfulcommunity
college president would have to reconcilethese seemingly
diverse elements.
Many factors contribute to the successfulleadership of
a community college president.One of the most crucial is
an understanding of the roles, values, and needsof her/his
constituents.
The President's Constituencies
The interpretation that constituenciesgive to a
president's actions has importantconsequences for the
exercise of leadership.Colleges have many constituencies-
students, parents, alumni, legislators,secondary schools,
employers, and community groups.But most observers tend to
agree that the three most prominentare trustees, faculty,
and administrative staff (Birnbaum, 1992a).According to
Birnbaum (1992a), these groupsare considered in both
normative statements and research studiesto be the major
legitimate, continuing participants in institutional
governance.They are the groups that presidentsare
presumed to lead and deal withon a regular basis.Others
may become involved in a variety of college issuesand
activities, but their participation usually ismore issue-
specific and intermittent.52
Though the three major constituents'views may overlap,
each has distinct organizational rolesto fill.
Constituents interact with differentaspects of the
institution's environment and constructdifferent pictures
of institutional reality.A president's actions and
behavior, therefore, is subject todifferent interpretations
depending on whether the observer isa faculty member, an
administrator, or a trustee (Bensimon,1991).The president
is "always in the middle,among, and between the
constituency groups" (Parnell, 1990,p. 24).Unfortunately,
presidents who satisfy one constituencyare likely to find
it consequently more difficult to satisfyothers (Pfeffer
and Salanick, 1978, cited in Birnbaum,1992a).
The level of constituent supportamong trustees,
faculty and administrators was investigatedby Fujita (1990)
who studied thirty-two universities andcolleges including
community colleges.She found that trustees and
administrators commonly made positiveassessments of their
presidents, and that differences in constituentsupport for
the president were primarily due todiffering assessments by
the faculty.Fujita (1990) reported that presidentswere
evaluated as good by 88.2 percent of boardleaders and 87.2
percent by administrative colleagues.In contrast, only
50.9 percent of faculty respondentsevaluated their
presidents as good.Fujita (1990) found that faculty53
support was invariably accompanied by supportof the other
two groups.
The President and Faculty
"Probably the most difficult butmost important
constituency is the faculty" (Parnell, 1990,p. 24).Yet,
faculty assessments of the quality of theirpresidents tend
to be less than satisfactory.Russell (1990, cited in
Birnbaum, 1992b) reported that only 57percent of a national
sample of full-time faculty were found to besatisfied with
the quality of their presidents, and only54 percent were
satisfied with the relationship between facultyand
administration on their campuses.
The faculty represent the institution'sinstructional
programs and its commitment to academic values.Faculty are
interested in a president's concern for curriculumand
student development (Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b),look for a
president's support of faculty values andacceptance of
faculty procedures and advice (Kerr & Gade,1986), and are
concerned with whether the president operates ina manner
consistent with a collegial community (Birnbaum,1992a,
1992b).However, the relationship between the presidentand
the faculty can be uncertain.Faculty criticisms ofa
president are many and varied, and often contradictory:
If he is always home, he isa nobody; if he is
often away, he is neglecting his homework.If he
spends little time with faculty members, heis54
aloof; if he spends much time with them, he is
interfering in their proper business.If he
balances the budget, he is stingy; if hecannot
balance the budget he is irresponsible and
incompetent...the president will always be between
the rock and the hard place (TheodoreHesburg,
quoted in Kerr & Gade, 1986, p. 213).
Leadership effectiveness and attributionsof positive
outcomes "depend greatly on the president's imageamong
faculty constituents" (Bensimon, 1991,p. 651).Like most
images, the image of a president is constructedadditively,
from many gestures and actions that reinforceone another to
form a pattern.Presidents who take the role of the
faculty, that is, share their values, theirbeliefs and ways
of thinking, seem to induce commitmentand support and their
constituents appear to be more forgiving oftheir weaknesses
and mistakes (Bensimon, 1991).Fujita (1990) found that
presidents seen as reaching out to faculty,soliciting their
opinions, dropping into their offices, eatinglunch with
them, and so forth, were more highly supportedthan those
seen as insular, unapproachable, or authoritarian.
Birnbaum (1992a) categorized facultysupport for
presidents as low, mixed, or high.Presidents who had low
faculty support were characterizedas autocratic, isolated
from the faculty, double-dealing and dishonest,not wanting
to make changes, and tended to rely too muchon charisma and
not enough on consultation.Mixed faculty support tendedto
have ambiguous interpretations, that is, quickaction was
interpreted as vigorous and decisive leadership,while55
deferred decisions were seen as reflectingthoughtful
consideration and understanding of institutionalculture.
The majority of presidents in the studywith mixed or low
faculty support were characterizedas having an
authoritarian leadership style.Birnbaum (1992a) developed
a composite description of authoritarian collegepresidents
as,
those whose emphasis was on achievingtasks with
little or no concern for people.[They were
criticized as being impatient withprocess,
indifferent to faculty participation in
governance, micromanaging specific institutional
processes or programs, acting too quickly with
little or no faculty consultation, beingaloof or
cold, failing to communicate adequately,being
difficult to deal with, not sufferingfools
gladly, or being unpredictable (p. 81).
Some presidents in Birnbaum's (1992a) studyalso were
criticized "for avoiding appropriatemanagement systems so
they could insert themselves intoany decision they wished
and act with no limitations on their discretion"(p.82).
Faculty dissatisfactions witha president may become
rationalized and presidents may not know theextent of
faculty concern, "presidents often remainedunaware that
they had lost faculty support becausethey developed self-
sealing systems of interaction with supportive
constituencies that reinforced their views ofeffectiveness"
(Birnbaum, 1992b, p. 19).Such a situation may prevent
presidents "from hearing any disconfirmingevidence and thus
making presidential learning or change unlikely"(Birnbaum,
1992a, p. 102).56
High faculty supportwas found primarily among
relatively new presidents (threeyears or less in office),
"seventy-five percent of new presidentsbut only twenty-five
percent of old presidents enjoyed high facultysupport"
(Birnbaum, 1992a, p. 73).Initial faculty support fora new
president tended to be high for severalreasons,(a) the
faculty constituency participated inthe selection process,
(b) dissatisfaction with the previouspresident made the
change desirable, and (c) thenew president was seen as
possessing attributes that would actas a corrective for the
perceived weaknesses of the previouspresident.Birnbaum
(1992a) found that presidents who hadhigh faculty support
were seen as "honoring and working within established
governance structures, accepting faculty participationin
decision making and being concerned withprocess" (p. 78).
They were also perceived to be,
very fair and ethical, as having high integrity
and competence, not dictatorialor heavy handed.
They kept promises once made...statedtheir
positions, and were not seenas having hidden
agendas.As a consequence, they were describedas
principled, decent, honest, and trustworthy
(Birnbaum 1992a, p. 78 79).
The single most frequently identifieddimension used by
faculty to assess their presidentswas a willingness to be
influenced (Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b; Fujita,1990).Birnbaum
(1992a) also found this was true fortrustees and
administrators.To be influences, presidents neededto be
good listeners.To listen effectively, presidentsneeded to57
consult broadly enough to permitthe emergence of multiple
views and to remainopen to evidence that may disconfirm
their own predilections, andto actively seek, rather than
merely passively receive, informationabout constituent
perceptions and campus functioning(Birnbaum, 1992a;
Leinbach, 1993).
Faculty support for presidents alsomay be affected by
the presence of unions and/ormembership in an institutional
system.Birnbaum (1992a) reported thatthe presence of a
faculty union and membership inan institutional system may
reduce faculty support fora president and therefore
constrain the leadership that thepresident can exercise.
He noted, however, that neitherelement necessarily makes
good leadership impossible, in fact,"exemplary presidents
were found both on unionized and system-relatedcampuses"
(p.163).
Careful attention to the facultyconstituency plays an
important role in presidentialsupport and effective college
leadership.Another equally important factoris the
president's selection of administratorswho serve with
her/him on an administrativeteam.
The President and Administrators
The president's selection of collegeadministrators
influences the level of effective leadershipexercised in
the institution (Birnbaum, 1992a;Bogue, 1985; Fisher, 1980;58
Fisher et al., 1988; Gardner, 1990; Moore,1980).The
college president, as chief executive officerof the
institution, functions as part ofan administrative team.
The president's cabinet or council is madeup of purposively
selected members who serve to inform and advisethe
president.
Effective college presidents surround themselveswith
the most able people theycan find (Birnbaum, 1992a; Fisher,
1980; Fisher & Tack, 1990).Knowledgeable, capable,
ethical, critical and creative administrativeteam members
enhance effective leadership.However, recruiting
administrative team members of high caliberdoesn't always
happen.
Gardner (1990) and Birnbaum (1992a)observed that
leaders often recruit individuals "whohave as their prime
qualities an unswerving loyalty to theboss" (Gardner, 1990,
p. 150).When this criterion prevails, effectiveleadership
teams are "illusory" (Birnbaum, 1992a), andall too often
become "a ruling clique or circle ofsycophants" (Gardner,
1990, p. 150).Such a clique, as Gardner (1990)explained,
tends to increase the leader's isolationand withholding of
candid criticism necessary to individualsin positions of
power, "even more serious, such a clique generallyneglects
one of the prime tasks of the team:to activate widening
circles of supplementary leadership" (p. 150 151).59
Presidents are cautioned not to filladministrative
cabinets or councils with only thepeople who agree with
them (Birnbaum, 1992a; Bogue. 1985;Gardner, 1990; Moore,
1980).To be well-informed and capableof rendering good
decisions, presidents need to be ableto rely on
administrative team members and othersto provide
alternative perspectives along withrelevant information and
feedback to avoid systematic biasesand selective processing
of information (O'Reilly, 1983).Any leader can be blinded
by the realities of a situation,"he may be arrogant and
screen out dissonant feedback" or "his staffmay fear to
furnish dissonant feedback" (Bogue,1985, p.129).In The
Effective College President, Fisheret al.(1988) reported,
effective presidents do notsurround themselves
with yes-people.They encourage people to think
creatively and to consider alternativesthat
appear on the surface to be impossible.Through
listening to people who thinkdifferently,
effective presidents stretch andgrow (p. 109).
In a similar line of thought, Bogue(1985) asserted
"administrators need the force of dissentto keep them from
both arrogance and the illusion ofknowledge" (p. 136), and
"a hospitality to dissent keeps theadministrator from the
destructive tendency of assuming pathologicalmotives on the
part of those with which hemay disagree" (p.135).Bogue
(1985) also proposed that presidentsneed to test the
validity of their ideas "in the hot crucibleof experience
in competition with the ideas ofothers...it may bemore
comfortable to work with sycophants thancritical60
colleagues...but [presidents] needabout [them] stalwart
spirits, quick minds, andcourageous hearts" (p. 136).
The need for critical colleagueson administrative
teams is especially evident ininstitutional decision-making
processes.O'Reilly (1983) observed thatadministrative
decision-makers often have strongpreferences and biases for
certain preconceived outcomes.Decision makers may tendto
selectively seek out favorable informationwhile avoiding
other types in ways calculated tomaximize acceptance of
their decisions."In organization settings,groups of like-
minded decision makersmay exaggerate these biases toward
selective perception and actuallyact collectively tocensor
or derogate information in opposition totheir desired ends"
(O'Reilly, 1983, p. 120).According to O'Reilly (1983),
decision makers may seek two kindsof information-
information used to make decisionsand information used to
support decisions.He noted it is notuncommon for leaders
qua decision-makers to actively seek certainkinds of
information or to hire outside consultinggroups, not for
use in making decisions, but solely for thepurpose of
supporting a decision that has alreadybeen made.Thus,
administrative information gatheringmay be incomplete and
communications with constituentsmay be withheld or
distorted.
Presidents who wish to improve theirown effectiveness
and that of their institutions willrecruit and retain only61
the best and most able people.They will also develop
effective working relationships with the college'sBoard of
Trustees.
The President and Board of Trustees
The relationship of the college president withthe
governing board is "the most personal and sometimestenuous"
(Parnell, 1990, p. 23).Boards of trustees are defenders of
the public interest and though they do not administerthe
institution, they require the assurance that itis being
administered effectively.According to Kerr and Gade
(1986), one of the first duties of a board oftrustees is
"to assure an effective presidency for the sakeof the
institution, but also for the sake of the board;only with
an effective presidency can a board be effective" (p. 177).
Selecting and retaining a college president,trustees mostly
look for "integrity, competence, results, goodexternal
relations, effective consultation with the board,
adaptability, and tranquility on campus" (Kerr& Gade, 1986,
p. 29) .
Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1993) investigated
effective boards of trustees.They interviewed 108 board
members and presidents at 22 colleges in the UnitedStates.
They defined effective boards as those that (a) adaptto the
distinctive characteristics of an academic environment,(b)
rely on the institution's mission, values, and traditionsas62
a guide for decisions, and (c) act so as to exemplify and
reinforce the organization's core values.Chait et
al.(1993) reported that specific characteristicsand
behaviors distinguish strong boards of trusteesfrom weak
boards.They categorized six dimensions of effective
trusteeship, which are briefly summarized below(Chait et
al., 1993, pp. 2 3):
1. Contextual Dimension:The board understands and
takes into account the culture andnorms of the
organization it governs.
2. Educational Dimension:The board takes the
necessary steps to ensure that trustees are well-
informed about the institution, the profession,
and the board's roles, responsibilities,and
performance.
3. Interpersonal Dimension:The board nurtures the
development of trustees as a group, attendsto the
board's collective welfare, and fostersa sense of
cohesiveness (original italics).
4. Analytical Dimension:The board recognizes
complexities and subtleties in the issues itfaces
and draws upon multiple perspectives to dissect
complex problems and to synthesize appropriate
responses.It searches widely for concrete
information and actively seeks different
viewpoints from multiple constituencies.63
5. Political Dimension:The board accepts as one of
its primary responsibilities the needto develop
and maintain healthy relationshipsamong key
constituencies.It consults often and
communicates directly with key constituencies,and
attempts to minimize conflict and win/lose
situations.
6. Strategic Dimension:The board helps envision and
shape institutional direction and helpsensure a
strategic approach to the organization'sfuture.
It anticipates potential problems andacts before
issues become urgent.
Chait et al.(1993) found that "the vast majorityof
trustees are not systematically prepared forthe role prior
to their appointment to a governing board,"and that "many
boards of trustees constitute a collectionof 'successful'
individuals who do not perform wellas a group" (p. 8).
Less effective boards tended to "inject 'soundbusiness
practices' into campus governance, and theyexpected to
modify the academic cultureso that it approximated more
closely their own familiar world and theirown prior
experience" (Chait et al., 1993, p. 11).Depending on
specific circumstances, such trusteesmay be viewed as
ignoring, underestimating, or violatingcampus cultures.
Effective boards, according to Chaitet al.(1993),
also "understand college mission especially welland rely on64
it as the essential context for major decisions" (p.13).
Effective boards frequently and explicitly make "reference
to the college's history and heritage" (p.14), "anticipate
problems and act before issues become urgent" (p.100), and
"regularly interact with the college's constituents and
genuinely respect the legitimate roles of others in the
governance process" (p. 127).
Fisher (1994) held a different and somewhat
contradictory view on the president/board relationship.He
argued, "countless presidencies have failed not becauseof
inept presidents, but for want of enlightened behavioron
the part of the board" (p.60).In The Board and the
President, Fisher (1991) asserted, "governing boardsare
largely responsible for the poor condition of the
presidency...they have approved policies and practicesthat
have unintentionally compromised the ability of the
president to lead" (p.1).Fisher (1991) asserted that
governing boards rightly hold college presidentsaccountable
but constrain them with less authority to get the jobdone:
The result has been lessened respect for the
presidential office and for those who hold the
position, and a growing tendency for governing
boards to get overly involved in the
administration of the institution.That
involvement has led to ever closer relationships
between boards and faculty, students and staff,
thus increasing the estrangement of the president
from each group.In such situations the leader,
to survive at all, must become a master at
pandering to each group until, almost inevitably,
he or she succumbs to their collective ineptitude
as the obvious scapegoat.In such situations,65
effective leadership is all but impossible (p.66
67).
According to Chait et al.(1993), president and board
relationships are reciprocal and mutually reinforcing.
Presidents and boards rely on each other to supply the
information, credibility, and support that enables themto
perform their respective roles effectively.The president
can play a "crucial role in encouraging, or undermining,
effective board functioning" (Chait et al., 1993,p. 114).
College presidents associated with effective boards
"acted as true educators, helping to instill and facilitate
the trustees' desire to learn more about their institution,
the nature of the profession, and the roles and
responsibilities of the board" (Chait et al., p. 118).
Effective boards can "weigh the most complex issues
intelligently and creatively, and welcome the opportunity to
do so, if the president furnishes them with pertinent
information and a supportive context for discussion" (Chait
et al., p. 126).Thus, through reciprocal processes of
learning, successful boards promote successful presidents,
and vice versa; and, college leadership tends to become
effective.
Leadership Effectiveness
Like definitions of leadership, definitions of
leadership effectiveness differ among researchers and vary66
among those in organizational settings.Criteria of
leadership effectivenessare often difficult to specify and
are frequently affected by factors beyonda leader's control
(Hogan et al., 1994).
The criteria for what constitutesleadership
effectiveness depend on the objectivesand values of those
making the determination.Judgements about leadership
effectiveness, therefore, willvary.One observer may
readily see effective leadership "ina president who heals a
wounded campus or renewsan institution's culture, while
another finds it more ina leader's potent strategy or
ability to make tough andcourageous decisions over strong
opposition" (Birnbaum, 1992a,p. 52).
Leadership effectiveness (or ineffectiveness)seems to
be ultimately determined by thoseinvolved with it and
affected by it.Kerr and Gade (1986) suggested that
effective leadership meant getting thebest people youcan
find to share the vision and helpachieve it.Birnbaum
(1992a) argued "the most effectivebehaviors of a leaderare
those that fulfill the expectations ofconstituents" (p.
36).However, a leader's superiorsare likely to prefer
different criteria for effectiveness thanhis/her
subordinates.Also, the expectations ofa leader's various
constituent groups are influenced heavilyby culture and
interpretation, and are likely to differfrom campus to
campus and situation to situation.67
According to Hogan et al.(1994), Vaughan (1986), and
Yukl (1989), an important indicatorof leadership
effectiveness is the level of followersupport.Murphy and
Cleveland (1991, cited in Hogan et al.,1994) observed that
the evaluation of a leader's performancedepends, in part,
on the types of relationships that the leaderhas
established with her or his subordinates.Hogan et al.
(1994) argued from the literatureon leadership evaluation
that subordinates are often ina unique position to evaluate
the level of leadership effectiveness.For example, Hegarty
(1974) found that university departmentchairs who received
feedback from their subordinates hadimproved records of
performance and increased levels ofeffectiveness.
Because subordinates are ina unique position to judge
leadership effectiveness,some researchers have investigated
which leadership characteristicssubordinates consideredto
be most important.Studies by Lombardo et al.(1988), and
others, found that a leader's credibilityor trustworthiness
may be the single most important factor insubordinates'
judgements of leaders' effectiveness.
Researchers in academic settings investigatedother
leader traits and behaviors that impactleadership
effectiveness.In The Effective College President,Fisher
et al.(1988) conducted a two-year nationalstudy
investigating whether there were certainleadership traits
or behaviors that enhanced a person's ability to be68
effective in a presidential position.The authors compared
95 effective presidents (as determinedby peer selection and
experts) and their representative(unselected) counterparts
and found that they differed ina variety of dimensions.
Fisher and Tack (1990) expandedon the characteristics of
effective leaders listed by Fisheret al.(1988).According
to Fisher and Tack (1990, pp. 8 10) effective college
presidents:
identify opportunities, analyze theinformation at
hand, consult others, and thenmake a decision;
think carefully about what theysay and do;
believe strongly in thepower of ideas and vision;
are more inclined to encourage staffand faculty to
take risks, to think differently,to be creative and to
share their thoughts no matter howdiverse;
surround themselves with exceedinglyable people;
actively seek input from thosedirectly affected by
decisions and encourage the creationof mechanisms to
provide this feedback;
balance distance and privacy withcloseness and
familiarity...lead warmly withcare and respect.
In a study of how presidentsassess their own
effectiveness, Birnbaum (1989) reportedthat college
presidents were found onaverage to rate themselvesas more
effective than the average presidentand much more effective
than their predecessors.Birnbaum (1989) also foundthat
college presidents tended tosee themselves as responsible
for campus improvements andcampus events that had positive
effects, while denying responsibility forcampus events with69
negative consequences.College presidents often ascribed
their successes to personal skills andabilities, and
failures to the environmentor bad luck.However, Zaleznik
(1993) suggested that a leader's learningfrom her/his
mistakes and making improvementsserves to enhance
leadership effectiveness.
On the other hand, some characteristics ofleaders and
their environmental contexts negativelyimpact leadership
effectiveness, and presidentialcareers tend to derail.
Derailment
The vast majority of researchon leadership
effectiveness sought to determine what leadership
effectiveness is or how it could be taught.Other
researchers such as Hogan et al.(1994) examined leadership
effectiveness in terms of what itwas not; that is,
leadership performance in a negative direction.Many
studies of this type examinedpersons whose careers were in
jeopardy or who had "derailed" (Bentz, 1990; Lombardoet
al., 1988).
Lombardo et al.(1988) argued that studying derailment
specifically illuminates aspects of leader effectivenessnot
usually connected with measures of success alone,
successful executives seem to engage in specific
behaviors which produce a general descriptionof
them as loyal or having integrity.Not blaming
others, admitting personal mistakes, putting
organization over self, and admitting personal70
limits are not often cited in studies examining
predictors of success.Considering reasons why
people fail illuminates the role honor and
integrity play in career success (p. 213, italics
added).
Derailment in a managerial or executive rolecan be defined
as "being involuntarily plateaued, demoted, or fired below
the level of anticipated achievement or reachingthat level
only to fail unexpectedly" (Lombardo et al.,p. 199).
Bentz (1990) studied the notion of derailment while
analyzing the correlates of executive performanceat Sears.
He found that among the persons who had appropriatepositive
characteristics, such as skill, intelligence, confidence,
ambition, and so forth--a subset had failed.Bentz (1990)
believed that failed executives had alienatedsubordinates
through some overriding character flawsor personality
traits which ultimately prevented them from beingeffective.
Bentz (1985, cited in Hogan et al., 1994) suggestedthat the
primary themes associated with failurewere dishonesty,
moodiness, and playing politics.
Lombardo et al.(1988) examined an inventory of
qualitative studies involving over 400company executives.
They found that derailed individualswere much more likely
to be seen as "lacking the cognitive capabilitiesor skills
to think strategically, make high-quality decisions in
ambiguous circumstances and demonstrate needed political
skills than the successful" and "to beseen as unstable,
abrasive, or untrustworthy" (Lombardo et al.,p. 212).Also71
associated with derailment were a failure to direct,
motivate, teach, develop and select wisely.
Other types of behaviors not often measuredas success
characteristics, but which appear to beso according to
Lombardo et al.(1988) are adapting to different kindsof
bosses,(e.g., new presidents or new board members),being
cool in a crisis, and a willingness to learn from allkinds
of people and situations.Benezet, Katz, and Magnusson
(1981) suggested that college leaders who learnfrom errors
are more valuable to an institution than those who don't,
learning to lead a college becomesa conscious
experience if one acknowledges thatmore learning
results from errors than from successes...themost
tangible reward of the president's willingnessto
learn from errors is that theyoccur less
frequently as his term goes on"(p. 108).
Research attempts to understand leadershipsuccess and
failure prompted Hogan et al.(1994) to suggest that there
are "bright side" and "dark side" characteristics to
leadership."Bright side" characteristicswere categorized
as agreeableness, conscientiousness, intelligence,surgency,
and emotional stability.Hogan et al.(1994) argued that
effectiveness requires both the presence of positive
characteristics and the absence of what they called"dark
side" characteristics, "irritating tendencies thatalienate
subordinates and interfere with [effective leadership]"(p.
499).
Many [leaders] who are bright, hard-working,
ambitious, and technically competent fail (orare
in danger of failing) because they are perceived72
as arrogant, vindictive, untrustworthy, selfish,
emotionally unstable, overcontrolling,
insensitive, abrasive, aloof, too ambitious,or
unable to delegate or make decisions(Hogan et
al., 1994, p. 499).
Dark side tendencies, according to theauthors, become
apparent on the job only under certain circumstancesand the
passage of time, but that subordinates are almostalways
aware of them.
Positive and negative aspects of leadershipcontexts,
leader traits, behaviors and situationalfactors tend to
contribute to leadership effectiveness andultimately to a
president's success or failure.
Success and Failure in the College Presidency
Robert Birnbaum (1992a) conducteda landmark study of
success and failure in the college presidency and how
academic leadership works.His five-year longitudinal study
included thirty-two educational institutionsrepresenting
universities, four-year state colleges, four-year
independent colleges, and two-year communitycolleges (eight
institutions in each category).The study's objectivewas
to examine "how college and university presidentsand other
leaders interact and communicate,assess their own and
other's effectiveness, establish goals, learn,transmit
values, and make sense of the complex and dynamic
organizations in which they work." (p. xii).Findings of
the study shed considerable light on the natureof academic73
leadership as well as success and failure inthe college
presidency.
Birnbaum (1992a) identified three types ofacademic
leadership, "the modal presidency", "thefailed presidency",
and "the exemplary presidency."Each categorical typewas
viewed as having a common beginning but withdifferent
outcomes."New presidents" to collegecampuses tended to
enter their roles believing they were effective
institutional leaders based on previousaccomplishments and
their selection over other candidates ina competitive
search process; however, other factors alsotended to
immediately impact their leadership effectiveness.New
presidents often inherited the problems of theirsuccessors
and found themselves under the watchfuleyes of faculty,
staff, administrators and trustees who lookedfor actions
that symbolized and validated the change inleadership.
Birnbaum (1992a) observed thatnew college presidents
are faced with strong and self-fulfilling expectations that
they will act to correct the deficiencies oftheir
predecessors.They are likely initially to be judgedas
successful because,
their desire to learn and makesense of a new
situation appears to demonstratea high level of
concern for constituent interests, their approach
and focus of attention areseen as a welcome
counterbalance to the behavior of the previous
incumbent, and the succession crisis disturbs
ongoing social systems and mutes criticism
(Birnbaum, 1992a, p. 98).74
In their first months on the job,new presidents tended
to be very visible spending time touringcampus, talking
with campus participants, asking questions, seeingand being
seen.Presidents were likely during this earlypart of
their term "to publicly profess a consultative style,and to
formally communicate to the campus their desireto receive
input and their openness to both criticism andsupport"
(Birnbaum, 1992a, p. 86).Their efforts at communication
were rewarded by initial perceptions of presidential
openness, skill, and commitment which led new presidents to
be seen as responsive to their constituents.
During the early phases of their terms, presidentsalso
were likely to hear more praise than criticism of their
actions, "potential criticism ofa new president is muted
because the expectation of good leadership overwhelmsany
evidence to the contrary" (Birnbaum, 1992a,p. 87).This
was the so-called "honeymoon period."During the honeymoon
period, presidents can do littlewrong.Constituents who
supported a new president's actionswere quick to say so,
and those who were troubled tended to watch andwait rather
than speak up.However, "newness" tended to fade with time.
Eventually, constituents were less inclined to givethe
president the benefit of the doubton the basis that he/she
has not yet settled into the position.Also, as new
presidents went from issue to issue and problemto problem,
their responses were initially seen as separate individual75
events.Campus constituents did not yet knowenough to
place them into a contextor interpret them, and the
meanings of the president's actionstended to be unclear
while the actions were being observedserially (Birnbaum,
1992a).Thus, it takes time for noveltyto wear off and for
enough information to be collectedbefore campus
constituents recognize meaningfulpatterns of presidential
words and behaviors.
According to Birnbaum (1992a, 1992b),"new" college
presidents eventually will turnout to be "modal", "failed",
or "exemplary" presidents.
The modal presidency.The modal presidencyas
characterized by Birnbaum (1992a, 1992b)was the typical or
average presidency.It began with high support fromcampus
constituencies (faculty, administrators,and trustees), it
ended without the support of the faculty.Initial
presidential successes and the withholding ofcriticism
during the "honeymoon period" led modalpresidents (a) to
become more certain of themselves,(b) to overestimate their
effectiveness,(c) to become less sensitive tocomplaints,
and (d) to diminish two-way communications.Birnbaum
(1992a) reported:
As modal presidents gain experience,they
communicate and respond more to trusteesand other
administrators than to faculty... facultyleaders
see this happening and conclude that even when
faculty are consulted it is usuallya pro forma76
exercise to provide a patina of legitimacy(p.
93)
As faculty criticism develops, itmay be discounted by
modal presidents as coming from unrepresentativecabals
or stoically accepted as reflecting an unfortunatebut
inescapable consequence of firm leadership(p. 90).
As relationships with faculty diminished, modalpresidents
tended to take increasing comfort in theiradministrative
colleagues (Birnbaum 1992a).Most new presidents tended to
restructure their administration to develop theirown teams
and to create reporting lines andstructures familiar to
them.After the reorganization,new (and/or remaining)
senior administrators, who owed theirpositions to the
president tended to bolster the president'ssense of
competence even as faculty backing diminished(Birnbaum
1992a).This tendency for leaders and theirteams to
reinforce each other's views, isolatethemselves from
disconfirming evidence, and become increasinglyrigid and
resistant to change was not unique to colleges(Katz, 1982;
Pfeffer, 1983; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990,cited in
Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b).
The failed presidency.Failed presidencies startedout
like modal presidencies (Birnbaum, 1992a).However, in
failed presidencies the president not onlylost the
confidence of the faculty (like the modal president),but
also lost the confidence of hisor her board and/or77
administrative colleagues.According to Birnbaum (1992a),
the most common cause of a failed presidency is,
when presidents respond to a crisis by taking
precipitate action without appropriate
consultation, which is seen as violating faculty
rights...it almost always involves the president
engaging in a task-oriented, rational managerial
act that appears insensitive to the humanaspects
of the organization and misreads faculty culture
(p.94 95).
Carroll (1992) observed that this type of situationcan lead
to early presidential departures and votes of "low
confidence" preceding the more serious vote of "no
confidence."However, Birnbaum (1992a) noted that
presidents who were indifferent to faculty viewsand whose
boards were unable or unwilling to intercede, could
sometimes weather the immediate storm and continuein office
longer. Actions of presidents leading to faculty
disaffection initially may be supported by theirboards or
administrative colleagues "because they appearedto reflect
presidential competence, courage, ora 'can-do' attitude"
(Birnbaum, 1992a, p.96).Failed presidents tended to lose
the ability to influence either institutionalprocesses and
outcomes or symbolic interpretations (Birnbaum, 1992b).
But, whether presidents ultimately remainedor departed,
associated emotions and memories of incidents relatedto the
events and circumstances of their tenures tended to remain
in the collective facultt, psyche (Birnbaum, 1992a,1992b;
Carroll, 1992).78
Birnbaum (1992a) found that failed presidents almost
uniformly had a linear view of leadership.Under pressure
they acted expediently and took unilateral action to respond
to what they perceived as a threatening environment.
Because their strategies tended to be linear, theysaw few
alternatives to the courses of action that they followed and
believed that they had no choice in what they did.
Moreover, they displayed the common distortion of
maintaining or even increasing their commitment to the
actions they took, regardless of negative outcomes, to
cognitively justify their past decisions (Birnbaum, 1992b).
In some cases a failed presidency was not
characterized by the occurrence of a precipitousevent;
instead, presidents developed a downward leadership
trajectory in a steady erosion of confidenceover time
(Birnbaum, 1992a).In any instance, "as a failed
president's inability to work constructively with the
faculty becomes evident, it eventually leads to loss of
board or administration support as well (Birnbaum, 1992a,p.
96).These factors stand in stark contrast to
characteristics of an exemplary presidency.
The exemplary presidency.Modal presidents lost
faculty support and failed presidents lost not only faculty
support but also trustee and administrative support.In
contrast, exemplary presidents maintained the support of79
faculty, administrators, and trustees throughout their
institutional careers.Birnbaum (1992a) reported the
following about exemplary presidencies:
Exemplary presidents are seen as both competent
and as sensitive to the social and political
dynamics of their institutions (p.97, emphasis
added).
The most important characteristic of exemplary
presidents is that they are seen as continuingto
respond to the faculty and willing toopen themselves
to faculty influence.They listen to faculty, and they
support existing faculty governance mechanisms (p.98).
[Exemplary presidents] viewed their institutionsas
collective enterprises, and their concern for taskwas
integrated with and inseparable from theirconcern for
people and process (p. 101, emphasis added).
Two key factors in Birnbaum's (1992a) description of
exemplary presidency leadership were cognitive
and the level of constituent support.Cognitive complexity
meant that presidents could see the organization from
multiple perspectives, or "cognitive frames" (Birnbaum,
1992a; see also Bolman & Deal, 1984).The level of
constituent support was considered the most importantaspect
of exemplary leader effectiveness.
Findings of Birnbaum's (1992a, 1992b) studieson
success and failure in the college presidency suggested ten
principles of good academic leadership:(a) making a good
impression,(b) knowing how to listen,(c) balancing
governance systems,(d) avoiding simplistic thinking,(e)
de-emphasizing institutional bureaucracy,(f) re-emphasizing
core values,(g) focusing on institutional strengths,(h)80
encouraging others to be leaders,(i) evaluating yourown
performance, and (j) knowing when toleave.
On the last principle, Birnbaum(1992a) observed that
though it may be in their institution'sbest interests for
presidents to leave voluntarily, theactual decision to
leave is difficult because the presidencyfor many is the
culmination of a career.Birnbaum (1992a) admonished
college presidents, however, "campusleadership positions
are roles not careers...presidents should beprepared to
leave when they no longer have thesupport they need"(p.
193).
Though Birnbaum (1992a, 1992b) admittedthat his
research cannot be generalized to theworld
education, he suggested that presidentialpaths, or
trajectories, "once established, tendto become self-
reinforcing and difficult to change"(Birnbaum, 1992b, p.
21).He further "guesstimated" (his term)that by the time
presidents leave office, "approximatelyone-fourth of all
incumbents will have followed the pathof exemplary
presidents; one-half, of modal presidents;and one-fourth,
of failed presidents" (p.103).Whether new presidents toa
campus follow a modal, failed, or exemplary path isrelated
to the characteristics of the president,the history of the
institution, the nature of the environment,and luck
(Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b).81
Though leadership effectiveness is often discussedand
researched in terms of leader traits, behaviors,power,
internal and external environments, constituentsupport, and
so forth, the "moral/ethical" dimension of leadershipcannot
be overlooked.
Moral/Ethical Dimensions
Many researchers and practitioners in education
maintain that educational leaders must be sensitiveto the
moral and ethical dimensions of their leadership(Birnbaum,
1992a; Bogue, 1985; Hankin, 1992; Hodgkinson,1991; Maxcy,
1991; Moriarty; 1992; Tatum; 1992; Vaughan; 1992).
Effective college leadership buildson both technical and
ethical foundations (Birnbaum, 1992a; Bogue, 1985;Maxcy,
1991).Citing the Josephson Institute for the Advancement
of Ethics, Tatum (1992) wrote that those inleadership
positions "should be honest, have integrity, keeppromises,
possess fidelity, be fair, care about others, respect
others, be responsible citizens, work for excellence,be
accountable for their actions, and protect the publictrust"
(p. 191).
Moriarty (1992) and Vaughan (1992) asserted that
community college presidents, as stewards of thepublic
trust, must continuously think and behave as if ethics and
moral leadership were their most important responsibility.
Because college leaders are involved in processes of82
gathering information, interpretingevents, making decisions
and selecting one course of actionover another, they are
constantly called on to make value choicesand to mediate
and resolve conflict.Conflicts are an inevitablepart of
organizational life and are an essential,necessary and
healthy part of their functioning (Burns,1978; Hodgkinson,
1991).Effective college leaders act witha moral
foundation that permits them to keep theirbalance in
unsettling conditions, "values permitprincipled and
consistent action, even in the midst ofuncertainty"
(Birnbaum, 1992a, p. 183).
The values leaders hold and the choicesthey make
define the moral dimension of their leadership,since they
require leaders to act outside the guidanceof rules,
"values infuse presidents' behavior withmeaning, provide
legitimacy for their actions, and seta moral tone to their
behavior" (Birnbaum, 1992a, p. 184).
Vaughan (1992) proposed that ethics shouldbe at the
center of campus culture.He defined professional ethicsas
"that set of principles, beliefs, and rulesof moral conduct
that guides the actions of the members of thecollege
community" (p.5).Vaughan (1992) also suggested that
college leaders should continuously demonstratean ethical
approach to leadership by being above reproachin their own
professional and personal actions.A leader's words and
actions about moral leadership "ring hollow whenthere is83
little evidence of the leaders personalintegrity or
personal awareness of ethics" (Moriarty,1992, p.55).
Constituents always ask that their leader'sactions support
their rhetoric (Birnbaum, 1992a; Bogue,1985; Hankin, 1992;
Hodgkinson, 1991; Moriarty; 1992; Tatum;1992; Vaughan;
1992).
Tatum (1992) suggested that thereare certain myths of
ethical behavior that tend to influence howsome leaders
conduct themselves and make decisions, but whichshould not
be used to excuse unethical behavior.One of the most
common myths is "If it is legal, it is ethical."It is a
familiar strategy used by politicians andbusiness
executives who take refuge in the law claimingthat the
legality of an action cleansed them of allwrongdoing.
Tatum (1992) pointed out that being legal doesnot equate
with being ethical.People may generally believe thatif
something is not specifically prohibited by law,it's O.K.
to do it.However, not all unacceptableor wrong behaviors
are proscribed by law.
A second myth described by Tatum (1992) is"If you have
a right to do it, it is the right thing to do."This is a
spin-off of the first.Tatum (1992) observed thateven
though it is perfectly legal and even though theperson may
have a right to do it, some actions destroytrust (see also
Bogue, 1985, p. 138).84
One of the most important leadershiptasks, according
to Gardner (1990), is to reinforceor develop processes that
constantly work to engender trust andregenerate an
institution's values.Leadership ultimately isa moral act
based on trust and values.Values can be implicit in whata
leader does, but in a symbolic environmentactions tend to
speak louder than words.Leadership, as an art form
(DePree, 1989), is improved by "the displayof personal
integrity" (Bogue, 1985, p.4, italics added).Public
articulation of shared values and visibledemonstration of
those values by leaders "engenders otherstrust, and trust
induces an increased openness to influence"(Birnbaum,
1992a, p. 185).Institutions that involve themselves in
achieving consensus and empowering peoplerather than
strengthening the hierarchical structureare much more apt
to create an environment conducive to ethicalbehavior than
are others, "shared governance on campus isone safe-guard
against unethical behavior" (Tatum, 1992,p. 206).
Bogue (1985) observed "the moral fibre ofmen and women
in leadership positions is tested daily inactions of
authority and power" (p. 138).Leaders tend to bring their
institutions in harm's way "not so much by lackof technical
skill as by the sacrifice of their integrity"(Bogue, 1985,
p. 138).Community college leaders have opportunities
available almost daily to demonstrate integrity andexhibit85
ethical behavior thereby weaving theirown behavior into the
fabric and culture of the institution(Vaughan, 1992).
Part of the trust that all constituentshave in leaders
is a communicated belief in the rightnessof what is being
done (Greenleaf, 1991).When community college leaders
emphasize values in the decision-makingprocess and
encourage members of the college community to ask ifa
decision or an act is right orwrong they "tap into
institutional values normally associated witheffective
institutions of higher education" (Vaughan,1992, p. 23).
According to Tatum (1992), college leaderswould do well to
preface every decision they make by askingthemselves:Will
this build trust?Will it build long-term trust?How might
it destroy trust?
Hodgkinson (1991) proposed "the integrityor moral
virtue of an administrator is the chiefcomponent of
credibility"(p. 61).Bogue (1985, p. 149 150) identified
five principles that describe the leader of integrity,which
are briefly summarized below.
Curiosity.Leaders in a community of learning modelin
their own lives what they expect of colleaguesand students,
a sustaining curiosity, intense intellectual drive, and
excitement and hunger for learning expressed inreflection
and action.
Candor.Leaders speak the truth--with sensitivityor
more force when appropriate.They ask for the truth, value86
dissent, and are willing to endure thediscomfort carried by
the truth.
Courtesy.Leaders treat each person withdignity, from
professor to groundskeeper, fromgovernor to student.They
resist arrogance becausearrogance offends a person's
dignity.
Courage.Leaders are willing to risk, to standin
isolation, to confront wrong-doing, tocommunicate directly
and forthrightly, and to accept themistakes of self and
others and learn from them.
Compassion.Leaders create hope and inspirationin
others by investing colleagues withtrust and high
expectations and by opening opportunityfor development.
Other useful principles for achievingeffective and
ethical leadership were offered by Hodgkinson(1991), "know
the task, the situation, the followership,and oneself" (p.
153) and "let the leader seek to be--sofar as possible-
good and true"(p. 154).
The foregoing review of relevant researchliterature
was purposively selected to facilitate connectionsbetween
what currently is known about leadershipin higher education
and the particular elements and context ofthe crisis in
leadership that occurred at Meadow ViewCommunity College.87
CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF RELEVANT METHODOLOGICAL LITERATURE
Overview
The selection of a research methodologydepends in
large part upon its usefulness to thepurposes of the
research.Silverman (1993) observed, "it isan increasingly
accepted view that work becomes scientific byadopting
methods of study appropriate to its subjectmatter (p.144).
Similarly, Hammersley (1992) wrote, "our decisionsabout
what level of precision is appropriate inrelation to any
particular claim should dependon the nature of what we are
trying to describe, on the likelyaccuracy of our
descriptions, on our purposes, andon the resources
available to us" (cited in Silverman, 1993,p. 26).
Real problems for research, according toErlandson et
al.(1993), "always appear in particular contexts"(p. 43).
While relevant data leading to resolution of theresearch
problem may come from many sources, solutionsare always
bound by the contexts (Erlandson, et al., 1993).Thus, one
of the roles of the researcher is "to gaina "holistic"
(systemic, encompassing, integrated) overviewof the context
under study" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.6).
In addition to arriving at an understanding ofthe
problem in its real context, Silverman (1993)suggested that
the investigator may open new avenues of action and88
perception among those studied, "Organisationalleaders may
be ignorant of the dysfunctional aspects ofcertain programs
or processes and an exposure to the research findingsmay
serve to correct their misconceptions" (p.174).
Selecting research methods appropriate to thesubject
matter, gaining a holistic understanding of thecontext
under study, and sharing research findings withthose
studied are important aspects of research in fieldsof
education, sociology and anthropology.In such fields of
research, "the naturalistic paradigm is the paradigmof
choice" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.260).
The Naturalistic Inquiry Paradigm
The naturalistic inquiry paradigm "providesa means of
exploring and understanding contexts--theirsuccesses, their
issues, and their problems" (Erlandson, et al.,1993, p.
176).The essence of naturalistic research is "the ability
to get inside the social context, to share constructed
realities with the stakeholders in that context, andto
construct new realities that enhance both the knowledge of
the researcher and the knowledge and efficacy of the
stakeholders" (Erlandson, et al. 1993, p. 68).Thus, a
principal task of naturalistic research is "to communicatea
setting with its complex interrelationships and multiple
realities to the intended audience in a way that enableand89
require that audiences interact cognitivelyand emotionally
with the setting" (Erlandson, et al., 1993,p. 163).
The naturalistic research paradigm differsin many ways
from the conventional, or positivist, researchparadigm.
The aim of naturalistic inquiry is not to developa body of
knowledge in the form of nomothetic (lawlike)
generalizations that are statements free fromtime or
context.The aim of naturalistic research is "to develop
shared constructions that illuminatea particular context
and provide working hypotheses for the investigationof
others" (Erlandson, et al., 1993, p. 45).Key differences
in the axioms, or underlying assumptions,for the
conventional (positivist) and naturalist researchparadigms
are illustrated in Table 1.
Validity, Reliability and Generalization
Naturalistic and conventional researchparadigms also
differ on conceptualizations of what makesa study credible
or trustworthy.A primary assumption underlying
naturalistic qualitative research is that realityis
holistic, multidimensional, and ever-changing; it isnot a
single, fixed, objective phenomenon waiting to beobserved,
measured and discovered (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).Moreover,
if the primary rationale for conductingan investigation is90
understanding (Agar, 1986),rather than predictionor
discovery of a law or testinga hypothesis, the criteria for
TABLE 1
Contrasting Conventional (Positivist)and Naturalist Axioms
Axioms About Conventional Paradigm Naturalist Paradigm
Nature of
reality
Relationship of
knower to the
known
Possibility of
generalization
Possibility of
causal linkages
Reality is single,
tangible, and
fragmentable.
Knower and known are
independent, a
dualism
Time- and context-
free generalizations
(nomo-thetic
statements) are
possible.
There are real
causes, temporally
precedent to or
simultaneous with
their effects.
Role of values Inquiry is value-
free.
(adapted from Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
Realities are
multiple,
constructed, and
holistic.
Knower and known
are interactive,
inseparable.
Only time- and
context-bound
working hypotheses
(ideo-graphic
statements) are
possible.
All entities are in
a state of mutual
simultaneous
shaping, so that it
is impossible to
distinguish causes
from effects.
Inquiry is value-
bound.
determining a study's trustworthinessare also going to be
different.91
In the conventional paradigm, theterms validity
(internal and external) and reliabilityare often used to
describe and determine the trustworthinessof studies.To
make comparisons in the conceptualizationsof what is
credible or trustworthy in naturalisticand conventional
paradigms, the traditional terms reliability,internal
validity, and external validityare paired with the
preferred qualitative terms dependability,credibility, and
transferability, respectively.
Many naturalistic and qualitativeresearchers consider
the terms dependability, credibility, andtransferability,
viable alternatives for more meaningfullyassessing the
"trustworthiness" of qualitative research(Erlandson, et
al., 1993; Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Lincoln& Guba, 1985;
Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Reliability and dependability.The underlying issue
here is whether the process of the study isconsistent and
reasonably stable over time andacross researchers and
methods.In other words, have things been done with
reasonable care (Miles & Huberman, 1994).Within
conventional studies, reliability is typicallydemonstrated
by replication, "if two or more repetitionsof essentially
similar inquiry processes under essentiallysimilar
conditions yield essentially similar findings,the92
reliability of the inquiry is indisputablyestablished"
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 298).
However, reliability in qualitative researchtends to
be problematic simply because human behavioris never
static, and situations constantly change.Thus, according
to Merriam (1988) replication of a qualitativestudy will
not yield the same results.
Because what is being studied in education is
assumed to be in flux, multifaceted, and highly
contextual, because information gathered isa
function of who gives it and how skilledthe
researcher is at getting it, and because the
emergent design of a qualitative study precludesa
priori controls, achieving reliability inthe
traditional sense is not only fanciful but
impossible (Merriam, 1988, p. 171).
Since reliability in the traditionalsense seems to be
inappropriate when applied to qualitative research,Lincoln
and Guba (1985) suggested thinking about the"dependability"
or "consistency" of the results obtained from the data.
That is, given the data collected and the methodsused, are
they consistent and dependable?Silverman (1993) emphasized
"authenticity" rather than reliabilityas the salient issue
in qualitative research, "the aim is usuallyto gather an
`authentic' understanding of people's experiences"(p.10).
Yin (1994) tended to approach the problemof
reliability differently.He suggested there is a need for
better documentation of research methods incase studies,
"in the past, case study research procedures havebeen
poorly documented" (p.37); and, "one prerequisitefor93
allowing [another] investigator torepeat an earlier case
study is the need to document the proceduresfollowed in the
earlier case" (p. 36).Along with better documentation of
methods, a case study's reliability,or dependability, or
authenticity is also strengthened throughtriangulation,
i.e., the use of multiplesources (Erlandson, et al., 1993;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Silverman,1993; Yin,
1994).
Internal validity and credibility.Internal validity,
in conventional use, is primarilya concern for causal
relationships.An investigator attempts to infer thata
relationship between two variables is causalor that the
absence of a relationship implies the absence ofa cause
(Cook and Campbell, 1979, cited in Lincoln& Guba, 1985).
More useful to the qualitative researcher, however,are
questions of credibility and authenticity ratherthan
causality (Miles & Huberman, 1994).That is, do the
findings of the study make sense?Are they credible to the
people studied and to the readers?Is there an authentic
portrait of what was studied?
Judging the validity of a qualitative studyrests upon
an investigator's ability to show that he or she has
represented the multiple realities of the stakeholders
adequately, i.e., the researcher has presenteda credible
rendering of how the informants viewed themselves andtheir94
experiences (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984; Merriam,1988).It is
important in naturalistic qualitativeresearch to understand
the perspectives of those involved in thephenomenon of
interest, to uncover the complexity ofhuman behavior ina
contextual framework, and to presenta holistic
interpretation of what is happening (Lincoln& Guba, 1985;
Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Several strategies for ensuring internalvalidity by an
investigator have been suggested by researchers(Erlandson,
et al., 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam,1988; Miles &
Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 1993; Yin, 1994).Among the
strategies were (a) triangulation throughuse of multiple
sources of data,(b) member checks through asking
participants for verification of factualcontent, and (c)
explication of researcher biases throughclarifying the
researcher's assumptions, preferences, andtheoretical
orientation at the outset of the study.
External validity and transferability.External
validity is concerned with the extent to whichthe findings
of one study can be applied to other situations.That is,
how generalizable are the results?Because of different
fundamental assumptions within the conventionaland
naturalistic research paradigms, interpretationof the term
"generalizing" differs.95
In conventional research generalizationsare made from
samples to populations or universes.Generalizations to
other settings or people are made throughassumptions of
some equivalency between the sample and the populationfrom
which it was drawn.The research utilizes random sampling,
control of sample size, and statistical inferenceswithin
specified levels of confidence.
Naturalistic qualitative research,on the other hand,
does not and cannot generalize in thesame way.Erickson
(1986) argued that the production ofgeneralizable knowledge
is an inappropriate goal for qualitativeinterpretive
research, "the search is not for abstract universalsarrived
at by statistical generalizations froma sample to a
population, but for concrete universals arrivedat by
studying a specific case in great detail and thencomparing
it with other cases studied in equallygreat detail" (p.
130).According to Silverman (1993) the issue of
generalizing in qualitative research "should becouched in
terms of the generalisability of cases to theoretical
propositions rather than to populationsor universes" (p.
160).
Erlandson et al.(1993) wrote that generalizations in
the traditional sense would be problematic fornaturalistic
research because "every context shiftsover time as the
persons in the context, their constructions of reality, and
the relationships among them also shift (even ifthe96
individuals are the same)," thus "notrue generalization is
really possible; all observationsare defined by the
specific contexts in which they occur"(p. 32).
Generalizing from samples to universessimply is "incorrect
when dealing with case studies" (Yin, 1994,p. 36).
Firestone (1993) recognized these differencesin
determining generalizability and suggestedthree levels of
generalization:(1) from sample to population,as in
conventional research;(2) analytic, for theory-connected
studies; and (3) case-to-case transfer,more helpful for
qualitative studies (cited in Miles& Huberman, 1994).
Schofield (1990) usefully distinguished generalizingto
"what is" (other actual contexts), "whatmay be" (sites
undergoing some similar process), and "whatcould be"
(exemplary or ideal cases)(cited in Miles & Huberman,
1994).
In an alternative view, Stake (1978) describedwhat he
termed "naturalistic generalization" (cited inMerriam,
1988).That is, people look for patterns that explaintheir
own experience as well as events in the world around them.
A thorough knowledge of the particular allowsone to see
similarities in new and foreign contexts (see also,Dewey,
1938).Generalizability in this sense is ultimatelyrelated
to what the reader is trying to learn from thecase study.
Readers of case studies draw on their tacit knowledge,
intuition, and personal experience by "recognizing97
similarities of objects and issues in andout of context and
by sensing the natural covariations of happenings"(Stake,
1978, cited in Merriam, 1988, p. 176).Reader or user
generalizability involves leaving the extent to whicha
study's findings apply to other situationsup to the people
in those situations."It is the reader who has to ask,what
is there in this study that I can apply tomy own situation,
and what clearly does not apply? (Walker, 1980,p. 34, cited
in Merriam, 1988).
Though a particular context has "meaningonly in the
idiographic sense, that is, for that contextat that time"
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.216), theremay be other contexts
with similar features.Transferability from one context to
another may occur because of those shared characteristics.
The degree of transferability is a "direct functionof the
similarity between the two contexts,or the degree of
congruence between sending and receiving contexts" (Lincoln
& Guba, 1985, p. 124).To establish transferability,
however, similar information must be available for both
sending and receiving contexts.The research report
supplies information only about the studied context.This
may make it possible for a reader to judge the degree of
transferability to some other context.
A function of the case study is to provide essential
judgmental information about the studied context througha
"thick description" of that context (Erlandson, et al.,98
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, Merriam, 1988).Guba and
Lincoln (1989) explained:
The thick description enables observersof other
contexts to make tentative judgments about
applicability of certain observations fortheir
contexts and to form "working hypotheses"to guide
empirical inquiry in those contexts.This is an
important distinction:In a traditional study it
is the obligation of the researcherto ensure that
findings can be generalized to thepopulation;in
a naturalistic study the obligation for
demonstrating transferability belongs to thosewho
would apply it to the receivingcontext (cited in
Erlandson, et al., 1993, p. 34).
Through this rich, thick description, "anyoneelse
interested in transferability hasa base of information
appropriate to the judgment" thereby improvingthe
generalizability of a study's findings (Lincolnand Guba,
1985, pp. 124-125).
Thus, naturalistic qualitative researchconceptualizes
and utilizes more appropriate research termsto describe and
determine what makes a study credibleor trustworthy.
Characteristics of Naturalistic Research
Characteristics of naturalistic research followfrom a
logical dependence upon the axioms outlined inTable 1.
These include preference for and relianceupon (a)a natural
setting,(b) the human as instrument,(c) purposive
sampling,(d) inductive analysis,(e) emergent design, and
(f) grounded theory.99
Natural setting.The natural setting or "real-life"
context is preferred because a fundamentalassumption of the
naturalistic paradigm is that realitiesare wholes that
cannot be understood in isolation from theircontexts, nor
can they be isolated for separate study of theparts.Thus,
the context's gestalt has primary importance--thewhole is
more than the sum of the parts.
Marshall and Rossman (1989) suggested thatthe ideal
research site is where (a) entry is possible,(b) there is a
high probability for a rich mix ofprocesses, people,
interactions, and/or structures that characterizethe
research problem, and (c) the researchercan devise an
appropriate role to maintain continuity ofpresence for as
long as necessary (cited in Erlandson, et al.,1993).
Human as instrument.The human investigator asa
research instrument is considered ideal fornaturalistic
case studies (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985;
Merriam, 1988; Yin, 1994).This is because of the
understanding that all instruments interact withrespondents
and objects but that "only the human instrument iscapable
of grasping and evaluating the meaning of thatdifferential
interaction" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 39).Humans have the
ability to be infinitely adaptable, tosense out salient
factors and follow up on them, and to make continuous100
adjustments and changes, all while activelyengaged in the
inquiry itself (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Moreover, the human as research-instrumenthas the
advantage of possessing not only propositionalknowledge,
but also tacit knowledge.Polanyi (cited in Lincoln& Guba,
1985) distinguished between propositionaland tacit
knowledge.Propositional knowledge is expressiblein
language form and is composed of all interpersonally
shareable statements, which for most peopleare observations
of objects and events.In contrast, tacit knowledge
(intuitive, felt), may also dwellon objects and events, but
it is a knowledge gained from experienceswith them,
experiences with propositions about them,and reflections on
those experiences.Polanyi (1962) explained thattacit
knowledge is always knowing more thanwe can say.Tacit
knowledge permits us to comprehend metaphors,to know
ourselves, or to know how to do somethingas simple as
riding a bicycle.Tacit knowledge "applies equallyto
connoisseurship as the art of knowing and to skillsas the
art of doing, wherefore both can be taughtonly by aid of
practical example and never solely by precept"(Polanyi,
1962, p. 88).Thus, experience and practical involvement
with the research are key.
For the qualitative researcher, tacit knowledge
includes a multitude of inexpressible associationswhich
give rise to new meanings, new ideas, andnew applications.101
"Tacit knowledge becomes the baseon which the human
instrument builds many of the insights andhypotheses that
will eventually develop..." (Lincoln& Guba, 1985, p. 198).
These perhaps may eventually be cast intopropositional
form.
Utilization of tacit knowledge in additionto
propositional knowledge is important tocase studies.Often
the nuances of the research context and the multiple
realities of respondents can be appreciatedonly in a tacit
way, because much of the interactions between the researcher
and the context and the respondentsoccur at this level.
Purposive sampling.Naturalistic sampling is basedon
informational not statistical considerations.Purposive
sampling is a well-known and widely used samplingstrategy
in qualitative research and is "themost appropriate
sampling strategy for a qualitativecase study" (Merriam,
1988, p. 52).In most case studies, it is impossibleto
interview everyone, observe everything, and gatherall
relevant materials in the case.
Erlandson et al.(1993) emphasized that purposive
sampling is a procedure governed by emerging insightsabout
what is relevant to the study, and the deliberateseeking of
both typical and divergent data that the insightssuggest.
Such an approach maximizes the range of specificinformation
that could be obtained from and about a particularcontext.102
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985),sampling to obtain
maximum variation facilitates theuncovering of a fullarray
of multiple realities without suppressingdivergent types of
information.With divergent types of information,the
likelihood of bias will have been reduced(Yin, 1994).
Lincoln and Guba (1985) characterizedpurposive
sampling with the following features:
1. Emergent sampling design:No a priori
specification of the sample is determinedbefore
the study.Sampling depends on the particular ebb
and flow of information as the study iscarried
out.
2. Continuous adjustment or "focusing" ofthe sample.
Insights and information accumulateand the
investigator develops working hypothesesabout the
situation.The sample may be refined to focus
more particularly on those units thatseem most
relevant.
3. Serial selection of sample units.One sample unit
leads to another. Successive unitsare selected
based on the need to extend, test, and fillin
information already obtained.
4. Selection to point of redundancy.Sampling ends
when no new information emerges.The criterion is
informational redundancy, nota statistical
confidence level.103
Goetz and LeCompte (1984, p.78 82) proposed
additional strategies to select informantsprior to the
collection of interview data.They identified the
following:
1. Comprehensive sampling--examiningevery case,
instance, or element in a given population(e.g.,
interviewing all board members).
2. Quota selection--identifying the majorsubgroups
and then taking an arbitrary numberfrom each.
3. Reputational case selection--instanceschosen on
the recommendation of an "expert"or "key
informant."
Purposive sampling is an integralpart of the ongoing
process of naturalistic data collection and analysis,which
is primarily an inductive rather than deductiveprocess.
Inductive data analysis.Inductive data analysis often
characterizes qualitative case studies.According to Goetz
and LeCompte (1984), inductive data analysis "beginswith
collection of data--empirical observationsor measurements
of some kind--and builds theoretical categoriesand
propositions from relationships discoveredamong data" (p.
4).Lincoln and Guba (1985) defined inductivedata analysis
simply as "a process of 'making sense' of fielddata" (p.
202).104
The use of inductive data analysispresumes a
preference for an open and relativelyunstructured research
design which increases the possibility ofcoming across
unexpected issues (Merriam, 1988; Silverman,1993).Many
researchers adhere to the notion of inductivepurity which
spurns early attempts to impose theories and concepts which
may blind the researcher to important features ina case and
cause a misreading of local participants' perspectives
(Silverman, 1993).In contrast, Miles and Huberman (1994)
suggested that a lack of conceptual structure,or bounding
or focusing, may lead to indiscriminate data collectionand
data overload.Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that
"better research happens when you makeyour framework--and
associated choices of research questions,cases, sampling,
and instrumentation--explicit, rather thanclaiming
inductive 'purity'" (Miles & Huberman, 1994,p. 23).
Emergent design.Research designs in naturalistic
inquiry are fundamentally different from those in
traditional research.Naturalistic designs are not
preordinate, but are emergent.Erlandson et al.(1993) wrote
"the design of a naturalistic study is usuallynot fully
established before the study begins butemerges as data are
collected, preliminary analysis is conducted, and the
context becomes more fully described" (p. 66).Lincoln and
Guba (1985) stated that "naturalistic studiesare virtually105
impossible to design in any definitiveway before the study
is actually undertaken" (p. 187).However, neither of these
views necessarily implies that naturalisticstudies do not
have a characteristic pattern of unfoldingand development.
From the start of data collection, thequalitative analyst
is "beginning to decide what thingsmean--is noting
regularities, patterns, explanations, possible
configurations, causal flows, and propositions"(Miles &
Huberman, 1994, p.11).According to Miles and Huberman
(1994), a conceptual framework explains, eithergraphically
or in narrative form, "the main things to be studied--the
key factors, constructs, or variables--andthe presumed
relationships among them" (p.18).
Grounded theory.Grounded theory is theory that
follows from the data rather than precedingthem, as in
conventional inquiry (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).No a priori
theory could anticipate the numerous realitieslikely to be
encountered in the field, nor could itencompass the many
factors related to contextual elements and valueswhich make
a difference at the local level (Strauss & Corbin, 1990;
Marshall & Rossman, 1989).Formulation of groundedor local
theory therefore is "an aggregate of local understandings"
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.204).
Consequently, generation of a qualitative study's
conclusions are considered tentative because (a) different106
interpretations are likely to be meaningfulfor different
realities,(b) interpretations depend heavilyfor their
validity on the contextual factorsinvolved, and (c) mutual
shaping influences and local valuesystems may vary sharply
from site to site (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Qualitative Methods
Qualitative methods are used to study whatpeople do
and what happens to them in their naturalcontexts (Merriam,
1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman,1993; Yin, 1996).
Qualitative methods give us "a strong handleon what 'real
life' is like" (Miles & Huberman, 1994,p. 10).Qualitative
methods can study processesas well as outcomes (Merriam
1988; Silverman, 1993) and theyare relatively flexible
(Silverman, 1993).With their emphasis on real-life
settings and people's lived experiences,qualitative methods
"are fundamentally well suited for locatingthe meanings
people place on the events,processes, and structures of
their lives" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.10).
Because real life occurs in a multiplicity ofsettings,
there is no standard approach to conductingqualitative
research (Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman,1994; Silverman,
1993).Qualitative research tends to bemore of a craft
than a strict adherence to methodologicalrules, "no study
conforms exactly to a standard methodology; eachone calls
for the researcher to bend the methodologyto the107
peculiarities of the setting" (Miles& Huberman, 1994, p.
5).
In validating qualitative research,three forms of
research validation are often used:(a) prolonged engagement
(Erlandson, et al., 1993; Lincoln & Guba,1985);(b)
respondent validation or member checking(Erlandson, et al.,
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988;Silverman, 1993);
and,(c) comparing different kinds of data intriangulation
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Miles& Huberman,
1994; Silverman, 1993; Yin, 1994).Triangulation is treated
in a separate section of this chapterand in Chapter 4.
Regarding prolonged engagement, time isrequired to
allow the researcher to be integrated intothe research
context so that his/her presence is not considereda major
stimulus of respondent behavior (Goetz& LeCompte, 1984).
Prolonged engagement provides a foundationfor credibility
by enabling the researcher to learn theculture of an
organization over an extended time period that"tempers
distortions introduced by particular eventsor by the
newness of researchers and respondents to each other's
presence" (Erlandson, et al., 1993, p.132).
Validation in the form of member checkingis often
utilized by the researcher during the interviewprocess
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Erlandson, et al., 1993).
Information obtained during interviews is reflectively
summarized by the researcher and "played back"to the108
respondents.In so doing, the researcher communicateswhat
he/she believed had been saidor what had been understoodup
to that point.This process is advantageous fortwo
reasons.First, the respondents are oftenreminded of new
or additional information upon hearing thesummary; and
second, it invites the respondents toreact to the validity
of the constructions which the interviewerhad made.This
gives the respondents opportunity to clarifyor refine their
responses and enhances the validity of the data (Lincoln&
Guba, 1985; Erlandson, et al., 1993).
Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection is separated from dataanalysis in a
conventional study.In naturalistic qualitative research,
however, data collection and analysis isa simultaneous
activity and one of the major featuresthat distinguishes
naturalistic research from traditional research(Erlandson,
et al., 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988;Miles &
Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 1993; Yin, 1994).
The continuous recursive analysis of dataleads to
emerging insights and hunches whichare used to direct
successive phases of research.Simultaneous analysis and
data collection allows the researcher "to directthe data
collection phase more productively",as well as to develop a
data base that is "both parsimonious and relevant"
(Erlandson, et al., 1993, p. 108).109
Merriam (1988) described data inqualitative case
studies as(a) detailed descriptions of situations,events,
people, interactions, and observedbehaviors,(b) direct
quotations from people about theirexperiences, attitudes,
beliefs, and thoughts, and (c) excerptsor entire passages
from documents, correspondence, andrecords.
Lincoln and Guba (1985) wrote thatnaturalistic
qualitative case study data analysis isnot an inclusive
phase that can be marked outas occurring at some singular
time during the inquiry process (for instance,following
data collection and preceding reportwriting).Data
analysis "must begin with thevery first data collection, in
order to facilitate the emergent design,grounding of
theory, and emergent structure of laterdata collection
phases" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985,p. 241-242).
According to Miles and Huberman (1994),collected data
are useful to a case study if they can (a) identifynew
leads of importance,(b) extend the area of information,(c)
relate or bridge already existing elements,(d) reinforce
main trends,(e) account for other information alreadyin
hand,(f) exemplify or provide more evidence foran
important theme, and (g) qualifyor refute existing
information.Thus, naturalistic qualitative data analysis
is the "process of bringing order, structure,and meaning to
the mass of collected data...a search for generalstatements110
about relationships among categoriesof data" (Marshal &
Rossman, 1989, p. 112).
Naturalistic qualitativecase study data analysis is
similar to that of traditionalethnographic inquiry
described by Goetz and LeCompte (1981,cited in Lincoln and
Guba, 1985).That is, as data are recorded andclassified,
they also are comparedacross categories.The discovery of
relationships among the data beginswith an analysis of
initial observations and undergoescontinuous refinement
throughout the data collection and analysisprocess.It
continuously feeds back into theprocess of category coding.
As events are constantly compared withprevious events, new
dimensions as well as new relationshipsare discovered.
The "method of constant comparison"(Erlandson, et al.,
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) for dataprocessing is useful in
case studies.It provides an excellent fit with theneed
for continuous and simultaneous collectionand analysis of
data.The method of constant comparisongenerates
theoretical properties for categories anddelimites data
which serves to economizeresources and provide workable
limits for the research (Erlandson, et al.,1993; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985).
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested fourdecision
criteria to end data collection and processing:(a)
exhaustion of sources (althoughsources may be recycled and
tapped multiple times);(b) saturation of categories111
(continuing data collection would producetiny increments of
new information in comparison to the effort expendedto get
them);(c) emergence of regularities (thesense of data
integration); and (d) over-extension (thesense that new
information was far removed from thecore of viable
categories that emerged).
As naturalistic qualitative dataare collected,
constantly compared, categorized and analyzed,they also are
triangulated.
Triangulation
Triangulation of data is crucially importantin
naturalistic qualitative case studies (Erlandson,et al.,
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988;Miles & Huberman,
1994; Silverman, 1993; Yin, 1994).Since all data must be
interpreted in terms of their contexts, it isextremely
important that sufficient materials be collectedto give
holistic views of the studied context (Erlandson,et al.,
1993).
Through triangulation, several differenttypes of
sources are sought which provide insights about thesame
events or relationships (Erlandson, et al., 1993;Lincoln &
Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Silverman, 1993;Yin, 1994).The
use of multiple sources of evidence in triangulationallows
the investigator to address a broaderrange of questions and
issues.Yin (1994) reported that case studies using112
multiple sources of evidencewere rated more highly, in
terms of overall quality, than those thatrelied only on
single sources of information.
Through triangulation of data, potentialproblems of
construct validity are addressed, "becausethe multiple
sources of evidence essentially provide multiplemeasures of
the same phenomenon" (Yin, 1994, p.92).Triangulation
serves to enhance meaning (Erlandson, et al., 1993),
"overcome partial views" (Silverman, 1993,p. 157), and
provides "thick description" of relevantinformation
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
The most important advantage presentedby using
multiple sources of evidence throughtriangulation is
converging lines of inquiry.That is, any finding ina
naturalistic qualitative case study islikely to be much
more convincing and accurate if it is basedon several
different sources of information, "followinga corroboratory
mode" (Yin, 1994, p. 92).
Common sources of qualitative case study dataused in
triangulation are observations, interviews,and extant
documents and records.
Observations
Observations are first-hand experiences withthe
research environment.As a research technique, observations
may "intrude as a foreign element into the socialsetting113
they would describe, theycreate as well as measure
attitudes, they elicit atypical rolesand responses, they
are limited to those who are accessible..."(Webb, et al.,
1981, cited in Merriam, 1988,p. 104).However,
observations also "maximize the inquirer'sability to grasp
motives, beliefs, concerns, interests,unconscious
behaviors, customs, and the like" and"to grasp the culture
in its own natural, ongoing environment"(Guba & Lincoln,
1981 cited in Lincoln & Guba, 1985,p. 273).
Observations can be classified in at leasttwo ways,
participant or nonparticipant.As a participant-observer,
the researcher would play two rolessimultaneously, that of
observer and that of a legitimate andcommitted member of
the group.As a nonparticipant-observer, theresearcher
would be a spectator.
Interviews
Interviews provide valuable data for qualitativecase
studies.Interviews can be described asa conversation with
a purpose (Dexter, 1970, cited in Merriam, 1988).Though
many tend to think of interviews simply as an investigator
asking questions of a subjector respondent, in many case
studies interviews take the form ofa dialogue or an
interaction (Erlandson, et al., 1993).Interviews help the
researcher to understand and to put intocontext the114
interpersonal, social, and cultural aspectsof the
environment under study (Erlandson, et al.,1993).
Interviews in case studies are usefulin discovering
what people think, how one person'sperceptions compare with
another's, and how those varyingresponses are related in
the context of common group beliefs and themes(Fetterman,
1989, cited in Erlandson, et al., 1993).
Though interviews are one of the best in-depthways to
find out what people think abouta subject, Yin (1994)
cautioned that interviews should be consideredverbal
reports only.As such, they are "subject to thecommon
problems of bias, poor recall, andpoor or inaccurate
articulation" (Yin, 1994, p.85).
Types of research interviews mayrange from those that
are structured (very focused or predetermined) to thosethat
are unstructured (very open-ended and nothing is said ahead
of time).In an unstructured interview, the format is
nonstandardized and the interviewer does not seeknormative
responses, but encourages the interviewee to introduce his
or her own notions of what is relevant (Lincoln & Guba,
1985).In the structured interview, the problem is defined
by the researcher before the interview, questionshave been
formulated ahead of time, and the respondent isexpected to
answer in terms of the interviewer's framework and
definition of the problem (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).115
However, the most common interview formatin
naturalistic case study research is thesemistructured and
open-ended type of interview (Erlandson,et al., 1993; Yin,
1994).With the semistructured format, interviewsare
guided by a set of basic questions and issuesto be explored
which allow for some structure and focus,but at the same
time provide a wider range of flexibility.Including an
open-ended feature in interviews allows theinvestigator to
ask key respondents for the facts of thematter as well as
for their opinions about events (Yin, 1994).
Yin (1994) also suggested that "ifone of the
interviewees refuses to comment,even though the others tend
to corroborate one another's versions of whattook place,"
the good case study report "will indicatethis result by
citing the fact that a personwas asked but declined to
comment" (p.85).
Naturalistic case study interview questionsare often
designed to reflect the following categoriesof response
types suggested by Merriam (1988) and Silverman(1993).
1. Facts:statements from informed sources aboutthe
structures, policies and actions of the
organization and/or descriptions ofan event or
community (Silverman, 1993).
2. Feelings and motives:use of open ended questions
allowing the respondents to choose theirown terms116
in relating their perceptions,reactions, values,
intentions, beliefs and desires(Silverman, 1993).
3. Standards of action:relating to what people
think should or could have beendone about certain
stated situations, reflectingpersonal experience
with the those situations (Silverman,1993).
4. Experience/behavior:questions aimed at eliciting
descriptions of experiences, behaviors,actions,
and activities that would have beenobservable had
the observer been present (Merriam,1988).
Establishing an interview formatand types of research
questions facilitates the gathering andrecording of
relevant research data.
Accurate recording of interview data isimportant to
research credibility.One of the best methods of recording
interview data is to audio tape andtranscribe the
interviews.For many studies, however, transcribing
numerous and lengthy interviews often can be prohibitively
expensive and time-consuming.Therefore, Merriam (1988)
proposed use of an "interview log"as an alternative to
verbatim transcription for graduate studentresearch.
The interview log is used to recordnecessary details
of the interview includingname, date, place and important
statements or ideas expressed by the respondents.Words,
phrases or entire sentences are quoted exactly.The notes
are coded to the tape counter so the location of thequotes117
can be easily accessed.The interview log also includesthe
researcher's observations about whatwas said.
Interviews are extremely useful incollecting relevant
research data for case studies, but interviewshave been
known to also have beneficial educativeand empowering
effects on participants.Erlandson and others,(1993)
suggested that participation ina naturalistic study should
be educative and empowering wherein"the naturalistic
researcher, rather than acquiringpower or supporting
existing power structures, seeks toempower all who
participate in the study" (p.158).This is primarily
achieved by openly soliciting and honoringeach individual
construction of the context under study.For the interviews
to be educative, "each participantemerges with more
information and better understanding thanhe or she had
initially" (Erlandson, et al., 1993,p. 158).
Documents
Documentary data are particularly reliablesources of
information for case studies for severalreasons.Documents
tend to reveal aspects of a contextor situation that could
not be observed because they took place beforethe study
began (Merriam, 1988).Documents exist independent of the
research agenda and are unaffected by theresearch process
(Yin, 1994).Documents also ground the investigation in118
real-world issues and concerns and lendcontextual richness
to the investigation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
However, because documentsare produced for reasons
other than research, there are alsopotential problems
associated with them.Documents may reflect idealized
aspects of the organization (Patton, 1980, citedin Merriam,
1988).They might be fragmentary and theirauthenticity may
be difficult to determine (Merriam, 1988).Yin (1994)
therefore suggested, "for case studies,the most important
use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidencefrom
other sources" (p. 81).
The mode of choice in reportingon the qualitative data
obtained through observations, interviews,and documents is
the case study approach (Erlandson, et al.,1993; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985; Yin, 1994).
The Case Study Approach
Case studies are useful in presenting informationabout
areas of curiosity and interest where little researchhas
been conducted (Merriam, 1988; Yin, 1994),and case studies
"frequently provide more information aboutthe process of
administration than the contentor knowledge base of the
field" (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1991,p. 4).While no
naturalistic study could ever describeor explain any
research context in full, qualitativecase studies have the
advantage of providing direction for dealing withthe same119
setting in the future or directing inquiryinto other
similar settings (Erlandson, et al.,1993).
Lincoln and Guba (1985) asserted thatthe case study
reporting mode is the vehicle of choicefor naturalistic
research.The case study mode is oftenpreferred because it
is more adapted to a description ofmultiple realities
encountered in the research context(Lincoln & Guba, 1985),
it could build on the reader's tacitknowledge through
presenting holistic and lifelike descriptionsthat would
allow the reader to experience thecontext vicariously
(Erlandson, et al., 1993), and it providesthe "thick
description" necessary for judgments oftransferability to
other sites (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Lincoln& Guba, 1985).
The case study approach also providesan assessment of the
context by communicating information groundedin the
particular setting being studied(Erlandson, et al., 1993;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985), it has the abilityto deal with a
full variety of evidence--documents, interviews,and
observations (Yin, 1994), it couldencourage and facilitate
theoretical innovation (Feagin, Orum& Sjoberg, 1991), and
it could contribute to both theory andpractice (Merriam,
1988).
Yin (1994) wrote that case studiesare the preferred
research strategy when "how" questionsare being posed, when
the investigator has little controlover events, and when120
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon withinits real-
life context.
Case studies also can serve to activateand enlighten
people within the context under study.Authentic insights
reached through case studies have "the capacityto work
reflexively to change the situation studied...[because]the
action possibilities created bycase study are grounded in
the situation itself, not imposed from outside it(Kemmis,
1983, cited in Merriam, 1988, p. 164).
Knowledge learned from case study research isdifferent
from other types of research knowledge in atleast three
important ways, according to Stake (1981) citedin Merriam
(1988).
1. More concrete--case study knowledgeresonates with
our own experience because it is more vivid,
concrete and sensory than abstract.
2. More contextual--our experiencesare rooted in
context, as is knowledge in case studies.This
knowledge is distinguishable from the abstract,
formal knowledge derived from other research
designs.
3. More developed by reader interpretations--readers
bring to a case study their own experienceand
understanding, which lead to generalizationswhen
new data for the case are added to old data.121
Unlike experimental,survey, or historical research,
case study research does not claimany particular methods
for data collection or data analysis,and most case studies
"are qualitative and hypothesis-generatingrather than
quantitative and hypothesis-testing"(Merriam, 1988, p.3,
italics added).
Merriam (1988) described fouressential properties ofa
qualitative case study--particularistic,descriptive,
heuristic, and inductive.Case studies are particularistic
because they focus on a particularsituation, event,
program, or phenomenon.The case itself is "important for
what it reveals about the phenomenon andfor what it might
represent" (Merriam, 1988,p. 11).Because of its
particularistic nature, acase study can suggest to the
reader what to do or what not to do ina similar situation,
examine a specific instance but illuminatea general
problem, and it may or may not be influencedby the author's
bias (Merriam, 1988).
Case studies are descriptive because thenarrative
account is a rich, "thick" description ofthe phenomenon
under study ("thick description" isa term from anthropology
meaning a complete, literal descriptionof the incident or
entity being investigated).Several aspects of acase study
address its descriptive nature,(a) it can illustrate the
complexities of a situation (i.e., the factthat not one but
many factors contributed to it),(b) it can show the122
influence of personalities on the issue,(c)it can include
vivid material from a variety ofsources (e.g., interviews,
newspaper articles, document excerpts, etc.), and (d)it can
present information from the view points of different
stakeholder groups.
Case studies are heuristic because they illuminatethe
reader's understanding of the phenomenon under study.They
can bring about the discovery of new meaning, extend the
reader's experience, or confirm what is known.Previously
unknown relationships and variablesmay emerge from a case
study which also may lead to a rethinking of thephenomenon
under study, "insights into how things get to be theway
they are can be expected to result fromcase studies"
(Merriam, 1988, p.13).
Case studies are inductive because they relyon
inductive reasoning.Generalizations, concepts or
hypotheses emerge from an examination of the data whichis
grounded in the context itself.Discovery of new
relationships, concepts, and understanding, rather than
verification of predetermined hypotheses, characterizes
qualitative case studies.
Case study research is "an ideal design for
understanding and interpreting observations of educational
phenomena" (Merriam, 1988, p. 2).According to Erickson
(1986, p. 121122) qualitative case study research is
needed in education for several reasons:123
1. To reflect on everyday life and to make thecommon
or familiar strange and interesting again (People
in the course of everyday life oftenare unaware
of what is actually goingon around them.).
2. To achieve specific understanding through
documentation of concrete details of practice.
3. To consider the local meanings thatevents have
for the people involved in them.
4. To engage in comparative understanding beyondthe
immediate circumstances of the local setting(How
does what is happening herecompare with what
happens in other places?).
According to Merriam (1988),a qualitative case study
is "an intensive, holistic descriptionand analysis of a
single entity, phenomenon, or social unit"(p.16).Thus,
selection of a single case study has both academicand
pragmatic usefulness.By concentrating on a single
phenomenon or entity, i.e., the case, the approach"aims to
uncover the interaction of significant factors
characteristic of the phenomenon" (Merriam, 1988,p.10).
Sometimes the study of a single casemay help to illuminate
how the more general process of the phenomenonworks
(Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991).
There also are instances when thecase study represents
an extreme, unique, or relevatory case (Yin, 1994),or when
it is critical (Erlandson, et al., 1993) and itis
impossible to study the phenomenon inany other way.The
situation of a revelatory case exists whenan investigator
has an opportunity to observe and analyzea phenomenon
previously inaccessible to scientific investigation.In124
these instances, the researcher hasopportunity to meet
people in the situation (perhapsas it is unfolding), and to
observe, listen, and learn of stakeholderperceptions,
actions and reactions.The meaning of critical hereis when
the incident reflects on a significantfeature of the
context being studied, i.e., "critical eventsare those that
either highlight the normal operationor contrast sharply
with it (Erlandson, et al., 1993, p.103).A case also might
be selected because it is an instance ofsome issue or
concern, that is, an instance (but not a representation)of
a class of phenomena, "the case study is usuallyseen as an
instance of a broader phenomenon,as part of a larger set of
parallel instances (Feagin et al., 1991, p.2).
Merriam (1988) wrote that descriptiveresearch is
undertaken (a) when description and explanationrather than
prediction based on cause and effectare sought,(b) when it
is not possible or feasible to manipulatethe potential
causes of behavior, and (c) when variables are not easily
identified or are too embedded in the phenomenonto be
extracted for study.
The foregoing review of relevant methododogical
literature provided both a justification anda conceptual
basis for the researcher to conduct thisnaturalistic
qualitative case study of a crisis in leadershipat a
community college.125
CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
Overview
This case study investigatedthe real-life occurrence
of a crisis in leadership ata community college.The
crisis in leadership was definedas the president of Meadow
View Community College receivingfrom his constituents three
votes of "no confidence" in twoyears.The investigation
was limited to the particular college understudy and was
bounded by the length of thepresident's tenure in officeat
the college.The researcher madeno generalizations beyond
the context of the study.
The researcher applied Lincolnand Guba's (1985)
definition of a research problemas "a state of affairs
resulting from the interaction oftwo or more factors that
yields a perplexing or enigmaticstate, a conflict, oran
undesirable consequence" (p.225).A purpose of thiscase
study was to "resolve" the problemin the sense of
accumulating sufficient knowledgeto lead to understanding,
"a kind of dialecticalprocess that plays off thetical and
antithetical propositions that form theproblem into some
kind of synthesis" (Lincoln andGuba, 1985, p.225).
Real problems, according to Erlandsonet al.(1993),
always appear in particular contexts.While relevant data
leading to a resolution of the researchproblem may come126
from a variety of sources, any proposedsolutions are bound
by those contexts.Thus, one of the roles of theresearcher
in this study was to gain a systematic,holistic,
integrated, and encompassing overview of thecontext and
phenomenon under study (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
To understand the problem of the leadershipcrisis in
its particular context, the investigator'sapproach to the
research was eclectic.As discussed in Chapter 3,
characteristics of this case study includedthe preference
for and a reliance on (a) the paradigm ofnaturalistic
inquiry (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Lincoln& Guba, 1985),(b)
qualitative methods (Marshall & Roseman,1989; Merriam,
1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994: Silverman, 1993),and (c)the
case study approach to reporting (Erlandson, et al.,1993;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Feaginet al., 1991;
Yin, 1994).Information outlining the particularsof this
case study and the researcher's use of naturalisticinquiry,
qualitative methods and thecase study reporting mode are
discussed below.The subject of respondent confidentiality
and anonymity is also presented and discussed.
Naturalistic Inquiry
The researcher relied heavilyon axioms from the
naturalistic inquiry paradigm (Erlandson,et al., 1993;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985) outlined in Chapter 3for conducting
this case study.The axioms supported a preference forand127
a reliance upon (a)a natural setting,(b) the human as
instrument,(c) purposive sampling,(d) inductive data
analysis,(e) emergent design, and (f) groundedtheory.
Natural Setting
The natural setting selected for thiscase study was a
medium-sized rural community college ina western state.
The researcher had little difficulty identifyingand
selecting a site that would maximize theopportunity to
engage the research problem (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).In
a recent two or three-year period, nearly thirtypercent of
the community colleges in the state wherethe research was
conducted had experienced conflict,controversy, and crises
in leadership.At the selected college under study,the
researcher was serving a doctoralprogram internship and had
opportunity to observe the leadership crisisunfold in its
latter stages of development.
Human as Instrument
The investigator as a research instrumentwas ideal for
conducting this naturalistic case study (Erlandson,et al.,
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988;Yin, 1994).
Utilization of researcher tacit knowledge inaddition to
propositional knowledge was important to the interview
process and data collection and analysis (Lincoln & Guba,128
1985; Polyani, 1962).Often the nuances and interactionsof
the research context and the multiplerealities presented by
respondents were discerned in a tacitway by the researcher.
Purposive Sampling
Sampling in this case studywas purposive rather than
random (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Lincoln& Guba, 1985;
Merriam, 1988; Yin, 1994).Purposive sampling was usedto
draw upon the information-richsources in the research
context from which the investigator couldlearn the most
about the study.Respondent sampling was characterizedby
emergent sampling design, continuousadjustment or focusing
of the sample, serial selection ofsample units, and
selection to point of redundancy(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
The researcher also utilized thesampling strategies
proposed by Goetz and LeCompte (1984)to select informants
prior to collection of interview data.Such sampling
strategies included (a) comprehensivesampling (e.g. all
board members),(b) quota selection, and (c)reputational
case selection.Thus, the object of purposivesampling in
this case study was not to focuson the similarities that
could be developed into generalizations,but to detail the
many specifics that gave this research contextits unique
flavor (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).129
Inductive Data Analysis
Inductive data analysis characterizedthis naturalistic
qualitative case study.Analysis began with collectionsof
observations, interview information and documentaldata
which formed the basis for theoretical categoriesand
propositions derived from relationships discoveredamong the
all data sources (Goetz & LeCompte, 1984;Lincoln & Guba,
1985; Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman,1994; Silverman,
1993).Case study data accumulated in the fieldwas
analyzed from specific raw units of informationto larger
subsuming categories of information andcompared across
categories (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Goetz& LeCompte, 1981;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The use of inductive data analysis presumeda
preference for an open and relatively unstructuredresearch
design which increased the possibility of comingacross
unexpected issues in the case (Merriam, 1988;Silverman,
1993).Inductive data analysis was useful to theresearcher
because the process was more likely (a) to identifythe
multiple realities to be found in the data,(b) to identify
the mutually shaping influences that interacted,(c) to make
decisions easier about transferability to othersettings,
and (d) to make values an explicit part of theanalytic
structure (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).130
Emergent Design
From the outset of the study, the researcher endeavored
to infer from the research context an overall though
tentative design that would provide direction for subsequent
data collection and analysis (Erlandson, et al., 1993;Miles
& Huberman, 1994).This process of continuously sampling,
collecting and analyzing data in the field was interactive
and recursive throughout the study.The interactive
circular process of data collection, data analysis, and
design review continued until a point of redundancywas
reached where no significant new information emergedor no
major new constructions were developed (Lincoln& Guba,
1985).
It was conceivable that if permitted, theemergent
design could grow and continue indefinitely since itwas
always possible to come across new questions andnew
insights worth pursuing.There was a point in the research
process, however, where certain features of the case emerged
which then were developed into a conceptual framework(Miles
& Huberman, 1994).The conceptual framework served to
further bound and limit the study.A conceptual framework
used by the researcher is outlined in Table 2.
As the case study proceeded it became more andmore
focused, salient elements began to emerge, insightsgrew,
revisions and modifications were made and theorizing became
grounded in the data.131
Table 2
Conceptual Framework.
I.Contextual Setting
A. Demographics.
B. Prior history.
C. Organizational norms, rules, andstructures.
D. Stakeholder assumptions and beliefs.
II.Catalytic Events
A. Identification.
B. Nature and extent.
C. Fixed and variable factors.
III. Effects of Events
A. Changes in stakeholder perceptionsand
actions.
B. Changes in organizationalnorms, rules, and
structures.
IV.Outcomes
A. How crisis may have been avoided.
B. Perceived gains and losses.
C. What was learned.
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory in thiscase study was discovered
empirically rather than expoundeda priori (Lincoln & Guba,
1985; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).Grounded theory tended to be
patterned, open-ended, andwas extended as more and more
knowledge began to fall into place.
Naturalistic qualitative inquirysteps of purposive
sampling, inductive data analysis,emergent design, and
development of grounded theory all interactedand were132
reiterated multiple times in thecourse of this study.
Eventually tentative conclusionswere generated about how
the leadership crisis may have been avoided(see Chapter 6).
Qualitative Methods
The assumptions underlying the naturalisticresearch
paradigm suggested that the use of qualitativemethods, as
described in Chapter 3, were appropriatefor the purposes of
this case study.Qualitative methods gave the researcha
strong handle on what real life in communitycollege
leadership can be like.With the emphasis on real-life
settings and people's lived experiences,qualitative methods
were well-suited to locating the meanings respondentsplaced
on the perceptions, events, structures, andprocesses
involved in the leadership crisis.
For the purposes of this study, three formsof
qualitative research validationwere adopted and used,(a)
comparing different kinds of data in triangulation(Lincoln
& Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994;
Silverman, 1993; Yin, 1994),(b) respondent validationor
member checking (Erlandson, et al., 1993;Lincoln & Guba,
1985; Merriam, 1988; Silverman, 1993);and,(c) prolonged
engagement (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Lincoln& Guba, 1985).
In regard to prolonged engagement (Goetz& LeCompte,
1984), time was required to allow the researcherto be
integrated into the research contextso that his presence133
was not a major stimulus of respondent behavior.This was
achieved through the researcher'sinternship and on-site
visits.Prolonged engagement helped theresearcher build
trust and develop rapport with the respondents(Erlandson,
et al., 1993; Goetz & LeCompte, 1984;Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
One respondent in this study commentedto the researcher, "I
wouldn't have done this [participate inthe interview] if I
hadn't had experiences withyou previously [through the
internship]."
This case study took approximatelytwo-and-a-half
years, from initial collection of data to finaldraft of the
case study report.Throughout the process, theresearcher
had maintained prolonged engagement withrespondents at the
research site.
Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection and analysis in thiscase study began
with the first interview, the firstobservation, the first
document read, and never ceased until thefinal report was
written.This continuous and recursiveprocessing of data
led to emerging insights and huncheswhich directed
successive phases of the research.Simultaneous analysis
and data collection allowed the researcherto direct the
data collection phase more productively anddevelop a data
base that was both parsimonious and relevant(Erlandson, et
al., 1993).134
The researcher adopted Merriam's(1988) descriptions of
qualitative data for use in thisstudy.Collected data were
(a) detailed descriptions of situations,events, people,
interactions, and observed behaviors,(b) direct quotations
from people about their experiences,attitudes, beliefs, and
thoughts, and (c) excerptsor entire passages from
documents, correspondence, and records.Accumulated data in
this case study were the constructionsoffered by or in the
data sources and analysis of the dataled to a
reconstruction of those constructions(Lincoln & Guba,
1985).Collected data were found usefulto the study if
they could (a) identifynew leads of importance,(b) extend
the area of information,(c) relate or bridge already
existing elements,(d) reinforce main trends,(e) account
for other information already in hand,(f) exemplify or
provide more evidence foran important theme, and (g)
qualify or refute existing information(Miles & Huberman,
1994).
Phases of data collection and analysis.Three
successive phases of data collection andanalysis (Lincoln &
Guba, 1985) were employed by the researcherin this case
study.Phase 1 was an orientation and overviewphase where
the object was to obtain sufficient informationto get some
sense of what the research context and situations ofthe
leadership crisis were like and to geta fix on what seemed135
most salient.Activities in Phase 1 took placeprimarily
during the time of the researcher'sinternship at the
community college under study.The initial approach to
respondents was made in a very open-endedway.Once the
first informational source was obtained,data analysis began
and some initial very provisional insightsand working
hypotheses were formed.Examples of tentative working
hypotheses for understanding the leadershipcrisis at this
stage were that the president may have beena victim of
aggressive faculty union leadership, and/orthat the Board
of Trustees may have undermined thepresident's authority by
micromanaging and meddling in placesinappropriate to their
intended purpose and functioning.
Phase 2 was the phase of focusedexploration.Time was
allowed between phases 1 and 2 for theinformation gathered
in phase 1 to be sufficiently analyzed,for a conceptual
framework to be drafted and revised, andfor a structured
interview protocol to be developed.The researcher
developed the case study interview protocolto obtain
information in depth about the elements ofstudy determined
to be salient in phase 1.Stakeholder groups and primary
respondents were identified and interviewed.Sampling was
purposive and divergent respondent viewswere sought.
Phase 3 was the member check phase.The task was to
verify, correct, amend or extend the informationcollected
in phase 2 and to determine theaccuracy of the data as136
constructed by the informants andto establish the
credibility of the case.The researcher conducted member
checks by (a) summarizing for each respondentthe apparent
content of each interview session and solicitingagreement,
including correction and expansion ofcontent,(b)
recontacting respondents at a later datefor clarification
and/or additional information, and (c)by checking
information through triangulation of data.
After phase 3, the case study reportwas drafted and
revised.The three phases of data collectionand analysis
in this research weren't necessarilymutually exclusive in
their practical application to thecase.The phases tended
to overlap with some recycling and reiterationthroughout.
Processes of data analysis.Analysis of data wasa
two-fold approach.The first aspect involved analysisat
the research site during data collection,the second
involved analysis away from the site(Erlandson, et al.,
1993).The analysis of gathered datawas "a progression,
not a stage; an ongoing process, nota one-time event"
(Erlandson, et al., 1993, p. 111).Data analysis was the
overall process of bringing order,structure, and meaning to
the mass of collected data.It was a search for general
statements about relationshipsamong categories of data
(Marshal & Rossman, 1989).Data processing and analysiswas
similar to that of traditional ethnographicinquiry137
described by Goetz and LeCompte (1981,cited in Lincoln and
Guba, 1985).As data were recorded and classified,they
also were compared across categories(Erlandson, et al.,
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
The method of constant comparison(Erlandson, et al.,
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) for dataprocessing was used in
this case study.It provided an excellent fit with theneed
for continuous and simultaneous collectionand analysis of
data.The method of constant comparisongenerated
theoretical properties for categoriesand delimited data
which served to economizeresources and provide workable
limits for the research (Erlandson,et al., 1993; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985).
Data representing the studied contextwere unitized,
categorized and compared throughuse of raw data files, data
reduction files, and data reconstructionfiles (Erlandson,
et al., 1993; Merriam, 1988; Miles& Huberman, 1994).Raw
data files included notes from observations,interviews,
documents, and other sources.Data reduction fileswere
those files distilled from theraw data files.Data
reconstruction files tracked themesas they emerged from the
raw data files and data reduction files and eventuallywere
used to form the overall patterns and themesof the study.
Categorizing the data served threepurposes.It
grouped unitized data relating to thesame content, devised
rules for describing the properties of thecategories, and138
provided a basis for comparingrelationships among
categories (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).Constructing the
categories was largely intuitive.But, it also was
systematic and informed by the study'spurpose, the
researcher's orientation and knowledge,and the constructs
made explicit by participants in thestudy (Merriam, 1988).
Categories were constructed basedon the importance
respondents gave to the data, the frequencywith which they
occurred, or their relative uniqueness inthe context.
Thus, the discovery of thematicrelationships in this
study began with the analysis of initialobservations and
underwent continuous refinement throughoutthe data
collection and analysis process.It continuously fed back
into the process of category coding.As events were
constantly compared with previousevents, new dimensionsas
well as new relationshipswere discovered.
To end data collection and processing,four decision
criteria suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985)were employed,
(a) exhaustion of sources,(b) saturation of categories,(c)
emergence of regularities and (d) over-extension.
Between periods of data collection andat the end of
data collection, analysis by constantcomparison enabled the
researcher to form a gestalt of the researchcontext from
relatively isolated data or data thatnaturally emerged
together (Erlandson, et al., 1993).Data analysis involved
taking constructions gathered from the researchcontext and139
reconstructing them into meaningfulholistic patterns
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).To form this gestalt,or
"meaningful whole," data were gatheredfrom a variety of
sources and in a variety of ways.Data were collected
through observations, interviews,and documents and records
(Erlandson, et al., 1993; Lincoln& Guba, 1985; Merriam,
1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman,1993; Yin, 1994).
Data from these sources were triangulated.
Triangulation
Through triangulation, several differenttypes of data
sources were sought which provided the researcherwith
insights about the circumstances,events and thematic
relationships within the case study(Erlandson, et al.,
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam,1988; Silverman, 1993;
Yin, 1994).The use of multiple sources of evidenceallowed
the researcher to addressa wider range of questions and
issues, and potential problems ofconstruct validity also
were addressed (Yin, 1994).Triangulation served to
overcome partial views (Silverman, 1993), enhancedmeaning
(Erlandson, et al., 1993), and provided thickdescription of
relevant information (Lincoln & Guba,1985).
As this case study progressed and particularpieces of
information came to light, informationwas validated against
other data sources or data collection methods;that is, with
other interviews, observations anddocumentation.No single140
item of information was given seriousconsideration unless
it could be triangulated.Triangulation helped supportor
disconfirm the data.Between-method triangulation, i.e.,
observations, interviews, and documentswas favored over
within-method triangulation, i.e., observationA,
observation B, observation C, etc.Data units analyzed and
found common in multiplesources and/or methods were
considered particularly salient foruse in the descriptive
account (see Chapter 5).
Observations
Observations were first-hand experiences withthe
research environment.The researcher's mode in this study
was non participant observer.His sole purpose was to
watch, listen and learn.During the investigativeprocess
the researcher was not a bona fide member ofany campus
group and did not officially participate inany college
functioning.During the latter stages of the leadership
crisis, the researcher was fillinga graduate program
internship at the community college under study.While
student-as-intern, he attended variouscampus meetings and
activities and took part in normal conversationswith
members of the college community, but his rolewas largely
unassuming and unobtrusive.
The novel circumstances of being presentat a community
college where a crisis in leadershipwas taking place was141
fortuitous.Yin (1994) suggested such a circumstanceis a
"distinctive opportunity...to perceive realityfrom the
viewpoint of someone 'inside' thecase study environment
rather than external to it" (p. 88).Such a perspective was
invaluable in producing an accurate portrayal ofthe case
study phenomenon.
The researcher's notes and observations whilestudent-
as-intern were included in the case study dataand were
treated similarly to notes taken during interviews.
Interviews
Interviews provided valuable data for thiscase study.
The interview format used was the semistructuredand open-
ended type (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Yin, 1994).Most
interviews tended to take the form ofa dialogue or an
interaction.Interviews with purposively selected
respondents helped the researcher to understandand to put
into context the interpersonal, social, and culturalaspects
of the case study context (Erlandson, et al., 1993).
Interviews allowed the researcher and respondentsto move
back and forth in time--to reconstruct the past,interpret
the present, and predict the future.
Interviews in this case studywere subject to
distortions and biases (Merriam, 1988; Erlandson,et al.,
1993; Yin, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994).Distortions may
have been unintended or intended.Distortions may have142
occurred simply because of the attentiongiven to
individuals during the research (the"Hawthorne effect" in
research involving human subjects).Interview data may have
been "self-censored, defensive, rosy"(Miles & Huberman,
1994, p.48).
Because of the rather controversialnature of a crisis
in leadership at the community collegeunder study,
respondents may have been overly cautiousor guarded in
their responses to interview questions.Distortions may
have been introduced by respondents whohad hidden agendas
or by those who wanted to please, deceiveor confuse the
investigator (Erlandson, et al., 1993).However, such
distortions were detected by checking theplausibility of
the account, the reliability of the informant,and by
comparing an informant's account withaccounts given by
other informants (Whyte, 1982, cited inMerriam, 1988).
Other safeguards to introduced distortionswere
corroborating interview data with informationfrom other
sources such as observations and checking documentary
material through triangulation of data (Yin,1994).
The respondents.The perspective of each respondent in
this study contributed greatly to the developmentof insight
and understanding of the leadership crisisphenomenon.
Merriam (1988) suggested that a good respondent(or
informant, if they are particularly knowledgeableof the143
situation) is "one who can express thoughts,feelings,
opinions, his or her perspective,on the topic being
studied" (p.76).
Thirty-seven individuals from the communitycollege
under study were selected for participationin interviews.
(For the purposes of this reportsome titles may have been
changed but organizational roles remainedthe same.)Six
respondent categories were represented.They included the
Board of Trustees (n = 5), administrators(n = 12), faculty
(n = 8), support staff (n= 5), student leadership (n = 3),
and the college president (n= 1).All respondentswere
purposively sampled (Erlandson, et al., 1993;Lincoln &
Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Yin, 1994).
Each of the six interview categorieshad category-
specific characteristics associated withthem.In the Board
of Trustees category, all five memberswere interviewed.
During early stages of the leadership crisis,the Board was
in transition and two memberswere replaced.The five
members who served during the heart of theleadership crisis
and who negotiated the president's contractbuyout were
interviewed.
The administrative category includedupper-level, mid-
level and lower-level administrators,e.g., vice presidents,
deans, associate deans, department chairs (both
professional/technical and lower-division collegiate),and
directors of a variety of campus activities andprograms.144
It is noted here that three individuals fromthe
administrators group, who were members of thePresident's
Cabinet, declined to be interviewed for the study(see Yin,
1994).This reduced N to 34.The reasons given for
declining to be interviewed varied.The Dean of Students
explained that felt indebted to the president.The Vice
President for Administration said that he hadan aversion to
discussing the crisis because it made him "physicallysick."
The Vice President for Instruction explained thatshe was
afraid of possible reprisals and negative effectson future
career opportunities if she were to discuss the leadership
crisis in an interview.
The faculty category included members (activeand
retired) from both professional/technical andlower-division
collegiate programs at the college.The support staff
category was comprised primarily of campus secretaries,and
the student leadership category was comprised of student
leaders who were in office during the time the leadership
crisis took place.The college president category is self-
explanatory.
At the outset of the study, respondents from each
category were chosen on the likelihood they could supplynew
constructions to the researcher's understanding.Later in
the investigative process, respondents tended to bechosen
for their perceived ability to elaborateor explicate
constructions that had already been introduced (Erlandson,145
et al., 1993).Interviewees from each categorywere
selected to allow the researcherto obtain as much
information as possible andto continuously fill in thegaps
and focus on emerging insightsuntil the point of
information redundancywas reached, or until the available
number of individuals ina category was exhausted (Lincoln&
Guba, 1985).Before conducting interviewswith respondents,
an interview protocol was developed.
Interview protocol.The interview protocolwas
developed and utilized in Phase 2of the study to actas a
guide in conducting theinterviews and to obtain informed
consent from respondents.Informed consentwas obtained
from each participating respondentat the beginning of each
interview.
Practical matters as wellas a variety of preliminary
questions and perspectives indeveloping the protocolwere
considered by the researcher.For example, the researcher
considered if the leadership crisisphenomenon was something
that respondents may be hesitantor not totally forthcoming
about.What would respondents be willingto say about the
situation?Would they have enough insightconcerning
themselves and their situation to beable to deal with
certain types of questions?
At the same time, the researcherconsidered possible
attitudes, perspectives and questionsof the respondents.146
For example, the researcher presumed thatthe majority of
interview respondents would be relativelystraight forward
in the interviews.However, the researcher alsowas aware
that some respondents may engage in whatMiles and Huberman
(1994) termed "impression management"(p. 10).That is, the
manipulation of how respondents wantedothers (e.g., the
researcher) to see the situationor themselves.Some
potential respondents may have felt itwas more expedient to
keep a low profile and notsay much, or not be interviewed
at all, than to run the risk of being askedquestions they
may not want to answer for fear of what theimplications
might be.
The researcher considered thatrespondents also may
have had certain questions to ask themselvessuch as, who
wants to know and why?Will I reap any politicalbenefits
from responding?Will I be doing them a favor?Can any
harm come to me if I answer honestly?
Consideration of the foregoing types ofquestions by
the researcher and potential perspectivesand questions by
the respondents suggested that the interviewprocess may
have had a mutual shaping effecton both the researcher and
the respondents (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).That is, the
researcher needed to determine what to askand how to ask it
of which respondents.Respondents may have been influenced
not only by the researcher's motives and questions,but also
by their own perceptions, attitudes andexpectations.147
The interview protocol specificallydeveloped for this
case study included the following elements.
1.A written letter of introductionfrom a doctoral
committee member and a personalverbal
introduction by the researcher.
2.A statement of the purpose of theresearch and the
intended use of the data.
3. A statement of assurance of confidentialityand
anonymity for the respondents.
4. A statement from the sitting communitycollege
president relating the voluntarynature of
participation in the research andgranting the
researcher permission andaccess to conduct the
research on site.
5. A statement on the use ofa tape recorder for the
interviews.
6. Semi-structured and open-endedinterview questions
developed and derived from theconceptual
framework (see Table 2).
7. A methodological question asking forthose with
differing points of view ora "divergent
construction" of the crisis.
8. Ending statements asking respondentsto feel free
to contact the researcher to addany other
information of interest, and thankingthem for
their time, participation and cooperation.148
Interview data were gathered from sixinterview
questions in the protocol.The use of specifically
developed questions was ameans of translating the research
objectives into specific language andwas a way of
motivating respondents to share theirknowledge of the
phenomenon under study (Merriam, 1988).
Interview questions were designedto reflect facts,
feelings and motives, standards ofaction, and
experience/behavior (Merriam, 1988; Silverman,1993).The
questions were:(a) what were your assumptions andbeliefs
about President Smith when hewas hired;(b) what prompted
the votes of no confidence;(c) what were your perceptions
of the leadership crisis;(d) could the leadership crisis
have been avoided, if so how;(e) what was gained and/or
lost; and (f) what wereany side effects, positive or
negative, from the leadership crisis?Responses to the
interview questions were tape recorded.
Recording interview data.During each interview the
researcher used an audio tape recorder andtook notes.The
audio tape recorder was used toassure interview accuracy,
completeness, and opportunity for later reviewby the
researcher.
Use of the tape recorder, however, hadsome drawbacks.
Because of the controversial nature of investigatinga
leadership crisis, respondents may have becomeoverly aware,149
self-conscious, or even threatened by thepresence of the
tape recorder during the interview.In a few instances,
some respondents preferred not to have their interviews
recorded at all.They consented to be interviewed, butnot
on tape.If respondents were uncomfortable with thetape
recorder, their request for not taping the interviewwas
honored and researcher notes became thesource of data for
that interview.In other instances respondents consentedto
the tape-recorded interview, but asked thatthe researcher
pause or turn off the recorder when sensitive information
was being related.In these instances, the researcher
relied heavily on note-taking, which also had itsadvantages
and disadvantages.
Advantages of note-taking were (a)it required the
interviewer to listen and attend carefully to whatwas being
said,(b) the notes could be flagged for importantitems to
which the interviewer returned later, and (c) the
interviewer did not need to rely onmemory alone to compose
a reflective summary for each interview.Interview notes
were reviewed as soon as possible after each interview to
jog the interviewer's memory aboutany additional items not
previously noted during the interviewprocess.
Disadvantages of note-taking were (a) the researcher
could not hand-record everything,(b) sometimes portions of
rapid handwriting tended to be a bit undecipherable later,
and (c) respondents tended to have a natural tendencyto150
slow their tempo to permit the interviewerto keep up.In
doing so, respondents may have losta train of thought, or
because the process was lengthy, simplydid not relate all
they may have thought aboutor intended to say.
Nonetheless, the majority of respondentsagreed to have
their complete interviews taped.
For the purposes of this study, taped interviewswere
transcribed using research guidelines suggestedby Merriam
(1988).Data from the interview log was coded accordingto
the emerging themes or categories whichemerged from the
data analysis.As the study proceeded, specific interview
data items were verified through triangulationwith other
respondents and with other sources suchas observation and
document analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985;Merriam, 1988;
Erlandson, et al., 1993; Miles & Huberman,1994; Yin, 1994).
Tape recording interviews anduse of an interview log
proved useful to the researcher in theinterview process and
in data collection and analysis.The interview processwas
characterized by other beneficial aspects whichcontributed
to the accuracy and thoroughness of the study.
Other interview characteristics.The interview process
was characterized by flexibility, use of interview probes,
reflective summary (or member check), andpotential effects
on the respondents.151
Flexibility during the interviewswas important so the
researcher could follow up promisingleads or return to
earlier points that needed additionalinformation or fuller
development.To achieve this flexibility, theresearcher
used interview probes.Interview probes took the formof
(a) nods of the head or simple callsfor more information,
e.g., "Could you say more about that?",or "For example?;"
(b) silence (wait time);(c) calls for reactions to the
interviewer's reformulations of whatwas said, e.g., "If I
understand you correctly, youseem to be saying that...;"
and,(d) simple, direct follow-up questionsto extend
something the respondent said.Rapport and depth of probing
were enhanced in interviews through the researcher'sprior
interaction with respondents during hisinternship as well
as during various site visits for fieldwork.
Information obtained during the interviewswas
reflectively summarized by the researcherand "played back"
to the respondents.It reflected what the researcher
believed had been said or what he hadunderstood up to that
point.This process was advantageous fortwo reasons.
First, the respondents were often remindedof new or
additional information upon hearing thesummary; and second,
it invited the respondents to reactto the validity of the
constructions which the interviewer had made.This gave the
respondents opportunity to clarifyor refine their
responses.This process also enhanced the validityof the152
data, termed "member check" (Lincoln& Guba, 1985;
Erlandson, et al., 1996).
The interview process alsomay have had beneficial
educative and empowering effectson participants (Erlandson,
et al., 1993).These effects were achieved throughopenly
soliciting and honoring each individualconstruction of the
context under study, and through respondentconsideration of
interview questions, reflectionon answers and dialogue with
the interviewer.Indeed, many respondents commentedthat
they were pleased with the opportunityto be interviewed, to
objectively reflect on the research topicand to discuss the
situation with "someone on the outside."Many considered
the process cathartic.
Documents
Documentary data were particularly reliablesources of
information for this case study.If acquired documentary
evidence was contradictory, rather thancorroboratory to the
other collected data sources, theresearcher inquired
further into the topic.
Archival documents and records at thecommunity college
under study were obtained through theFreedom of Information
Act.The researcher filed a form withthe college for
access to public records and made photocopies ofrelevant
documents and records.College employees who had actual
possession of other relevant documents andrecords also153
provided the researcher with photocopiesand/or original
documents which were then copied andreturned.
The researcher sought and obtaineddocuments and
records that would provide accuratedescriptions of actions
and events that took place in theresearch setting.These
included, but were not limited to,(a) a variety of
administrative and faculty union lettersand memoranda,(b)
minutes from President's Cabinet,MVCC Foundation, and Board
of Trustees meetings,(c) campus news releases and local
newspaper articles and editorials,(d) budget and
legislative documents,(e) MVCC policy and procedures
documents,(f) historical accounts (pamphlets,brochures,
bulletins, etc.), and (e) officialdocumentation of
proceedings related to events in theleadership crisis,
e.g., the Fact Finding Committee's InterimReport, the MVCC
Administrative Response to the Fact FindingCommittee's
Interim Report, and the Opinion and Awarddocument from the
arbitration hearing on alleged sexualharassment by a
faculty member.
Case Study Approach
The case study reporting modewas preferred because it
was specifically adapted to a description of themultiple
realities encountered in the researchcontext (Lincoln &
Guba, 1985).The purpose of this single descriptivecase
study (Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994;Yin, 1994) was154
to examine the specific eventor phenomena of a crisis in
leadership at a particular communitycollege.The present
case study was an instance from a largercontext (Feagin, et
al., 1991) and also was both revelatory(Yin, 1994) and
critical (Erlandson, et al., 1993).
Thus, the aim of this single descriptivein-depth case
study was not to find the "correct"or "true" interpretation
of the facts, but rather to focuson discovery, insight, and
understanding from the perspectives ofthose being studied
and to eliminate erroneous conclusionsso that the reader is
left with the best possible, themost compelling,
interpretation of the research (Bromley,1986).
Confidentiality and Anonymity
Confidentiality and anonymitywere particularly
important to this case study because of itsrather
controversial nature.Confidentiality and anonymity served
to protect the real case and its real participants(Yin,
1994).However, maintaining confidentiality andanonymity
in this case study was a double-sided problem.This was
because the case study report hada dual nature--there was
both an external and an internal audience.Relatively
simple changes of location and nameswere intended to
disguise an individual or a site from theexternal audience.
The task was more difficult though, when theaudience also
consisted of persons in or familiar with thelocal155
situation.Miles and Huberman (1994) observed"anonymity of
individuals is difficult or impossibleto assure when acase
study of a group or organization is read byits members" (p.
48).
Maintaining anonymity also had other drawbacks.
Important background information abouta case may need to be
eliminated to protect individuals' identitiesand the
mechanics of composing the case report becomemore difficult
than it otherwise would be (Yin, 1994).Some authors go so
far as to assert that in somecases informational accuracy
and detail should not be sacrificed forthe sake of
anonymity (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
In this case study, however, the researcherexercised
all reasonable precaution topreserve the confidentiality
and anonymity promised to respondents throughinformed
consent.Institutional location was disguised,use of
individual names was avoided wherever possible,and all
names used were fictitious.Though relevant quotes from
interviews and other sources were used toillustrate
patterns and themes identified in the descriptiveaccount of
Chapter 5, it was largely unnecessary to attributemost
quotes to specific individuals.
To further protect respondents, the researcher
performed all secretarial work includingtranscribing
interview data and typing the drafts and finalcase report.156
CHAPTER 5
DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT
Overview
This chapter reconstructs theevents and circumstances
surrounding the leadership crisis at MeadowView Community
College (fictitious name).The leadership crisiswas
defined as the college president and hisadministration
receiving from campus constituents threevotes of "no
confidence" in two years.
The descriptive account incorporatesaccepted
guidelines for conducting and reportingnaturalistic
qualitative case study research (Erlandson,et al., 1993;
Goetz & LeCompte, 1984; Lincoln & Guba,1989; Merriam, 1988;
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman,1993; Strauss & Corbin,
1990; Wolcott, 1990; Yin, 1994).This narrative account is
descriptive, not evaluative or causallyexplanatory.The
account is based upon triangulated data gatheredfrom
observations, documents and interviews(see Chapters 3 and
4).Documents are cited where appropriate.Quotes used
throughout the narration were purposivelyselected from the
data because they best represented thecategories and themes
found in the data.Quotes are illustrative, not all-
inclusive, of the themes supported bythe data.Participant
comments are in quotes.To preserve respondent
confidentiality and anonymity, most quotesare not157
attributed to specificpersons (unless otherwise indicated
in the account).
Four central themes emerged from analysisof the data
and were strongly supported throughtriangulation.The
themes tended to pervade theleadership crisis andwere
reflected in the votes ofno confidence, but were not
necessarily mutually exclusive.Identified themes were:
1. Administrative unresponsiveness tofaculty and
staff concerns;
2. Administrative disregard for facultyrights of due
process;
3. Non-compliance with college personnelpolicies and
procedures; and,
4. Differences in administrative statedphilosophies
and personal actions regardingparticipatory
management.
Other themes related to the crisissuch as biased media
attention (local newspaper) and levelof faculty union
activism were identified, butwere not as strongly supported
by the data.The researcher inventoried eighty-sixcrisis-
related articles published by the only localnewspaper.
Respondent views on the newspaper's objectivityin reporting
the conflict on campus variedamong those expressing an
opinion.Level of faculty union activismwas mentioned by
some (but not many) respondents.They expressed opinions
that the faculty union leadershipwas tenacious, if not158
aggressive, in playing its adversarial role against the
president and his administration.Past experiences on
campus between the college president and the president of
the faculty union seemed to create tension and animosity
between the two.Dr. Smith saw the faculty union president
as a person who liked to stir up trouble, and the faculty
union president viewed Dr. Smith as a "Bozo."
This descriptive account of the leadership crisis with
supporting quotes from the data includes (a)a brief
historical background of Meadow View Community College,(b)
descriptions of events which prompted the votes ofno
confidence, and (c) perceptions of the leadership crisis by
the Board of Trustees, administrators, faculty, support
staff, student leadership, and the college president.
Historical Background of College
Meadow View Community College (fictitious name)was
established in 1955 as a two-year technical college in a
rural area of a western state.It grew to become one of 29
community and/or technical colleges in the state's system of
higher education.As part of a state system, the college
received its funding from the state general fund as
determined by the state legislature.The college's Board of
Trustees had five members who were appointed by the governor
to serve five-year terms.At the time of the study, the
college's annual operating budget was approximately $18159
million, the student enrollmentwas around 6,500 (3,700
average annualized FTE), and the college employed 100full-
time and more than 250 part-time faculty.
Meadow View Community College (MVCC) playeda central
role in its community through openaccess to education and
economic development and community partnershipprograms.
The college offered a comprehensive curriculumfor Associate
Degree in Arts and Science, Associate Degreein Applied
Science, Certificate of General Studies, AdultBasic
Education, GED, and English asa Second Language (ESL),
along with occupational trainingprograms and community
education.The college had educational partnershipswith
local high schools and a state university.It also had a 2
+ 2 articulation agreement which allowed highschool
students to receive advanced placement creditsin the
college's vocational programs.Students who had completed
lower division collegiate course requirementscould transfer
as juniors to state universities.The college also had
career planning and academic advising programs with
assessment and testing services, a multiculturalservice
program, education access services for students with
disabilities, and a women's resource center.Many such
programs and services, however, were present only inMeadow
View Community College's recent history.
In the early days of the technical college, MeadowView
was viewed by some people as "a high school with ash trays."160
In the mid-1960s, Mr. Edward Dixon, a former school
superintendent in the area, assumed the presidency of Meadow
View Community College.Mr. Dixon lead the college for more
than 20 years with a "steady" and "strong hand."His
personal manner was "a bit brash" and his management style
was considered "authoritative" and "autocratic."Although
most college employees viewed him as a "benevolent
dictator," people tended to "know where they stood with him"
and there were "few surprises on campus."President Dixon's
administrative cabinet (Dean of Instruction, Dean of
Administrative Services and Finance, and Dean of Students)
also were viewed as having the same "authoritative" and
"autocratic" style of management.To varying degrees, they
tended to "seek power" and "manipulate personnel and events"
to achieve their particular purposes.During President
Dixon's tenure, there was "no executive use of
entrepreneurial activities or grants" and "relatively little
involvement in the form of educational partnerships with the
community" compared to subsequent years.In the late 1980s,
Mr. Dixon retired from Meadow View Community College and the
Board of Trustees began searching for a new leader and
president of the college.
In their search for a new president, the Board of
Trustees solicited input and involvement from faculty,
staff, and other campus constituents.The Board wanted a
candidate with "past successes" and "fresh ideas," someone161
who was "progressive" and "active in pursuingcommunity
education and minority recruitment,"someone who had "a
participative management style" and who could"usher in a
new era of openness" for the college.
Presented with their first opportunityto be involved
in choosing a new president, the collegefaculty wanted a
person who "stood in contrast to the previous president."
They sought a president whowas "student and faculty
oriented" who had a "collaborative andparticipative
management style" and who would "involvemore people in
decision-making processes."They were keenly interested in
finding someone who would "change theorganizational
culture" established by the previous presidentand his
administration.
After a national search, the collegesearch committee
and the Board of Trustees gave unanimousapproval to John
Smith (Ed.D.).Dr. Smith was considered by the search
committee to be "the absolute bestamong the candidates
interviewed."He was viewed as "someone who would leadthe
campus with more democratic methods."He described himself
as a person who could get things done, a "mover andshaker."
He had professional experience in communityservices and
community education and he had been presidentof a two-year
college in another western state where he hadserved for
nine years.He was so successful and well-liked inhis
previous position that trustees there offeredhim a salary162
increase if he would stay.However, Dr. Smith insteadchose
to become the new president of MeadowView Community
College.The college community at MVCCwas pleased with
their selection of Dr. Smith,enthusiastic about their
future, and eager to see their expectationsrealized.
Upon Dr. Smith's arrival at Meadow ViewCommunity
College in January, 1988, he heard thatone of the area's
major employers would be implementinga sizable layoff and
thousands of people would be thrownout of work.Dr. Smith
"wasted no time" in respondingas the college's new
president.He immediately established theWe Care committee
to help address communityconcerns about the layoffs.He
emphasized the college's abilityto provide job-retraining
programs for the displaced workers and trainingpartnerships
with area businesses and industry(under the previous
president the college had not been involvedwith such ideas
or programs).Working closely with local leaders,Dr.
Smith's early success in this endeavorgave him a high
profile in a difficult period.In 1989, Dr. Smith received
the Thomas J. Peters Award for Leadershipas an outstanding
community college president from theLeague for Innovation
and the University of Texas.
When Dr. Smith began fulfillinghis role as president
of Meadow View, he had decisionsto make about the
constitution of his administrative cabinet.By taking
office, he "inherited the previous president's163
administrators and theirway of doing things."The new
president espoused a "participativestyle of management,"
but his predecessor's administrativeteam was still
considered "authoritarian."
Adding to the situation, thecollege's Dean of
Instruction had applied for thepresidency of MVCC, butwas
not interviewed.He had served as Dean of Instructionat
MVCC since 1977 and was consideredby the campus community
as "intelligent", "resourceful", and bymany (but not all)
as "devious" and "manipulative."After Dr. Smith had been
in office for approximately sixto twelve months, issues of
senior administrative infightingand non-support for Dr.
Smith surfaced.Concerned about the situation,the Board of
Trustees told Dr. Smith that they wouldsupport him if he
chose not to renew some administrativecontracts.However,
deciding to work with each of thecurrent administrators,
Dr. Smith retained his predecessor'sentire administrative
team.Dr. Smith also later hireda new Director of
Personnel and Director of CommunityEducation to serve with
him on his administrative cabinet.
From the beginning of his tenure, Dr.Smith was
"actively involved with the community"and "innovative in
developing new programs and services"at Meadow View.He
served on the board of directors of theUnited Way and the
area's Economic Development Council.Through his
leadership, the college acquired sizablegrant funding164
resources, developed entrepreneurialprograms, forged
training partnerships with communitybusinesses and
industry, and developed the multiculturalservice program,
education access services for studentswith disabilities and
the women's resource center.In many of theseareas, Dr.
Smith received award-winning recognitionfrom special
interest groups and community organizations.Such highly
visible accomplishments were applaudedand well-received by
nearly everyone.
However, in the college's internalenvironment of daily
decision-making and interactions withfaculty, staff and
other administrators, some of PresidentSmith's decisions
and actions were far less appreciated.The combination of
questionable decisions and actions byPresident Smith and
two of his administrative cabinet membersultimately led to
faculty concern, campus unrest, andvotes of no confidence
in the college's leadership.
The Votes of No Confidence
Three votes of no confidence in thecollege's
leadership occurred over approximatelytwo years.Most of
the leadership issues reflected inthose votes were directly
related to the themes identified inthe overview section of
this chapter.
Many of the administration's "questionabledecisions
and practices" which lead to thevotes of no confidencewere165
influenced by at least two identifiablefactors.The first
was in college personnel-related issues--primarilyhirings,
dismissals and salary raises.These comprised the majority
of the formalized issues andconcerns in the votes of no
confidence.They are discussed in detail laterin this
chapter.The other, less tangible factor,was in the
perceived personality and behavioraltraits of MVCC's
leadership.Though the personality and behavioraltraits
were openly discussed by many respondents in theinterviews,
the traits were only indirectlyaddressed in the no
confidence votes.
The leadership crisis and votesof no confidence
reflected directly upon Meadow ViewCommunity College's
administrative leadership.That is, "it wasn't just the
President."Along with the "questionable decisionsand
practices", various personality and behavioraltraits
manifested by the President and membersof his
administrative team produced doubts andconcerns among the
college's faculty, staff and other administratorsabout
their leaders.President Smith officially ledthe college
and was perceived to have many "positive"traits, such as
"energetic", "innovative", and "talented."However,
President Smith and the Dean of Administrationand Finance
and the Director of Personnelwere named in votes of no
confidence.They were criticized by thecampus community
for possessing and demonstrating overriding"negative"166
personality and behavioral traits intheir leadership.They
were variously described by interview respondentsas
"ingenuine", "arrogant", "deceitful","inept", "uncaring",
"manipulative," "deceptive", "incompetent","untrustworthy,"
and "unethical" in certain applicableareas of concern for
each.
It should be noted that "some seedsof discontent" were
sown before Dr. Smith assumed the presidencyat MVCC.His
predecessor's administrative team had alreadyestablished an
"authoritative" manner of operating atthe college and had
alienated many faculty and staff (andother administrators,
as well).Adding to the situation,a senior faculty member
had brought a lawsuit against the collegealleging
retaliation after he asked state auditorsto investigate
charges of "administrative wrong-doing."The lawsuit was
pending during part of President Smith'stenure and the
faculty member who brought the suitwas active in faculty
leadership during the votes ofno confidence.
The three votes of no confidence tendedto be
cumulative, progressing over time inscope and consequence.
The first vote was primarily a criticism ofinappropriate
personnel practices and did not directlyname individuals.
The second vote occurred 18 months after thefirst and
criticized the lack of promised improvement in
administrative decision-making and personnelpractices since
the first vote.It directly named the President, theDean167
of Administration and Finance and the Directorof Personnel.
The third vote of no confidence escalatedto the point that
it also included a criticism of theBoard of Trustees.
First Vote of No Confidence
The first vote of no confidence occurredin May, 1992,
and was the first in the college's history.The faculty
association, which represented approximatelyhalf of the
full- and part-time faculty,was asked by the faculty senate
and others to call for a Vote of NoConfidence.The vote
was not directly against the administration, butwas a vote
which reflected "a lack of confidencein the college's
personnel practices rather than toward specificindividuals
who may be responsible for those practices."
The faculty formally cited twelvecomplaints about the
college's personnel practices.The complaints tended to
focus on (a) fair employment practices andpay equity,(b)
major administrative decision-makingprocesses,(c)
adherence to college personnel policies andpractices, and
(d) faculty rights of due process.Of the 85 votes cast
(mostly full-time faculty), 79 reflecteda degree of no
confidence in the administration's practices.
Two examples of controversy-inducingdecisions and
actions by MVCC's leadership emerged from thedata--the
appointment of the Dean of Students and thesuspension of a
faculty member accused of sexual harassment.Each event168
produced continual campusconcern and tended to linger
unresolved through the end of PresidentSmith's tenure.
Appointment of dean of students.The appointment of
the Dean of Students was one example ofseveral appointments
that occurred at the college which "didnot adhere to
established hiring policies and standards ofthe college",
i.e., posting and advertising positions andusing search,
screening and interview committees.
In July, 1991, MVCC's Dean of Studentsresigned to
accept a similar position at another communitycollege in
the state.Dr. Smith appointed an acting Dean ofStudents
who was to "serve for six to ten months"while the president
evaluated his reorganization plan.In doing so, President
Smith stipulated "only those individualswho are not
interested in applying for the permanentposition will be
considered for the acting dean appointment."Two MVCC
employees in student services who held doctoraldegrees were
interested in the Dean of Students position.However, they
withdrew from being considered for theinterim position
because of the president's stipulation.Instead, they
planned on applying for the full-timeposition when it was
officially posted and advertised by thecollege.
To fill the interim position of Dean ofStudents, Dr.
Smith appointed the MVCC Director of StudentActivities, who
was a faculty member from the music department.Contrary to169
college hiring policies for fillingpermanent administrative
positions, the Dean of Students openingat MVCC was "never
advertised or posted", "no applicationswere available" and
"qualified applicants inside and outsidethe college were
denied opportunities to apply."Inspite of this, Dr. Smith
officially made the interim positionpermanent.
Alleged sexual harassment by faculty member.Meadow
View Community College's handling ofsome student sexual
harassment complaints against a faculty memberwas an
important campus issue and a catalyticevent for the first
vote of no confidence.Complaints against the faculty
member were received by the administrationin Spring 1992.
The matter eventually was heard byan arbitrator who
rendered a decision in September 1993.
According to the arbitration Opinionand Award
document, the MVCC administration, afterreceiving the
sexual harassment complaints, met with thefaculty member
and informed him that he was "being suspendedwith pay
pending investigation of the complaints."He was "given a
vague set of charges, denied his attorney, evicted fromthe
campus as though he were a proven criminal, and consistently
denied copies of the complaints despite verbaland written
requests for the charges."
President Smith had appointed his Directorof Personnel
to oversee this matter.President Smith also contracted170
with a representative from another state communitycollege
"to serve as an independent investigator."In May, 1992,
the investigator submitted a report to the Directorof
Personnel in which he concluded that the collegedid not
have cause to dismiss the faculty member.According to the
investigator, "there was no clear violation of eithersexual
harassment laws or MVCC's sexual harassment policy."
The MVCC Board of Trustees met on June 1, buttook no
action regarding the faculty member's suspension.Because
the faculty member remained on suspension hisname was
removed from a description of classes which he hadbeen
assigned to teach during Summer quarter, and he losthis
right to teach that quarter.President Smith later met with
the faculty member on August 17, to advise himthat he was
being reinstated.At that meeting, the faculty member
received a letter of reprimand for violating MVCC'sCode of
Ethics and the letter was placed in his personnelfile.
On August 28, the faculty member "fileda grievance
challenging the reprimand."On September 8, the president
"denied the grievance without a hearingor further
discussion."The denial was appealed to the Board of
Trustees which rendered a decision on November 16, offering
"$1,500 in recognition that the investigation couldhave
been concluded more expeditiously."The parties engaged in
settlement discussions which did not prove fruitful andthe
matter went to arbitration.171
According to the arbitrator's Opinionand Award
document, the faculty union argued that thecollege had
violated the association contract ineffecting the faculty
member's suspension and reprimand.The union therefore
sought remedy in removing the letter ofreprimand from the
faculty member's personnel file, and inback pay with
interest for losses incurred by the facultymember in not
teaching summer school.
According to the above-mentioned document,the college
administration argued through itsattorney that the
grievance was "procedurally deficient,"that the requested
remedy was "beyond the scope of arbitration,"that "the
investigation was not unnecessarily prolonged,"that "the
contention that [the faculty member]'sdue process rights
have been abridged should be rejected,"and that "the
grievance should be denied."
The arbitrator found in favor of thefaculty member.
MVCC had violated three dueprocess rights explicitly
provided to faculty members in their bargainingagreement,
i.e., the requirement of justcause for discipline, the
right to representation, and the rightto all information
forming the basis of discipline.
The arbitrator determined that MVCC had"failed to
carefully investigate" before suspending thefaculty member
and evicting him from his office.The suspension was
"improper" because of the college's "failureto follow its172
own established procedures."The arbitrator affirmedan
investigation is "patently unfair whenan employer chooses
to disregard its own procedures anddenies an accused
instructor the right tosee the specific complaint filed
against him or her."
Administrative "procedural errors",the arbitrator
decided, "violated substantial dueprocess rights" of the
faculty member and were "significantenough to support the
finding that the college lacked justcause for discipline."
Thus, the college "violated thecollective bargaining
agreement when it suspended [the faculty member]with pay...
and when it issued him a letter ofreprimand."The faculty
member was awarded back pay with interestand the college
was directed to rescind the letter of reprimandand remove
it from the faculty member's personnelfile.The college
complied with the arbitrator's opinionand award, but the
faculty member later sued the college incivil court.
The twelve complaints about administrativepersonnel
practices mentioned earlier were investigatedby an ad hoc
committee convened by the President.The committee's
recommendations were presented to the Presidentand Board of
Trustees.The committee's report focusedon:
1. Better administrative communicationand following
the Long Range Plan (LRP).173
2. Closer adherence to college personnelpolicies
including the competitive selectionprocess
wherein all positions should beannounced.
3. Better administrative use of participatory
management principles by including facultyin the
decision making process as wellas in the
implementation process whenever possible.
The president and his administratorsaccepted the
committee's recommendations andagreed to "work diligently"
to improve their administrative practices.
Second Vote of No Confidence
The second vote of no confidencetook place eighteen
months after the first vote.The faculty were concerned
about "the lack of evidence" for the"promised improvements"
since the first vote.They invited the Presidentto
formally meet with them on October 19,1993, to discuss
their concerns over current and continuingpersonnel-related
problems and issues.
Adding to the already tense situationat this point, a
vacancy in the Board of Trustees and a changingstate
financial picture impacted the college.The outgoing chair
of MVCC's Board of Trustees resigned.Around the same time,
the Board openly expressed someconcerns regarding college
hiring procedures, and were "concernedabout quality."
Also, the state financial office directedstate institutions174
to prepare to implement budget reductions.In May, 1993,
the budget picture for MVCC included"up to a 4.5 percent
budget cut."
Impending budget reductions affectedthe college's
organizational planning and were viewedas potentially
translating into staff and FTE reductions.President Smith
indicated that any layoffs would be applied"equitably" to
all employee groups "whether faculty,support staff or
administrators."Strategies for dealing with reduced
funding included "not fillingnew positions, replacing
retiring faculty with part-time personnel,and converting
the summer school to 'self-support.'"An administrative
saving considered by President Smithwas his plan to
"combine two dean positions--student servicesand
instruction--into an executive vice president."Amplifying
the "grim financial picture", the 1992state legislature
implemented a salary freeze which meant therewould be "no
raises" allowed for faculty and administrators.
Salient factors contributing to thesecond vote of no
confidence included the non-renewal of sixtenure-track
faculty members and issues surrounding thePresident's
reorganization of the college.The event considered most
precipative, however, was "salary raisesfor the president
and his cabinet" during a period of financialexigency when
faculty raises were denied.175
Non-renewal of tenure track faculty.In March 1993,
the MVCC Board of Trustees did notrenew the contracts of
six full-time tenure track instructors,"five were let go
before they completed their three-yeartenure probation and
the sixth was denied tenure."This event later was referred
to by faculty as "The Monday NightMassacre."Reasons for
the non-renewal were debated betweenthe faculty association
and the administration.
The faculty association suspected that"budget cuts"
was the real reason for the non-renewal, because of the
uncertain financial picture at the college.Faculty were
concerned the college was "comminglinga reduction-in-force
with tenure."The Board, however, initially assuredcritics
that their decision was based "solelyon tenure issues."
The chair of the Board of Trusteeswas quoted in the
newspaper as saying the decision was "entirely at the
discretion of the college...we acton recommendations that
are entirely performance-based...so wecan get the strongest
faculty."The college later changed its positionon this
issue to reasons of budget considerations,which was
discovered to be allowable under state law.
Retaining the highest quality facultywas a personal
expectation of the Board Chair.The Board of Trusteeswas
presented with a total of twenty facultymembers who were
recommended for contract renewal by MVCC'stenure review
committee.At a separate meeting (and earlier inthe176
contract renewal process), the Board chairmanhad told
President Smith that all twenty facultymembers couldn't
possibly be the top quality the collegewas looking for.
The Board Chair therefore instructed thepresident to
"eliminate the lower thirty percent fromconsideration."
The president did so, and six of the twentyfaculty members
did not receive contract renewal.Two of the six eventually
filed a law suit claiming the college deniedthem due
process and damaged their ability to find workas
instructors.
College reorganization.President Smith reorganizedor
planned for reorganization of the college eachyear.Most
reorganization plans and activities took place"during the
summer months with little or no input from those affectedby
the reorganization."Yearly reorganizations varied insize
and complexity.Because of the impending budget reductions,
President Smith enacted a major reorganizationof the
college and his administrative cabinet.
President Smith's cabinet receiveda "reassignment of
responsibilities" along with "changes in titlesand salary."
President Smith planned to consolidate the positionsof Dean
of Students and Dean of Instruction intoan Executive Vice
President for Instruction and Student Services.The Dean of
Students position had been filled by the interim appointee
in July, 1991.In December 1992, MVCC's Dean of Instruction177
resigned.MVCC's senior administratorswere to receive a
salary increase in January 1993, butPresident Smith had
informed the Dean of Instruction months earlierthat he
would not receive his salary increase alongwith the other
administrators.The Dean of Instruction, with twoweeks
notice, decided to resign.Later, an interim Dean of
Instruction from outside the collegewas appointed.
By June 1993, the college had its Executive Vice
President of Instruction and Student Services.She had been
Dean of Arts and Sciences at another two-year community
college in the state.She described her management styleas
"participatory democratic" in which she soughtto "enable
others to make decisions."She was considered a "welcome
addition" to President Smith's administrative cabinet.She
immediately opened-up the budgetprocess to Instructional
Directors and worked diligently to bring instructional
divisions closer together.President Smith created the
position of Executive Vice President for Instructionand
Student Services ostensibly to save the collegemoney.
Contradicting earlier statements, he decided to retainthe
Dean of Student Services position and made the interim
appointee the permanent Dean of Students.
Through President Smith's reorganization plan,
administrative duties were "shuffled around" and positions
and titles changed.The Dean of Administration and Finance
became the Executive Vice President of Administration and178
Finance, the Director of Personnel becamethe Associate Dean
of Human Resources, and the Directorof Community Education
became the Associate Dean of CommunityEducation and College
Relations.
Questions surrounding the hiring andpromotion of the
Director of Community Educationwas a focus of concern for
many campus constituents.President Smith had known the
candidate before she applied for the position.Her hiring
was questioned because she was "not on the screening
committee's list of recommended candidates."The president
"intervened and required [the committee] to placeher name
on the list."She was hired "when applicants ofpurported
equal or better qualifications weren't interviewed."
President Smith was observed "to spenda lot of time with
her" and the relationship appeared "more thanprofessional."
There were rumors of an affair.
Administrative pay increases andno faculty raises.
Much of the controversy prompting the secondvote of no
confidence centered on administrativepay increases stemming
from the reorganization.Salary increases for some
administrators reached as high as 21%.The campus community
was concerned that "Smith and his inner circle" had received
"unjustifiable" pay raises at a time when facultywere
denied contractually earned increments (Professional
Improvement Credits or PICs) because of "budgetary179
limitations" stipulated by the state Legislature.The
salary increase situation caused considerableconcern
throughout the campus community.
President Smith explained tonewspaper reporters that
his cabinet's salary increaseswere "payment for additional
responsibilities under a reorganization ofadministrative
staff."He referred to the pay increasesas "salary
adjustments," not "salary raises."The amounts of "salary
adjustments" varied with the appointments.The salary for
the Vice President of Administration and Financerose 7.2%.
Pay for the Associate Dean of Human Resourcesrose 9.5%, and
salary for the Associate Dean of CommunityDevelopment and
College Relations rose 21% (in a thirteenmonth period).
The Board granted the Presidenta 6% pay increase,
though he reported and continuously maintainedit was "only
a 3% increase."The faculty objected, "whena paycheck goes
up 6% from what you got before, that's the amount ofthe pay
raise."On January 1,1993, President Smith received the
increase and his two-week paycheck jumped 6.3%,from
$3,864.80 to $4,108.56 (or to $98,605per year, an increase
of 32% in five years).The difference in the President's6%
vs. 3% pay increase was explained by the President and his
Vice President for Administration and Finance.Since the
pay increase came on January 1, that meant that half of
Smith's increase fell on the last six months ofthe 1992-93
contract, with the other half applied to his 93-94contract.180
The state freeze on salary increasesimposed by the
legislature was effective July 1, and thePresident was
accused of trying to "slipan extra pay raise under the
wire."President Smith, however, maintainedthat his pay
increase was allowed by state law andthrough Board
approval.The state auditor's office, afterinvestigating
the matter, confirmed the President's position.
On the issue of payment for facultyProfessional
Improvement Credits, faculty leadership arguedthat when
their contract was renewed the interimDean of Instruction
agreed that PICs would be paid "asresources were
available."This was interpreted by facultythat any
appropriate available resource couldbe used to pay the
increments.The administration argued that raisesweren't
allowed "because of the legislature'ssalary freeze."The
state attorney general's office later investigatedthe
matter and stated "no community college in thestate paid
the increments because of the prohibitivelanguage of the
1993 legislation."
These events and others prompted thefaculty to ask
President Smith to meet with themon October 19th to discuss
their concerns.In a letter from the faculty union
president to the college president, Dr. Smithwas asked to
address the following issues.
1. Salary increases made for the presidentand his
cabinet.181
2. The decision not topay contractually earned step
increases.
3. The handling of the faculty sexualharassment
case.
4. The President's "breaking promises"to:(a)
appoint a Dean of Students onlytemporarily, open
the position competitively, andconsolidate it
into a vice presidency;(b) share budget
reductions equitably;(c) distribute resources
fairly; and,(d) solicit staff input priorto the
reorganization.
After President Smith addressedthe faculty on these
issues, an all campus referendumwas held to assess the
faculty's satisfaction with thepresident's explanations.
The ballot also asked respondentsto rate the level of
satisfaction with the overall performanceof the President,
the Vice President for Administrationand Finance and the
Associate Dean of Human Resources.The ballot used a 4-
point scale ranging from "very satisfied"to "very
dissatisfied."There were 136 respondents fromfull-time
faculty, part-time faculty, classifiedstaff, administration
and exempt staff.Over 90% reported dissatisfactionwith
the president's explanations of the issuesand with the
overall performance of the President andthe two
administrators.Respondents to the referendum perceiveda182
"lack of evidence for the promised improvements"in
personnel practices and in "participatorymanagement."
Participatory management.When Meadow View Community
College hired Dr. Smith, the faculty, staff andother
administrators had "high expectations" for himas a leader
who would "change the organizational culture" and"involve
more people in decision-making processes" witha
"collaborative and participative management style.""It
didn't happen."
The realization of unfulfilled expectationsof
participatory management took placeover time, "it gradually
built brick after brick," each person's individual
experience that participatory management "wasnot really
true, and it was perceived to be "a real problem."
College employees anticipated providing "moreinput"
and being "more involved with decision-makingprocesses in
areas that affect those implementing the decisions."They
knew that "merely forming committees" didn't constitute
"participatory management."The "committees went nowhere."
Faculty and staff asserted that decisionsshould
involve those implementing them or affected bythem."There
was no feedback loop in the decision-making process...there
was no evaluation of the decision to see how well it's
working."President Smith sometimes would "collect input
but not consider it."He'd "get the input, and then be183
autocratic.""It was worse than being 'autocratic,'because
it was basically dishonest."
Other "autocratic administrators probablyaffected
[the] participatory management capabilitiesof the
President."College administrators would "do whateverthe
hell they wanted to anyway" despite facultyinput or college
policy."It would not have come toa vote of no confidence
if [participatory management] had beeneffective."
"Not only did things not get better[since the first
vote], they got worse."After endorsing committee
recommendations for improved administrativepractices, Dr.
Smith "fashioned a major reorganizationwith minimal faculty
participation, secured large pay raisesexclusively for
himself and his cabinet and hired andpromoted a cabinet
level person who had been eliminated bya screening
committee.""Had Dr. Smith simply followed the
recommendations he had agreed to, perhapsthe second no
confidence vote would have been unnecessary."
Third Vote of No Confidence
A few weeks after the second vote ofno confidence, the
MVCC Board of Trustees decided thata fact-finding committee
should be appointed "to hear staff complaintsabout
President John Smith and other administrators."The third
vote of no confidence followed on the heels ofBoard's184
response to the fact-finding committee's report andincluded
a referendum seeking a state investigation.
Fact-finding.The fact-finding committeewas convened
by the President.The committee was comprised of eight
members, including representatives fromall campus groups
and a Trustee (six of the fact-findingcommittee members
were interviewed for this study).The President appointed
the new Vice President for Instruction andStudent Services
to serve as committee chair.
During the time the fact-finding committeeconducted
its investigation, another trustee resigned.This reduced
the Board of Trustees to only three members.Because the
college was in crisis, the localnewspaper called for the
governor to quickly appoint two new Board members.In mid-
December, the state governor appointed tworeplacement
members to the Board--a local attorney anda retired
instructor from Meadow View Community College.
After four months of gathering data, the fact-finding
committee presented its report to the Board.From the
outset of the committee's investigation, thefaculty
association had expressed anxiety over whetherthe committee
could "give a fully unbiased report."Faculty were
concerned that the committee had members whowere "too
inclined to support the positions taken by Smith."The
faculty association, therefore, intended to holdanother185
staff vote to get reactions to the report.The vote would
be concerned with "the substance of thereport, the
procedures the committee used and the trustees'response to
the findings."
The Trustees initially refused to releasethe
committee's findings, explaining that itwas an interim
report and therefore "not legally considereda public
document."The campus and the localnewspaper disagreed and
the report was made public a short timelater.The Board of
Trustees was criticized by faculty and others fornot
releasing the report sooner and for meeting in"too many
closed-door sessions."Once released, the reportwas
generally characterized as "rather innocuous."It "omitted
some of the most controversial complaints entirely" andsome
of the committee's conclusions were removed fromthe
report's final writing.Faculty and staff complained the
report was "laundered", "sanitized", "watered-down"and "a
white-wash job."
The released report did state that MVCC'stop
administrators got pay raises "for assuming added
responsibilities but refused to pay first-linesupervisors
and other staff members for doing extra work."The report
noted that Dr. Smith told employees in the October19th
meeting to "seek pay increases" if they believedthey
weren't being compensated for additional workor186
responsibilities, but "when employees asked forsalary
increases, cabinet-level administrators turnedthem down."
Among complaints submitted by concerned facultyto the
fact-finding committee, but left out of its finalreport,
were that MVCC's administration:
1. Received morally indefensible salary increases.
2. Allowed clear inequities to exist betweenthe
treatment of cabinet-level administrative
salaries/workload vs. the bulk of Meadow View
Community College's administrative, academicand
classified employees' salaries/workload.
3. Hired a person as college relations andfoundation
director when more qualified applicantswere
passed over without an interview.
4. Suspended an instructor without dueprocess on
allegations of sexual harassment.
5. Refused to grant tenure to six instructorswhen
the tenure reviews showed theywere qualified
which violated the Tenure Review Procedure.
6. Reorganized administrators without seekingfaculty
and staff advice.
Also excluded were staff complaints that theAssociate
Dean of Human Resources needed to follow and obey the
relevant employment law and the faculty contract,and that
President Smith tended to alienate faculty, ruled by
intimidation, did not deal honestly with them, andisolated187
himself from all staff but those unfailinglyloyal to him.
The fact-finding committee's reportwas considered
significant because of what it both minimizedand omitted.
The Board of Trustees responded in early-Marchto the
fact-finding committee's report.Their response was
summarized as "mistakes had been made" andincluded
recommendations for "better communicationsbetween
administrators and staff."Shortly thereafter, the faculty
association reacted to the findings and heldits third vote
of no confidence.
Referendum and state investigation.Within the third
vote, respondents were asked (a) how satisfied theywere
with the trustee's findings and decisionson fact-finding,
(b) how likely the President, the Vice Presidentof
Administration and Finance, and the AssociateDean of Human
Resources will be trustworthy and competent in thefuture,
and (c) whether they favored "a state investigationof the
college's management practices."
The ballot received 177 responses from 100faculty, 66
classified staff, and 11 administrators.Approximately 87%
of those voting were not satisfied with the Boardof
Trustee's investigation and their proposed solutionsto the
campus unrest.Around 92% did not believe the President
would become trustworthy and competent in the future,and
about 86% held the same sentiments for the Vice Presidentof188
Administration and the Associate Dean of HumanResources.
Approximately 79% favored an independentstate investigation
of MVCC's management practices.
A few weeks after the referendum, the Board ofTrustees
asked the State Board for Community Collegesto appoint an
investigative panel.Though the State Board hadno official
investigatory mechanism in place, ayear earlier it had
investigated a separate leadership crisis involvinga new
president at another state community college.The panel was
to try to find what out had been causing thecontroversies
at MVCC and to give the Trustees suggestionson what could
be done.After about one month, however, the StateBoard
declined to appoint the review panel.A representative
explained that a state probe wouldn't have beenappropriate
for the quasi-judicial type of investigation withsworn
testimony that MVCC requested.Also, the review panel
"wouldn't have jurisdiction over matters of hiringand
firing which were among the issues to be investigated."The
State Board instead recommended that trustees themselves
"move quickly to resolve the issues."
Aftermath of Final Ballot
After the third vote of no confidence, the Board of
Trustees conducted an evaluation of President Smithas "part
of the solution" to the college's problems.Though
President Smith had asserted he "wouldn'tgo willingly", he189
and the Board of Trustees eventually reacheda mutual
decision that "a change in leadership" wasnecessary at
MVCC.The Board of Trustees entered into negotiationswith
Dr. Smith to buy out his contract.The Board agreed topay
Dr. Smith for the remaining 10 months on the secondyear of
his three-year contract and included payment foraccrued
sick leave, vacation time, and medical benefits.Dr. Smith
later announced his retirement from MVCC ata Board meeting.
The Board's charge was "to review the performance of
the president."Though the Vice President of Administration
and the Associate Dean of Human Resources alsowere named
with Dr. Smith as "the focus of no confidence votes",the
Board took no action on their positions, because "the
president reviews the performance of his staff."Shortly
after the Board of Trustees negotiated the contractbuyout,
the Board Chair resigned.190
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Overview
This case study of leadership in crisis ata community
college was undertaken to add to the practical and
theoretical knowledge and understanding of presidential
leadership issues that actually occur in American community
colleges.
The problem of what can be learned from an
investigation of one community college enduringa crisis in
leadership was the focus of the study.Research questions
guiding the study were:(a) what does the research
literature have to say about leadership and leadership in
crisis;(b) how did the crisis in leadership occur at Meadow
View Community College and what were the situational
preconditions and catalytic events surrounding the crisis;
(c) what were the perceptions of the leadership crisisas
viewed by the Board of Trustees, administrators, faculty,
staff, student leadership and the college President;(d)
what did Meadow View Community College constituents learn
from the leadership crisis experience; and (e) whatcan this
case study of leadership in crisis contribute to the body of
knowledge in community college leadership?191
This chapter contains asummary of the case study based
upon the above research questions.Tentative conclusions
about how the leadership crisismay have been avoided,
implications for educational leadershippractice, and
suggestions for future research alsoare presented and
discussed.
What Does the Research LiteratureHave to Say
About Leadership and Leadership inCrisis?
A review of relevant leadership literatureprovided the
researcher and the reader with alternativetheoretical
perspectives on how to view the particularsof this case
study.Although much has been written abouttheoretical
perspectives and approaches to leadership,few studies have
attempted to investigate the particulartopic of leadership
when it is in crisis, or leadershipcrises at educational
institutions specifically.
Seven theoretical approaches and perspectiveson
leadership were reviewed in Chapter 2.They included trait,
behavioral, power-influence, contingencyor situational,
transactional and transformational, culturaland symbolic,
and post-industrial perspectives.Specific topics of
leadership in higher education, the president's
constituencies, leadership effectiveness,derailment,
success and failure in the college presidency, andmoral and
ethical dimensions of college leadershipwere presented.192
No single theoretical perspectiveor research approach
to leadership could adequately describe thebehaviors,
events, or circumstances surrounding the leadershipcrisis
that occurred at Meadow View CommunityCollege.
How Did the Crisis in Leadership Occur at MeadowView
Community College and What Were the Situational
Preconditions and Catalytic Events
Surrounding the Crisis?
The descriptive account in Chapter 5 addressedthis
research question with a detailed reconstructionof the
leadership crisis.In summary, President Smithwas
considered the best among the candidates interviewedfor the
presidency of Meadow View Community College.The Board of
Trustees, administrators, faculty, and supportstaff viewed
Dr. Smith as a welcome change to the previouspresident and
also viewed him as the person who would bringthe college
back into the community and administer thecollege with a
participatory management style of leadership.
Over time, however, President Smith'sconstituents
became concerned about (a) administrative unresponsiveness
to faculty and staff concerns,(b) administrative disregard
for faculty rights of due process,(c) non-compliance with
college personnel policies and procedures, and (d)
differences in administrative stated philosophiesand
personal words and actions regarding participatory
management.193
During a period of approximately twoyears, these
unresolved concerns led to three votes ofno confidence in
the college president and two of his administrators.
Catalytic events surrounding the leadership crisis included
(a) appointment of the Dean of Students,(b) alleged faculty
sexual harassment situation,(c) non-renewal of tenure track
faculty,(d) administrative pay increases with no faculty
raises,(e) circumstances surrounding the fact-finding
committee's report, and (e) incongruency between stated
administrative philosophies and constituent observations
regarding a participatory management.The ensuing three
votes of no confidence gradually increased over time in
scope and consequence, eventually included a criticism of
the Board of Trustees, and ultimately lead to Dr. Smith's
reluctant early retirement.
What Were the Perceptions of the Leadership Crisisas
Viewed by the Board of Trustees, Administrators,
Faculty, Staff, Student Leadership and
the College President?
Perceptions of Meadow View Community College's
leadership crisis, as viewed by members of the Board of
Trustees, administration, faculty, support staff, student
leadership, and the college President contributed
significantly to this research.Constituent perceptions of
the leadership crisis, including what was gained and lost
are presented below.A summary of President Smith's194
reflections on some of the mistakes he felt hemade while in
office and his advice for new community collegepresidents
also are presented.Words in quotes are respondentcomments
in each category, unless otherwise noted.
Board of Trustees' Perceptions
At the beginning of the leadership crisis, theBoard of
Trustees upheld their responsibility to support the
president."The honeymoon was over", but the conflictwas
not perceived as a significant problem, "itwas a blip, it
would straighten out."The Board's inclination was to give
the president the opportunity to "solve the problem
himself."On one hand, the Board wanted to support the
president throughout the crisis; but on the other,they also
felt over time that "the dilemma of public accountability
vs. the problem" was something they must address.
The Board's main source for informationon college
functioning and activities, including any problems,was the
President himself, "John offered reasonable explanations,or
excuses, for his behavior and the situation which led toa
perception that problems were being takencare of."
However, as the crisis developed, Board perceptions
changed.Certain aspects of the President's management
style were gradually realized by the Board.Communication
in his administration tended to be "top-down inan
authoritarian sort of way.""John said he was a team player195
and a participatory manager, but thatwas true only if you
agreed with him."With John, "everything had tobe
adversarial and confrontational...[the administrationand
the faculty union] couldn't work outan argument or work
together...that was garbage and we all knew that."
As time passed, the Board began tosee for themselves
"indications of the criticisms against PresidentSmith" and
began "to lose trust."Dr. Smith's cumulative actions,
comments, and responses to leadership issues tendedto
"surprise" and "frustrate" Board members.This, along with
other factors (such as "his inability to dealadequately
with rumors of an affair") lead Board membersto conclude
that he was "not being totally honest" incommunicating
fully with them.Board members tended to suspect thathis
information to them "wasn't everything thatshould have been
relayed.""Once known...about the lying, deceit,etc., the
trust was gone.""Distrust was widespread.""Folks didn't
trust John."
When the conflict "festered and grew" moving"from bad
to worse", the Board was asked by faculty, staff,other
administrators and the community to intervene.Dr. Smith
criticized the Board for micromanaging and notsupporting
him, but when it "became a point that Smithwas ineffective
and had no credibility, to some extent from thatpoint on
the Board's stance was we will get to the bottomof it and
we will do the right thing."196
A rift eventually developed between the Board andDr.
Smith.President Smith had "neglected faculty concerns."
The sexual harassment allegations againsta faculty member
was a "significant" issue which "should have beenmore
expeditiously investigated."The Board's posture through
most of the ordeal was "let's deal with the mistakes and
move on."Inevitably, however, the realization came that
the Board, the President and the administration "couldn't
continue in a mutual relationship.""Something had to be
done."President Smith asserted, "I am not going willingly"
and the Board "didn't have much choiceon options."As
pressure mounted, the Board negotiated a contract buyout and
financial settlement with President Smith inducing himto
retire.
Board of Trustees's perceptions on whatwas gained and
what was lost through their experiences in the leadership
crisis are identified in Table 3.
Administrators' Perceptions
Perceptions of the leadership crisis by administrators
(primarily associate deans and directors) tended to cluster
in two general areas--the administration's inconsistencyin
following college policies and procedures, where certain
practices and rules were "good for some people and not for
others," and in the claim of participatory management, where
there was a perceived "divergence in stated philosophy and197
Table 3
Board of Trustees' Perceptions of Gains and Lossesfrom the
Leadership Crisis (n = 5)
Gained
Increased Board and
College dialogue over
issues.
Professional and personal
growth.
Better definition of
roles of Board and
President.
Lost
College resources of time,
money, and energy.
Personal resources of time
and energy.
Integrity and credibility.
personal actions on the part of President Smith" andhis
administrators.
Respondents tended to characterize the leadership
crisis in terms of the "autocratic managementstyle" of the
president and some cabinet-level administratorsand the
accompanying "absolute lack of trust" that ensued."No
matter what was done, there was such a lack of trust."This
lack of trust was viewed as a "major factor" in the
leadership crisis.
At first, most administrators were "strongly infavor
of the president and his right to govern."He had made
early progress in grants and entrepreneurial activitiesand
Title III was a "major success."President Smith "looked at
the institution as an economic development tool forthe
community" and MVCC would not have advanced in theseareas
if Dr. Smith hadn't "helped open things up."198
However, "it became apparent with passage of time and
with dissemination of information...more andmore people
became dissatisfied with the actions of the president."
They "gradually became aware of denials andcover-ups and
attitudes on issues" and realized that "hecame in and
talked the participatory game...[but] as he began tooperate
it became quite clear that there wasn't any participatory
management...decisions were being made without appropriate
input."Those affected by decisions were "not fully
involved or consulted."
As things came into clearer focus, the Presidentwas
viewed as a leader who was "adversarial", "inflexible", and
"less than forthcoming."He had an "adversary style of
behaving--even in conversations it was always the
administration vs. the faculty vs. the classified staff."
"Once he made up his mind, no amount of reasonor discussion
would change it--even if [the decision] was wrong.""[He]
couldn't be trusted, he'd tell you one thing then do
another."President Smith was quoted as saying to
administrators in campus meetings and elsewhere, "Iwas
hired to be right, you were hired to be wrong." "Inmany
ways it was who's right instead of what's right."
Other factors also cited by respondents were
inappropriate attempts to control administrative teams,
faculty union activism, and a perceived micromanaging Board.
President Smith "forbade Instructional Directors from having199
lunch together on a regular basis."There was "aggressive
leadership from the union" during the crisisand the union
leadership was considered "tenacious."And, the Board of
Trustees "stepped into the management of thecollege...[and]
gave specific directions to the president that shouldhave
been his role, including administrativemanagement of day-
to-day operation functions."
Yet another, and often cited factor,was the effects of
organizational culture.Some leadership issues were "deeply
rooted" in organizational culture from theprevious
president and they "persisted with John."As a new
president, "John relied stronglyon his top-level
However, "some of those administrators
were responsible for many problems for John."John "only
wanted to have yes-men around him, whichwas a greater
factor than skill or ability to perform.""Maybe it wasn't
John totally, it may have been themore autocratic
administrators working with him.""John is gone," but "much
of the problem is still here, the distrust,the lack of
communication, the lack of goals thatwe all share."
Administrators' views of what was gained andwhat was
lost through their experiences in the leadershipcrisis are
identified in Table 4.Table 4
Administrators' Perceptions of Gains and Lossesfrom the
Leadership Crisis (n = 12)
Gained Lost
A united campus. Trust, Creativity and
Morale.
An understanding of how
bad things can be.
200
Organizational momentum
and effective teams and
working relationships.
A new presidential Credibility in the
advisory committee. community.
The Faculty's Perceptions
With the change in leadership at MVCC,faculty members
wanted a new president who was "student andfaculty
oriented," who had a "collaborative and participative
management style," and who would "involvemore people in
decision-making processes."They wanted someone who would
"change the organizational culture established bythe
previous president and his administration."The faculty
anticipated that Dr. Smith would meet their expectations.
While in office, President Smithwas viewed as
"innovative in bringing much needed changes to thecollege
in areas of grants and contracts" and "was reallygood out
in the community."Initial impressions were that President
Smith was "trustworthy and had good intent, but itwas not
substantiated over time."The former presidentwas "a hard-201
liner and everybody knew it and he madeno bones about
it...[however,] with the new president, he sort ofspoke one
line and then behaved in a different manner."
Some faculty leaders felt that the presidentand
certain administrators "lacked consistent values oftruth
and honesty" and "denigrated any constraintson their
behavior or procedure."Hiring practices were "contraryto
policy."The administration was viewed as "high-handed"in
treatment of the faculty member accused of alleged sexual
harassment, "their own outside investigator had saidthere
was no harassment 2 weeks after the suspension; yet they
kept [the faculty member] out 4 months."On the pay raises,
the faculty had "all accepted that there would beno pay
raise...the legislature had specifically prohibitedPICs for
that year."Then, "Smith and members of his cabinetgot a
pay raise, with a range up to 21%."It was viewed as
"administrative hypocrisy--tight finances, weepingand
sorrowful portrayals, yet administrators got raises."It
"just twisted some tails."
President Smith's decisions and actionson personnel-
related issues were significant factors in the leadership
crisis, but other factors contributed as well."Much of the
problem was the lieutenants."Dr. Smith inherited an
administrative team that was "dictatorial and vindictive."
Two members of the administrative team were "extremely
aggressive interpersonally and as a management style","rule202
with an iron-hand type.""The old system was still there
and it never really was what you would call his system",
President Smith "didn't change it enough."
By retaining previous administrators, President Smith
also retained some of the "accumulative frustration and
animosities that had been built up over theyears...so he
had some organizational things that were not desirable."
Many (but not all) faculty respondents commented that MVCC
was not an easy place for Dr. Smith to assume office.The
college had "an organizational culture that had been shaped
by an autocratic regime...some people from the old regime
behaved in the old manner."
President Smith "was not well served by those he
inherited...they failed to give good advice."Not everybody
directly under him, "but enough of them to certainly create
a problem."His administrators "really catered to him--yes
boss, yes boss."They gave him "inaccurate information,"
"filtered information," and "information he wanted to hear."
At meetings, Dr. Smith would provide "inappropriate
responses to questions...reflecting an uninformed position."
He would rely on "political rhetoric," and there were "no
real answers to the issues."
President Smith "shot from the hip, kept himself holed
up, didn't get out."There was "a big chasm" between the
president and his cabinet and the rest of campus.There203
became "a closed circle in the administration from which
information didn't seem to get in or really get out."
Administrative and faculty perceptions about whatwas
happening and what needed to happen were not thesame.When
the administration was "still trying to be autocratic" and
"didn't communicate openly and honestly," it "ended in
conflict."
The expectation of participatory management alsowas
viewed by faculty as an important factor.For them,
participatory management turned out to be "committees that
went no where to be overruled by executive privilege."In
some cases, the whole process of committee work was "arouse
to begin with," because if committees didn'tcome up with
"the right decision, the one that was already goingto
happen...it would just happen later on."Most of the
committees were "ignored."President Smith "professed
participatory management, but it was a catch phrase that
wasn't true.""John was a team player with other
administrators, not the faculty.""He had his own agenda."
"Ninety percent of the changes and decisionswere made in
the summer when faculty were gone...when faculty hadzero
input."On one occasion, faculty were invited by President
Smith to provide input at a particular meeting.While at
the meeting, the faculty were told "what would be at that
same meeting...there was no listening, no input."204
Another contributing factoras viewed by faculty was
that "the Board got involved, perhapstoo much.""In a
sense, the Board butted-in where it shouldn't have,and
didn't butt-in where it should have."Faculty first viewed
the Board as "a solution to the problem"and then eventually
decided "they weren't going to solve it."Another
identified factor was President Smith's"questionable
relationships with certain employees beyondacceptable
limits."
Faculty members' views of whatwas gained and what was
lost through their experiences in theleadership crisis are
identified in Table 5.
Table 5
Faculty's Perceptions of Gains andLosses from the
Leadership Crisis (n = 8)
Gained
Faculty unity.
A new contract with
specific language about
personnel issues, RIF,
reprimand and due
process.
A new beginning.
Support Staff's Perceptions
Lost
Trust.
A sense of team spirit,
community and
effectiveness.
Image in the community.
Perceptions of MVCC'S support staffon the leadership
crisis were expressed primarily in terms of"frustrations"205
with the administration.Support staff respondents
expressed distrust in the administration and perceivedthem
as not having "respect for others."Support staff felt they
were "denied voice" and were "unsupported" by the President
and members of his administration.
From the beginning of President Smith's tenuresome of
his actions and comments toward MVCC's supportstaff tended
to alienate them.He contracted for a desk audit of all
support staff which resulted in "lowered income formany
employees."He was often overheard to say "support staff
are a dime-a-dozen."
Some of the support staff stated that Dr. Smithwas a
"glad-hander" with "a phony smile" who "hada facade most
people could see through.""He talked a lot with little
substance on real issues."He "didn't walk the talk."He
"sold himself as participatory manager," but "in reality
[was] more of a dictator."He "surrounded himself withyes-
men" who "weren't doing him any favors."They "treated
staff like low life.""It was not just Dr. Smith, it also
was [the Vice President of Administration and Finance and
the Associate Dean of Human Resources].""People didn't
trust any of the administration."There was "reprisal for
people who stood and asked questions or voiced concerns."
Support staff members' views of what was gained and
what was lost through their experiences in the leadership
crisis are identified in Table 6.Table 6
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Support Staff's Perceptions of Gains andLosses from the
Leadership Crisis (n = 5)
Gained
Unionization of Support
Staff.
Ownership and pride in
organization.
A new beginning.
Student Leadership's Perceptions
Lost
Some good people lost
their jobs.
Time and ground in
producing positive
results.
Trust in administration.
Perceptions of MVCC's student leadershipwere that the
general body of students "wasn't affectedin any way" by the
crisis and that it had "no effect in theclassroom" or on
their "formal education."For most student body officers,
until they got into student government,they "didn't have
any clue there was a problem."
The terms of office of student leadershipoverlapped
during the crisis period and perceptions ofworking
relationships with President Smith and hisadministrators
tended to vary.In the aggregate, "firsthand experiences"
with President Smith were "good."However, some student
leaders said that there were times when theadministration
"wasn't honest", "wouldn't listen", "wouldmake promises and
wouldn't follow through" or would make decisionscontrary to207
students' interest, such as "cutting Spring breakdown to
three days instead of five, whichwas controversial."
Views of MVCC's student leadershipon what was gained
and what was lost through their experiencesin the
leadership crisis are identified in Table 7.
Table 7
Student Leadership's Perceptions of Gainsand Losses from
the Leadership Crisis (n = 3)
Gained Lost
A new perspective of how Trust and respect.
people in authority are
viewed. Time and progress.
Sense of community.
The College President's Perceptions
Before his retirement, Dr. Smith shared hisperceptions
of the leadership crisis inan open interview with the
researcher in phase 1 of this study.During the interview,
Dr. Smith reflected on his presidency, identifiedproblems,
discussed mistakes, and offeredsome advice to new community
college presidents.
Dr. Smith knew he was "the numberone choice of the
Board of Trustees" when he was hiredas the new president of
Meadow View Community College.The Board was "looking for
someone to bring the college back into the community",
someone "to change things" and "make things happen."Upon208
his appointment, President Smithwas "responsive to
community needs" through many "job retrainingprograms and
grants and contracts."Though "support erodedon campus",
Dr. Smith had "support in the community."
Within a year of when Dr. Smith took office,an
"undercurrent of non-support and negativism"surfaced among
senior administrators (most notably "the Dean of
Instruction").President Smith believed that "anyone who
thinks they should have been the president and isstill on
the payroll will second-guess mostevery decision of the
President."The Board had told Dr. Smith, "ifyou wish not
to renew their contract[s], we will support it."However,
President Smith's position was he would "ratherwork with
people and compromise than fire someone."
President Smith saw the college through fouryears of
down-sizing.After five years, he "did a major
reorganization."Through the reorganization he "changed
duties and responsibilities and increasedpay for some
people."The "adjustments in pay were legal."The Board
"gave a raise to the CEO", but the faculty union said"Smith
gave himself a raise."Dr. Smith realized that faculty
raises in the form of Professional Improvement Credits
(PICs) were "not allowed by law...no communitycollege gave
them."President Smith recognized that "major problems"
arose from the reorganization, budget cuts, and salary
increases for administrators but not the faculty.209
Other "major problems" identified byDr. Smith were
non-renewal of six tenure track facultymembers and alleged
sexual harassment by a faculty member.There was "union
vindictiveness and furor" over the sexualharassment issue.
Regarding the non-renewal of six faculty,a Board member had
told President Smith, "not 100%are excellent faculty...
probably 70% should be renewed, not 100%for sure."
President Smith reaffirmed that the non-renewalwas "a
quality issue" and not "budgetary"as the faculty union had
maintained.
At the time when the Board of Trusteeshad only three
members, "the union saw a weak Board"and "used it to
advantage."The faculty union "blasted thepresident and
his administration."The Board then developeda "task
force" to investigate and "study allegations."When it was
finished and presented its results, "oneperson on the
committee voiced concerns to the Board.""The chair allowed
the comments."It was "a sign that the Boardwas listening
to general employees...[and] the beginningof the end for
[the] CEO."The Board was "no longer willingto support the
President and administration."
The local newspaper "refused to listento the President
and the Board" and "accepted what the unionsaid as fact",
it "always made administration look bad."President Smith
felt it never printed his side of the story.He had been "a
CEO for 15 years and never had mediaor employees attack210
[him]."He was "brought in with unanimity" but "insix-and-
a-half years received two votes of no confidence."He
regarded the issues raised in the votes ofno confidence as
"bogus", and considered the referendums "the workof a
handful of aggressive faculty members" whowere "trying to
destroy" the college.
President Smith felt that the Boardsaw the "only way
to help itself out" was to buy out his contract.President
Smith intended to "retire in two years."But, for that to
happen, the Board needed to "stand up and say"to the
faculty union "we support the president to takecare of
governance."President Smith believed, the faculty's"most
important job is teaching, not in sharedgovernance."
President Smith expressed curiosity about thefuture of
Meadow View Community College and pondered whetheror not it
"could end up like [another state communitycollege] that
had seven presidents in 10 years."
Mistakes identified by president.President Smith
reflected on some of the identified mistakes hehad made and
commented on what he would have done differently(first
person quotes are used here).
On the alleged faculty sexual harassment issue:"I
didn't do a good job of expeditiously investigatingthe
sexual harassment charge...it dragged on for threemonths,
it should have taken three weeks.""I should have brought211
in a private investigator from [town] to evaluate,
investigate and make recommendations quickly."The
situation needed "faster investigation and reinstatement
sooner."
On the appointment of the Dean of Students:"It
probably was a mistake too.""I promised to open it up, but
didn't.""The Board was concerned.""If I had it to do
over again,I probably would have opened itup and taken [a]
barrage of [criticism about] reappointing the currentDean
of Students over the other two [MVCC administrators].""It
was a 'Catch 22'."
On the non-renewal of tenure track faculty:"When the
Board member said only 70 percent of tenure-trackfaculty
should be renewed, I should have said 'Let the
administration determine how many people will be recommended
for non-renewal', then let the Board determine differently
if they want[ed] to."
On the reorganization: "At a time when facultywere not
able to get an increment [raise], I probably would have
given a lesser amount of pay adjustment than I did",but
"not apologize for pay."
On faculty complaints: "I should have said to the Board
earlier, let's bring in union leadership, support staff
leadership, and with the faculty senate, the Board, the
president and senior administrators, say hereare your
complaints, let's sit down and work them out."212
On his "most crucial mistake":"I should have fired
most of the senior administrators andstarted with a clean
slate...a lot of CEOs do that."
Advice to new community college presidents.Dr. Smith
reflected on his professional experiencesin community
college leadership and offered the followingadvice for new
community college presidents:
1.Always be open with your Board.
2.Be honest and trustworthy.
3.Have a good sense of humor.
4.Don't take your job so seriously thatit could
destroy your health.
5.Choose an environment withsome fun in it.
6.Accept the fact that a small decisioncan become
magnified into a huge decision.
7.Be prepared to become a very fast learner.
Perceptions on the leadership crisis bythe Board of
Trustees, administrators, faculty, support staff,student
leadership, and the President provided valuableinsight into
how the leadership crisis occurred and howthose involved
viewed it.The collected perceptions also provideddata for
identifying what the college's constituentslearned from
their experiences.213
What Did Meadow View CommunityCollege Constituents
Learn from the Leadership CrisisExperience?
Several lessons learnedwere identified from respondent
experiences in the leadership crisis.Lessons learned hada
variety of dimensions, both generaland specific, and tended
to be of two types--those relatedto personal values and
philosophies and those with practicalapplications.Some
lessons were considered crucial, whileothers were viewedas
slight adjustments.
"We learned to reexamineour own values, our beliefs,
and our leadership styles, and theway we do business," was
the essence of what MVCC's constituentslearned.Through
experiencing "a heightenedawareness of crisis potential,"
Meadow View Community College constituentsresolved to make
some changes.They focused on revising policiesand
procedures in tenure-review, hiring,retaining and releasing
personnel, and improving college communications.Board
members in particular resolved to "improvecommunications
holistically," to "seek moreaccess with the college
community", and to "meet regularly withfaculty and staff to
explain policies and management decisionsand to exchange
views."
Among other lessons learned by Boardmembers were the
importance of (a) working toward "anon-adversarial
relationship with the faculty union,"(b) getting things
"more out in the open with lessuse of executive session,"214
(c) learning from experiences andpassing along thememory
of those experiences tonew Board members, and (d)
developing "an appropriate evaluationtool" for the college
president.
College faculty and staff learnedthat they "could be
successful in resisting unfairness andrepeating the things
of the past."They learned to be "watchful of oldguard and
old ways of doing business" and the"lingering effects of
untrustworthy administrators."They learned to expect their
administration "to act morally andethically, not just
legally."
Meadow View Community Collegeconstituents learneda
fundamental lesson from their experienceswith a crisis in
leadership--be aware of crisis potential,pay more attention
to warning signs, and take preventiveaction before it gets
out of hand.
What Can This Case Study of Leadershipin Crisis
Contribute to the Body of Knowledgein
Community College Leadership?
One of the purposes of this studywas to generate some
observations about how the leadership crisisat Meadow View
Community College may have been avoided.The reader should
keep in mind that analysis of the datashowed some
comprehensive patterns and relationshipsamong observations,
documents, and respondent descriptions, butdid not reveal
cause and effect relationships.The researcher's goal215
throughout the entire data collection and analysisprocess
was to treat the evidence fairly, to produce a compelling
descriptive account and to rule out alternative
interpretations.The researcher relied on a variety of
sources and analytical elements to generate the tentative
conclusions including (a) analysis of relevant literature,
(b) identification of fixed and variable factors, and (c)
respondent views.
The relevant leadership literature discussed in Chapter
2 provided a theoretical connection between what is already
known in the research and the particulars of this case
study.The literature was influential in illuminating
possibilities for how the leadership crisis may have
occurred and how it may have been avoided.Examples
included research on leadership traits, behaviors,power and
influence, situations, transactions and transformations,
cultures, and leadership needs for the twenty-first century.
Also included were leadership in higher education, the
president's constituencies, leadership effectiveness,
success and failure in the college presidency, and
moral/ethical dimensions of leadership.
Identification of Fixed and Variable Factors
Identification of fixed and variable factors is a
useful way of interpreting circumstances and events
surrounding leadership crises in a particular environment216
(Parnell, 1993).Fixed factors in this casewere those
considered beyond the president's control.The effects a
president may have on a campus can be confoundedby the
actions of other institutional leaders, changesin the
environment and internal organizationalprocesses such as
culture and history (Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b; Fisher,1984,
1994).Variable factors, on the other hand,were those
subject to change within the particularcontext.
Identification of both fixed and variable factorsmay have
unclear boundaries, depending on how one interpretswhat is
changeable or not.
Fixed factors identified in thiscase study were
related to the college's environment, institutionalculture,
and actions of other institutional leaders.Finance and
budget factors impacted Meadow View.The college was forced
to deal with reduced state funding for severalyears, and in
a recent session the state legislature mandatedno raises
for community college employees.The culture of the college
was in transition, from a previously established
authoritative administration to a participatory formof
institutional management.Other institutional leaders at
MVCC had both individual and collective effects.High-level
administrators attempted to undermine the president,
offended faculty and staff in word and deed, andtended to
obstruct transition to participatory management.The Board
of Trustees underwent changes in membership andsome Board217
members tended to micromanage, meddleor impose personal
views and philosophies on establishedinstitutional
processes.
Variable factors were related primarilyto
administrative decisions and actionson a variety of issues.
Despite situational demands of leadershipcontexts, leaders
have choices in what to attend to, what toemphasize or
deemphasize, with whom to interact, how topresent
information, and how to interpret events (Zaleznik&
Matsushita, 1993).Principle issues in this case included,
but were not limited to,(a) hiring, retaining and
dismissing college personnel,(b) handling complaints of
sexual harassment,(c) college reorganization and
administrative pay increases, and (d) alignmentof
philosophies, values, and styles ofmanagement among college
leaders.
Administrative decisions and actionson personnel
issues tended to infuse the leadership crisis.The manner
in which the Dean of Studentswas hired, the handling of
alleged sexual harassment by a faculty member,the non-
renewal of six tenure track faculty members,and pay
increases for select administrators all becamefocal points
in the votes of no confidence.Other variable factors
included responses by the president to thevotes of no
confidence and responses by the Board of Trusteesto the
fact-finding committee's report.218
Identification of fixed and variable factorswas a
useful approach to interpreting events and circumstances
underlying how the leadership crisis may have been avoided.
Another useful approach was to directly ask for the views of
those involved with the leadership crisis context.
Constituent Views on Avoiding the Crisis
Constituent views and descriptions provided a general
mosaic with rich central meanings about the
interrelationships of events and circumstances in the
leadership crisis at Meadow View Community College.To
avoid inferences based on incomplete or insufficient data,
respondents were asked directly if the crisis in leadership
could have been avoided, and if so, how.Respondent views
and suggestions are summarized below.
The Board of Trustees.All members of the Board of
Trustees agreed that the leadership crisis could have been
avoided, or at least kept from reaching its final
proportions, "it didn't need to get to the point it did",
"some sort of resolution could have occurred after one
vote."Board members made the following suggestions for
what the President and the Board could have (or should have)
done differently to avoid or reduce the leadership crisis.
The leadership crisis could have been avoided or reduced by
President Smith:219
1.If he "would have looked inward, been fully
responsible and accountable, and recognized and
admitted mistakes."
2.If he "had handled the [alleged faculty sexual
harassment] issue more swiftly to defuse it."
3.If there was "a difference in administrative style
[and] less retaliating conditions."
4.If there was "early open and honest dialogue with
the Board."
The leadership crisis could have been avoidedor
reduced by the Board of Trustees if they had "done more in
the open, with fewer closed sessions", and if therewere
"earlier intervention to ward off other votes ofno
confidence."
College administrators.The college administrators
(except one) affirmed that the crisis in leadership could
have been avoided:
1.If there had been "congruency between stated values
and observed behavior."
2.If there had not been "simultaneous threats of
budget cuts and pay raises for administrators."
3.If "the Board had not meddled in campus affairs,
i.e., faculty tenure issue."
4.If the President had admitted to "mistakes" and
"questionable reactions, responses and decisions"220
and sought "cooperation, compromise and greater
communication."
The exception held that the leadership crisiswas
inevitable and could not have been avoided, "because ofthe
players involved, the mix of administrators...[Dr. Smith]
shouldn't [have kept] the same administrative staff whoare
still considered untrustworthy."
College faculty.MVCC's faculty firmly believed the
leadership crisis could have been averted.They "were
almost desperate to have everything better."The crisis
could have been avoided:
1.If "Smith had stumbled into a cabinet where people
were grounded in reality and respectful of
procedure"; "he needed the right people under him
making the right decisions."
2.If the administration "had followed proper
procedure and due process and been fair."
3.If "there had been a concerted effort to change",
and "John had said 'we erred', it didn't need to be
AI/ /V
4.If "decisions had been made with appropriate input
and genuine participatory management processes."
5.If "John had listened to all the voices."
College support staff.The support staff also believed
that the leadership crisis could have been avoided.They
suggested:221
1.If leaders had been "honest", "forthright"and
"treated people fairly."
2.If "fact-finding hadn't been laundered."
3.If the Board of Trustees had investigatedthe
situation earlier.
4.If people had been listened to.
Student leadership.The college's student leadership
surmised that the leadership crisis could havebeen avoided
if "people had worked more toward compromise innegotiating
a solution before trust was lost", and if "people had been
more willing to look for solutions and not continueto focus
on the problems."
Tentative Observations and Conclusions
Tentative observations and conclusions forhow the
leadership crisis may have been avoided at MeadowView
Community College were derived, synthesized anddeveloped
from relevant literature, identification of fixedand
variable factors, and aggregated respondent datafrom
constituents.
The observations were related to what thecollege's
collective leadership, i.e., Board of Trustees,President,
and Administrators could have done to avoid theleadership
crisis.Observations tended to cluster around themes
related to administrative style, interpersonal
relationships, congruency between stated and observed222
administrative philosophy and behavior, adherence to college
policies and procedures, and listening to constituents.
Thus, the crisis in leadership at Meadow View Community
College may have been avoided:
1.If college leadership had followed established
policies, procedures and processes, and admitted
and corrected mistakes in a timely fashion.
2.If the president had made sure his administrative
team was comprised of members who shared similar
philosophies, values and a participatory style of
management.
3.If college leadership had listened to and
appropriately responded to the concerns of their
constituents.
The researcher acknowledges that readers of this study
may generate alternative conclusions on how the crisis may
have been avoided based upon individual insights and
professional experiences in similar environments.
Occurrences of unusual or critical events suchas a
crisis in leadership often provide opportunities for those
involved to learn directly from their experiences.Though
the crisis in leadership was often described as "painful"
and "a difficult ordeal," Meadow View Community College
constituents managed to learn from it.Whether or not they
were able to apply what they learned is subject to further
investigation.223
Implications for Practice
This research holds implications for communitycollege
leaders in understanding the complexities ofreal-life
leadership crises and in improving the practiceof
educational leadership.This study focused upon the problem
of what can be learned from a case study ofone community
college enduring a crisis in leadership.
Community college leaders and other readers ofthis
report may derive naturalistic generalizations about the
case study that will become useful extensions of their
personal and professional understandings of leadership
contexts (see Chapter 3).Though the results of this
research cannot be generalized in the statisticalsense,
certain aspects of this study may apply not onlyto Meadow
View Community College's context, but alsoto other
community college settings dependingupon the similarity of
contexts and who is making the judgement.It is left to the
reader to determine exactly what may transfer from thiscase
study investigation to other leadership settings.
Implications for practice, like the conclusions,were
derived from researcher synthesis of relevant literatureand
the descriptive account of the leadership crisis.The
implications for improving the practice of educational
leadership in community colleges centered around(a)
leadership awareness of crisis potential,(b) recognition of224
warning signs, and (c) the need to take early preventive
action.
Many of the leadership implications pertain either to
community college presidents or Boards of Trustees, or both.
Presidents and Boards of Trustees are in unique positions to
influence the practice of educational leadership.They must
rely on each other for information and support that enables
them to perform their respective roles effectively and
prevent leadership crises from occurring (or reoccurring) at
their colleges.
Therefore, as supported by the literature and the
results of this case study, a community college president
and Board of Trustees may be well-advised to:
1.View their institution as a collective enterprise
and balance concern for task and results with
concern forpeople and process(Chait, et al.,
1993; Yukl, 1989).
2Commit to a system of shared values, flexibility,
and multiple frames of reference in viewing
institutional functioning (Birnbaum, 1992a; Bolman
& Deal, 1984).
3.Accept the importance of institutional culture and
symbolism in decisions and actions (Parnell, 1990;
Pfeffer, 1981; Schein, 1992; Tierney,1988).
4.Actively seek input from those directly affected by
decisions and encourage the creation of mechanisms225
to provide such feedback (Birnbaum, 1992a;Chait et
al., 1993; Tierney, 1988).
5.Lead with care and respect (Fisher& Tack, 1990).
Certain aspects of preventinga leadership crisis may
be directly applicable to decisions and actionsof the Board
of Trustees.To prevent a leadership crisis fromoccurring
or reoccurring, Boards of Trustees may be well-advisedto:
1.Adapt to distinctive characteristics ofthe
academic environment and avoid interferingin
campus governance or modifying academic cultureto
fit Board member philosophy and experience(Chait
et al., 1993).
2.Require from the president--integrity,competence,
open and honest communication, adaptability, and
tranquility on campus (Kerr & Gade, 1986).
For community college presidents,a key implication is
that they may eventually find themselves inleadership
contexts which lead to crises.Though a president
occasionally might be tempted to extend his/herlegitimate
power beyond reasonable parameters or to force issues at the
expense of his or her position, the outcome of such
decisions and activities should notcome as a complete
surprise.As chief executive officer, the president is
expected to successfully lead the institution intothe
future.Despite this responsibility many communitycollege
presidents may be constrained by political and cultural226
realities of the institution and environmental and
organizational circumstances that are beyond their control.
On the other hand, community college presidents also have
choices in how to make decisions, who to listen to, what
actions to take, and how to manage meaning for constituents,
and so forth.
What community college presidents choose to do and how
they choose to do it is a function of their interactions
with constituents.To lead effectively, the exemplary
president (Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b) will be in frequent
contact with her/his constituents, especially the faculty.
Part of constituent contact will be to explain and justify
decisions and initiatives and to persuade.But much of the
contact with constituents will be to listen, to hear what
others have to say, to gauge constituent responses to
issues, and to assess the level of leadership support.
Therefore, much of the responsibility for preventinga
leadership crisis rests firmly on the shoulders of the
college president.
As supported by the literature and the results of this
case study, to prevent a leadership crisis from occurring or
reoccurring, a community college president may be well-
advised to:
1.Employ participative leadership and decision making
procedures to foster collaborative goal setting,
bottom-up communication, and trust (Likert, 1961).227
2.Make timely and sensible decisions, keep promises,
and admit and correct mistakes as early as possible
(Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b; Kerr & Gade, 1986).
3.Nourish institutional culture based on mutual
values, mutual trust, and walking the talk (Clark,
1992); and align leadership strategies with the
culture rather than compete with it (Schein, 1985,
1992).
4.Notice that an industrial paradigm of leadership
may no longer be appropriate in contexts where
highly educated people, such as a college faculty,
tend to value and prefer a post-industrial paradigm
type of leadership characterized by collaboration,
common good, client orientation, freedom of
expression, critical dialogue, consensus-oriented
policy-making processes, etc.(Rost, 1991).
5.Synthesize transactional and transformative
leadership to support what currently works and to
restore values and make improvements (Birnbaum,
1992a).
6.Facilitate shared responsibility in organizational
learning (Schein, 1992; Senge, 1990; Wheatley,
1994).
7.Stay within legitimate parameters of position and
power (French & Raven, 1959); honor and work within
established governance structures, accept faculty228
participation in decision-making, and beconcerned
with process (Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b).
8.Listen effectively and be willingto be influenced
(Birnbaum, 1992a, 1992b; Fujita, 1990).
9.Consult broadly enough to permitemergence of
multiple views, remain open to disconfirming
evidence, and actively seek informationabout
constituent perceptions andcampus functioning
(Birnbaum, 1992a; Leinbach, 1993;Vaughan, 1986).
10.Select qualified and able people for
administrative cabinets who shareleadership
values, avoid self-sealing systems ofinteraction
with supportive constituencies,and do not fill
cabinets or councils with yes people(Birnbaum,
1992a; Bogue, 1985; Gardner, 1990;Moore, 1980).
11.Know when to leave (Birnbaum, 1992a,1992b; Kerr &
Gade, 1986).
Given the potential for leadershipcrises to occur in
communitycolleges, recognition of warning signsand
possible preventive measures by presidentsand Boards of
Trustees may serve to reduce or lessen boththe potential
and the occurrence of a leadership crisis.Preventive
measures, however, are not guarantees forsuccess.If
leadership crises in community collegesare to be reduced or
prevented, community college leaders will needto be aware
not only of leadership crisis potential, butthey also will229
need to be familiar with real-lifecase studies of specific
leadership crisis contexts suchas the one that occurred at
Meadow View Community College.Community college leaders
will need to be cognizant of howleadership crises tend to
occur, how they are perceived by those involved, whatcan be
learned from them, and how they might beavoided.Examining
how leadership crises occurred in thepast can be helpful in
trying to prevent leadership crises in thefuture.
Suggestions for Future Research
Further research into specific leadershipcrises at
educational institutions is needed.Given the frequency
with which leadership crises tend tooccur at community
colleges, they are under-researched.Meadow View Community
College was part of one state system of highereducation
that in approximately two yearssaw nearly one-third of its
community colleges in turmoil, upheaval andlooking for new
presidents.
Our knowledge of educational leadershipcan be enhanced
by studying and comparing variouscase studies of leadership
in crisis.Additional case studies would providemore data
for formulating overarching themes andpatterns for
understanding leadership crisis contexts, outcomes,reasons
for presidential departures, and possible methodsof crisis
prevention.Research from several cases also would increase
the potential for hypothesizing and generalizingbeyond this230
particular case study.Interpretations of data from several
cases can provide more information and be more compelling
than the results from a singlecase.By comparing sites or
cases, "one can establish the range of generalizabilityof a
finding or explanation, and at thesame time, pin down the
conditions under which that finding will occur"(Miles &
Huberman, 1984, p. 151).
Additional studies at other institutionsare necessary
also to corroborate the conclusions suggestedby this study.
Though synthesis of this study's findings intoBirnbaum's
(1992a) orientation of presidential modesof leadership
appears to have considerable corroboratorypower, the true
worth of this and other similarcase studies must be tested
and compared through additional researchat other sites.
One of the more practical implications ofmultiple
studies in educational leadership crises isthe possibility
of developing an early warning system.By looking at
studies of past leadership crisis contextsresearchers and
college leaders may learn more not only about howleadership
crises tend to occur, but also about possibleexplanations
for why they occur.With sufficient knowledge gained from
description and explanation of educational leadership
crises, it eventually may be possible to predict,reduce, or
altogether prevent leadership crises from occurring.
To advance research in this area, future studiesshould
look for overall patterns in what characterizesleadership231
crises at educational institutions. How do leadership
crises tend to occur?What are their outcomes?How might
they be averted?
Results from the present case studyalso suggest other
types of research questions.For example, what parts do
boards of trustees, faculty, administrativecouncils, and
presidents play in leadership crisiscontexts?What do
college leaders themselves learn fromtheir experiences?
Are certain patterns of leadershipstrengths and weaknesses
acceptable to constituents while otherpatterns tend to lead
to conflict and crisis?Are there fatal leadership flaws
that tend to override any combination ofleadership
strengths, e.g., a president who isn'ttrusted?Is there a
pattern behind bad luck in community collegeleadership,
i.e., are there wrong places atwrong times?
A particularly promising avenue of futureresearch is
the post-crisis leadership context.That is, what changes
take place at a college aftera leadership crisis and what
effects remain?What's it like being thenew president of a
college that just experienceda crisis in leadership?What
are constituent expectations?What can an incoming
president learn from his/her predecessor?
Birnbaum (1992a) suggested that about twenty-five
percent of college presidencies can be characterizedas
exemplary, twenty-five percent as failed, andfifty percent
somewhere between.Clearly, an investigation of both232
successful and unsuccessful collegepresidencies holds
promise for both the advancement oftheoretical lines of
thought and for implications for practicefor college
presidents, board members and faculty leaders.It remains
to be tested by future researchers, whetherconsistent
patterns of educational leadership crisiscontexts and
outcomes can be discerned, and to what levelresearch
results can be effectively applied to understandingand
averting crises in leadership.233
EPILOGUE
Dr. Smith retired at age 61 from Meadow View Community
College knowing that he had made some positive changes at
the college during his six-year tenure.He continued his
professional activities through future plans for contracted
consulting work and/or teaching at a four-year university.
Three or more lawsuits against MVCC were spawned by
events in the leadership crisis.The lawsuit brought by the
faculty member over unsubstantiated allegations of sexual
harassment and violations of due process was settled out of
court in favor of the faculty member.Other lawsuits such
as those brought by two faculty members who were denied
tenure track renewal were still in process.
In late August, after a delay because of the campus
turmoil, the college's Foundation kicked off its $1.25
million dollar capital campaign to finance a workforce
training facility and obtain matching grant money from Title
III for student scholarships.The campaign ended a success.
The Board of Trustees appointed an interim president of
MVCC who was a retired community college president from the
same state.Because he was an interim, he left decisions of
retaining the administrators who were included in votes of
no confidence to the next new president. As a result, all
of Dr. Smith's administrative team remained at the college,
except for the Associate Dean of Community Development and
College Relations who resigned her position.234
The interim president's primaryresponsibility was to
find the next president of MVCC.He used a customized
search process that included representationand input from
all campus groups.The search committee eventuallyselected
a doctoral candidate (Ph.D.) who was Dean ofInstruction at
an eastern two-year college.In his first presidency, he
was chosen because of his "established styleof
participatory management" and his "strongcommitment to
personal values and professional ethics."The newly
appointed president of MVCC decidedto retain the
administrative team of his predecessor.
Meadow View Community College'sfaculty, staff and
Board of Trustees were pleased abouttheir selection of
their new president, eager forcampus healing and renewal to
begin, and cautiously optimistic aboutthe future.235
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